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Abstract
After finding their tanks outclassed in terms of firepower and armor in 1941, Germany
opted to design and field a tank that could defeat any enemy tank on the battlefield while
remaining nearly impervious to enemy anti-tank rounds. The Tiger I and II were more than
capable of serving in this role, but by the time of their introduction, Germany was on the verge of
fighting a defensive war that would require large numbers of tanks that could rapidly relocate
across a vast front line. The Tiger tank family has been the subject of hundreds, if not thousands,
of publications, but these generally are either detailed technical descriptions of the tanks or its
use in the field.
This research will approach the Tiger from the point of its combat effectiveness on all
fronts in which it was used, its impact on Allied planners, and its effect on German logistics and
production through the latter half of the Second World War. In this context, the Tiger’s ability to
destroy tanks has been relegated largely to the sidelines, as simply destroying an enemy machine
could never have the impact the German High Command had expected. Rather, this research
approaches the Tiger in a defensive role, as a force spread among assaulting German units, and
as a mobile reserve used to contain Soviet and Allied breakthroughs as they occurred.
Using in-depth analysis of memoirs, battle reports, official unit histories from the
Germans and Allies, as well as archival documents, this study proves the Tiger tanks were not
effective in the role for which they were designed, placed a significant strain on an already weak
German logistic system, and encouraged the Soviets and Allies to produced weapons that were
far more lethal against all German vehicles, not just the Tigers.
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Chapter I
Introduction
World War Two was a conflict where mechanized warfare became the epitome of
modern warfare. Today, 80 years since the Tiger's first battle, the tanks remain symbols of
German armored warfare. The Tiger and Tiger II were among the most formidable Germany had
to offer during WWII, and their appearance influenced the development of weaponry capable of
defeating them. Initially conceived in response to superior French armor encountered during
operations in 1940, the Tigers broke with established bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare,
doctrines employed by Germany in the early campaigns. Instead of speed, these tanks were
designed to break prepared enemy fortifications and provide supportive firepower against enemy
armor while on the offensive. However, their true power was found in the defensive, where the
Tigers proved they could help contain the most aggressive Allied offensives.
Colonel-General Heinz Guderian suggested the shift in armored development that led to
the Tiger. Guderian had based many of his theories on the work of others, such as Austrian
theorist General Ludwig von Eimannsberger, British officers Major-General J.F.C. Fuller and
Captain Basil Liddell Hart, and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Soviet Union. 1 In 1937,
Guderian outlined his plan for armored warfare doctrine, which included consolidated

Much of the myth surrounding bewegungskreig, known as blitzkrieg, comes from Guderian's
autobiography, published in English as Panzer Leader, Basil Liddell Hart’s The German Generals Talk, and
Kenneth Macksey’s Guderian. However, during his time assigned to the Inspectorate of Motor Troops from 1922 to
1928, Guderian only published five articles, and none were focused on German armor or armor doctrine. On the
other hand, Ludwig von Eimannsberger had published The Tank War in 1934, and it received a broad audience in
the German military. If credit is due to Guderian, it is for bringing von Eimannsberger's work to the higher circles
where Guderian traveled and popularized the ideas. As T.N. Dupuy wrote, "Guderian was undoubtedly the leader of
the movement toward armor-warfare doctrine, but it is evident there were several other young General Staff officers
with comparable opinions and similar capability. See: James Corum: Hans von Seekt and the German Military
Reform (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1992), 137-143; Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, Der
Kampfwagenkrieg (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1934).
1
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deployment and an emphasis on the breakthrough that envisioned heavy tanks as a battering ram.
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, a former German army officer turned air doctrine reformer,
argued that the heavy tanks would form the core of the breach. Their sole objective was the
destruction of enemy tanks and anti-tank guns and penetrating as deeply as possible while not
losing visual contact with them the subsequent wave of medium tanks and armored infantry. 2
Despite Guderian’s plans to incorporate heavy tanks into offensive plans to destroy
fortifications and anti-tank emplacements, the Heer – the land component of the Wehrmacht –
and its cavalry arm believed tanks should fit into a reconnaissance role. As a result, the heavy
tanks were only theoretical, and even medium Panzer III and IV tanks were not introduced until
1936-1937. During operations in France, the Germans had found their doctrine of
bewegungskreig was tactically sound, but their tanks lacked overwhelming firepower,
particularly against the French SOMUA S35 and Char B1 heavy. This deficiency was mitigated
through well-trained Panzer Divisions, where integrated infantry, artillery, and engineer units
supported tank advances. 3 This was starkly contrasted by British and French doctrine, where
armor was scattered among the infantry divisions, relegating them to an infantry support role
rather than fully exploring their anti-tank capabilities. 4

Albert Kesselring, and others, eds., Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units. MS
#P-06B. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1952), 115.
2

Habeck noted that Guderian argued that future wars, i.e., after World War I, would be focused on
simultaneously bringing the entire depth of an enemy's defense under attack. This was a compromise between those
who viewed tanks as infantry support only and those who believed the tank would win the war on its own. See:
Mary Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939
(Ithaca: NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, 251-252.
3

“Besichtigungsbemerkungen der Kommanierenden Generals des Kommandos der Panzertruppen im Jahre
1937,” (Berlin: Kommando der Panzertruppen, 1937), reprinted in Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won
Normandy (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 129.
4

2

Unlike the Germans, who could muster a large force of tanks at the focal point of the
assault, the French and British dispersed their tanks throughout the infantry divisions. They
envisioned the machines in a role similar to how they had been employed in the First World War
– that of infantry support. After the campaign, some concerns were raised that the Panzer III and
IVs had been inadequately armed and armored, and the 1940 Battle of Arras was one such
indicator of this fact, as the German tanks had been unable to counter the British Matilda’s
effectively. To rectify this issue, the German government ordered Porsche and Henschel to
submit plans for a 45-ton heavy tank by June 1942 – two full years after the French campaign
was over.
During Operation Barbarossa, the Germans were dismayed to discover that the Panzer III
and Panzer IV variants could not adequately engage and destroy the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks.
Henschel designer Erwin Aders remarked, "there was great consternation when it was discovered
that the Soviets tanks were superior to anything available to the Heer.”5 Though heavy tank
designs had been in the research and development phase since 1937, these early versions of the
Durchbruchswagen (breakthrough vehicle) were little more than an enlarged Panzer III, as it
weighed in at 30 tons compared to the Panzer III’s 23 tons. Further, it mounted the same shortbarreled 7.5 cm L/24 cannon as the early Panzer IV variants, a cannon woefully ill-suited to antitank operations.6 Eventually, trial and error led to the submission of the VK 45.01H1, which
carried an 8.8cm L/56 cannon. This design was demonstrated on the occasion of Hitler's birthday

Dr. Erwin Aders quoted in Bob Carruthers, Tigers in Combat (Berkshire, UK: Archive Media Publishing,
Ltd, 2011), 14.
5

6
The Panzer IV was upgraded to a longer, higher velocity cannon in 1941, the 50mm Pak 38 L/60. It could
not penetrate the T-34's sloped armor or the thickness of the KV-1 unless attacking from the flanks or at close range.
This failure necessitated the immediate upgrade to the heavier 7.5 cm Kwk 40 L/46 that would remain on the Panzer
IV and Stug III and IV for the duration of the war. See Hillary Doyle and Tom Jentz, Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausf. G,
H, and J (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 6-7.

3

on 20 April 1942. Hitler accepted the Henschel design and, without delay, ordered the vehicle
designated Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. H into production. The vehicles were rushed into service
while still in the prototype phase, and this rushed production led to several design changes for
the duration of the tank’s service life.
As the war raged on, the Allies developed heavier tanks to counter the threat posed by the
Tiger, creating the need for a larger, more heavily armored vehicle. The German firms Henschel
and Porsche, who had submitted competing designs for the Tiger, had developed a much heavier
tank that mounted the 8.8cm KwK L/71. Henschel won the contract again, and their vehicle was
designated Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf. B, also referred to as the Tiger II. It incorporated the
same powered turret motor as the Tiger I and the same powerplant – a Maybach HL 230 P30 690
horsepower gas engine – as the Tiger I and Panther tanks. Tigers I and II shared an engine by
necessity, as Allied bombing prohibited a new engine from being produced to power the
significantly heavier Tiger II. Thus, the tank was underpowered, slow, and incredibly fuelinefficient, and the strain on the drivetrain created unforeseen seal, gasket, and steering gear
failures which had not been reported in the Tiger I and Panther tanks. Despite these failures, the
Tiger II was reportedly impervious to the Soviet 122mm D-251 cannon, the largest tank gun of
the war, at ranges exceeding 600 meters. 7 This report was contradicted somewhat by later Soviet
testing; though a round may not penetrate, German use of vanadium instead of molybdenum, a
material the Germans desperately lacked, led to spalling on the interior face of the armor plate
and, depending on shot placement, spalling created metal fragments that often damaged the
engine or transmission and rendered the vehicle inoperable and, in many cases, killed German
crewmen. Given the circumstances, inoperability equaled destruction.

7

Igor Zheltov, Iosif Stalin (Tankomaster Special Issue 02, 2002), 33.

4

The total number of Tiger I and II combined was less than three thousand; conversely, the
Soviet Union produced nearly six thousand IS series heavy tanks from 1944-1945 alone. The
Tigers were built in sparse numbers, compared to other German vehicles such as the StuG or
Panther, due to designs that were difficult to manufacture, the lack of streamlined production,
and bomb damage to the sole factory which produced them. Further, where the Americans were
reasonably adept at repairing damaged vehicles and returning them to the front and where the
Soviets could produce new tanks cheaper than they could recover and repair them, Germany
enjoyed neither of these situations with great regularity. The Tigers required extensive daily
maintenance, and even during operations proscribed maintenance checks were required to be
conducted periodically throughout. Further, major field overhauls were exceedingly laborious, an
obstacle that prevented many s.Pz.Abt from joining battle with all their Tigers operational.
Simply stating that the Tigers were poorly designed does not tell the whole story. The
government of the Third Reich inserted the Nazi Party into nearly every aspect of the
procurement process, and political affiliations often trumped actual technical expertise. 8 For
instance, Ford and Opel were manufacturers with considerable experience and technological
ability in areas of mass production and the use of the assembly line. However, these firms were
forbidden from participating in the bidding process. 9 Instead, firms such as Henschel, MAN, and

United States Holocaust Museum, “Gleichschaltung: Coordinating the Nazi State,” Holocaust
Encyclopedia. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/gleichschaltung-coordinating-the-nazi-state.
Accessed on November 26, 2022.
8

Both Ford and Opel, a General Motors subsidiary, have been found to have significantly contributed to
the German war effort until the declaration of war between German and the US in late 1941. Ford claims its
Dearborn headquarters had lost control of its plant in Cologne, as the German government confiscated the factory.
However, Ford appointed a German Board of Directors, renamed German Ford to Ford Werke, and sold stock in that
new corporation preventing the Third Reich from restricting its production due to non-German ownership.
Documents uncovered during recent litigation indicate Ford Werke had dedicated its entire production capacity to
military trucks by 1941. See: Ken Silverstein, "Ford and the Führer," The Nation (January 2000); James Lucas,
World War II through German Eyes (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1987), 114.
9
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Porsche gained the contracts despite limited or no practical experience in mass production.
German tank manufacturing firms were not prepared to produce vehicles in the numbers
Germany would need to fight the coming war, and the manufacturers and designers approached
tank production from the perspective of an artisan, unlike Messerschmitt, who had designed the
ME109 fighter with mass production in mind. German tank designers were undoubtedly capable
of producing models which could be streamlined in the face of increasing material shortages, as
they did with the Panther. Still, the design flaws in the Tiger were never corrected, and vehicle
production remained low.10
Additional factors exacerbated the inherent difficulty in the German tank-building
approach. First, the civilian industries failed to switch to military production until 1943, and then
did not adopt a wartime economy mentality as thoroughly as the Americans did, which produced
a shortage in common consumer goods such as cosmetics and appliances. Secondly, there was
little to no expectation that the large factories producing tanks would have to expand their
production lines to accommodate increased demand. Henschel built Panthers, Tigers, and other
Panzer variants in their Mittelfeld factory, Werk III and Tiger production took place in only
shops three and five. Urban limitations prevented Henschel from building additional production
lines. As the firm also did not possess the machinery required to bend or weld heavy armor
plates, they received hulls and turrets from other facilities that Henschel employees then

In part, German tank production was inhibited by the corporations' belief that their military support
would be brief. As a result, they never prepared for total war and the suspension of civilian production. Further, the
manufacturers failed to anticipate the need to expand production lines, which created a lack of spare parts and
prevented stockpiling of finished products. These deficiencies were partially remedied after Albert Speer became
Reich's Minister of Armaments. See: Mark Healy, Zitadelle: The German Offensive against the Kursk Salient 4-17
July 1943 (Stroud, UK: The History Press Limited, 2010), 135-148; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs
(New York: The McMillan Company, 1970), 244-245.
10
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finished. Thus, Germany not only never had a surplus of spare parts as the Allies did, but their
production could be bottlenecked effectively by strategic bombing.11
Purpose of Research
The Tigers were undoubtedly well-suited to destroying enemy tanks; this was their
primary purpose. However, the war would not be won through tank destruction alone. In order to
have an impact on the war, the Tigers had to maintain a high success rate in the missions they
were given. In many cases, these fell outside the Tiger's established doctrinal role, and they were
forced into a defensive role for which there was no doctrinal guidance.
In many cases, they were sent alone or as a pair, which directly violated General
Guderian's guidance for the employment of heavy tanks. Moreover, the German government had
grand expectations for these tanks. Nevertheless, they consistently deployed them to sectors
inappropriate for heavy tanks, failed to support them with adequate spare parts, and failed to
devise a doctrine tailored for a purely defensive war. Would the Tigers be able to overcome these
obstacles?
The Tiger tanks were generally unsuccessful in their doctrinal role as a breakthrough
tank. Its doctrinal role was as the first wave – the schwerpunktwaffe, or main emphasis weapon –
and it was to close swiftly with the enemy, destroy enemy tanks and artillery, then defeat any
forthcoming counterattacks. Each subsequent wave would have a specific role and well-defined
mission as well. This required concentration and the ability to withstand tremendous punishment.
The Tigers were indeed capable of achieving both, but as the war shifted from ongoing
offensives to a primarily defensive war, they were rarely used in the role they were created for.

11

Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs (New York: The McMillan Company, 1970), 244-245.
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Secondly, the Tiger's most significant impact outside of battle was on Allied planners and
armor research and development. The Tiger's heavy armor drove the Soviets to design and
produce vehicles with increasingly heavier guns with greater armor thickness, and captured
Tigers were thoroughly tested, which allowed the Allies to make changes to their strategic and
tactical plans. At the same time, they provided critical intelligence regarding the most effective
means to disable or defeat the Tiger.
Lastly, the Tiger series were developed as breakthrough tanks meant to serve in an
offensive role, but they were most effective when used in the defense. As Chapter Three will
discuss, from 1943 to the war's end, the Tigers excelled defensive missions when they were in
optimal terrain. This is particularly true of the Eastern Front, where Tigers operating as part of
Army Detachment Narva held up Soviet advances at the Narva bridgehead for six months, and in
the Courland Pocket, where German forces were cut off for nearly a year but continually beat
back all Soviet attempts to crush the pocket. Moreover, in the Italian Campaign, the Tigers
suffered heavily, as Chapter Four will outline, but using the poor terrain to their advantage, they
assisted in holding the mountainous peninsula for 22 months, until the last week of the war.
Additionally, local counterattacks to support the defense of France, such as at Villers-Bocage,
took advantage of command mistakes in the British 7th Armored Division. The tactical victory at
Villers-Bocage allowed Germany to hold Caen – a city Allied planners had expected to control
on 6 June - for two months.12
Additional factors rendered the Tiger less combat-effective than it may have been
otherwise. As noted above, German tank production was not positioned to build tanks rapidly nor
to have surplus parts and major components. These problems were exacerbated by transportation
Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London:
Penguin, 1983), 62-64.
12

8

difficulties, the struggle to adequately supply the heavy tank battalions, and the Allied bombing
campaign that targeted factories that produced vital parts such as engines and transmissions. An
example of these obstacles was the Tiger's width, which required a special narrow track for
transport. To satisfy freight width restriction guidelines, the Tiger had to be transported with its
outmost row of roadwheels on each side removed, a total of sixteen wheels. The tank was then
fitted with 20-inch-wide transport tracks. Once at its destination, the Tiger was refitted with its
roadwheels and combat tracks, which took half an hour to complete per side. This prevented the
Tiger from moving immediately to combat if the situation required. This was partially mitigated
by the practice of transporting the tanks with their combat tracks in place when being moved
about in enemy territory, with the caveat that this practice could not be used if there were narrow
passes or tunnels along the route.13
Combat Performance and Impact
There is little question that the Tigers made an impact on the battlefield. The Tigers were
effective against enemy tanks on all fronts, whereas the British, American, and Soviet armor was
woefully ineffective unless they maneuvered to suicidally close range. There were occasions
when the German confidence in the new tanks led to disastrous results and when it led to
massive success. Albert Speer recalled that Hitler expected the new Tiger I to change the war's
course, as he did with every new technological development. His plan was for the Tigers to break
through the defenses of Leningrad as a monumental debut. Guderian recalled:
Hitler ordered that the Tigers be committed in a quite secondary operation, in a limited
attack carried out… in the swampy forest near Leningrad where heavy tanks could only
move in a single file along the forest tracks, which was exactly where the enemy antitank guns were posted, waiting for them. The results were not only heavy, unnecessary

13

Thomas Anderson, Tiger (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 69–72.

9

casualties but also the loss of secrecy and of the element of surprise for future
operations. 14
The Soviets fired on the side armor of the lead and trail vehicles, disabling them, thus trapping
the tanks; the remaining four were finished off in short order.15
Though the Tiger did not make a remarkable impression on the Soviets initially, it
certainly did when it operated in the terrain it was designed for – the open steppes, where the
88mm cannon could be used to lethal effect. 16 In one such instance, a Tiger from the 2nd Platoon,
13th Panzer Company, 1st SS Panzer Regiment Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler commanded by
Franz Staudegger engaged a group of fifty T-34 tanks on the southern flank of the Battle of
Kursk, near Psyolknee. Expending his Tiger's ammunition, Staudegger and his crew destroyed
twenty-two T-34s and scattered the remainder. Remarkably, this feat was accomplished with a
Tiger that had been left for repairs while the bulk of the fighting was further west. Staudegger
and fellow Tiger commander Rolf Schamp had been left behind with tanks that had damaged
tracks and running gear, but they were able to make hasty repairs which allowed them to defend
against the advance of the Soviet 10th Tank Corps. In the fighting, Staudegger's Tiger was hit by
76mm shells sixty-seven times, and though the damage was extensive, Staudegger's actions
blunted the Soviet advance, and he was awarded the Knight's Cross – the first Tiger crewman to
earn the prestigious award.17
14

Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1952), 280.

15

Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970), 288-289.

Contrary to German production methods, the Soviets opted to keep their tanks easy to build and simple to
repair, and rather than upgrading existing tanks, they expended those in missions they were unlikely to complete
successfully to buy time while more robust models were built. See: Anthony Tucker-Jones, Stalin’s Armour, 19411945: Soviet Tanks at War (Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2021), 8-9.
16

Evan Pinter, “Franz Staudegger – German Tiger Ace in the Battle of Kursk.” War History Online, March
2017. Retrieved from https://www.warhistoryonline.com/guest-bloggers/franz-staudegger-german-tiger-ace-battlekursk.html
17

10

Further evidence for the Tiger's killing abilities was found in an earlier report from 1943,
written by Leutnant Zabel of 3rd Company, 503rd, regarding an attack on a Soviet collective farm
west of Serenikovo. As the 503rd was still composed of both Tiger I and Panzer III, the Tigers
drew to the front to absorb the impact of anti-tank shells. Zabel’s Tiger was hit on the structure,
knocking away the protective tank tracks, on the commander’s cupola, blowing the vision glass
out from its welded position, and on several hatches. One was so warped it later had to be opened
with a pry bar. Zabel’s Tiger was incapacitated when the gun mantlet was stricken, causing the
cannon to be lodged in the recoil position, but the Tiger left battle under its own power. Later,
the crew noted the tank had been hit by two hundred twenty-seven anti-tank rifle rounds,
fourteen 57mm and 45mm anti-tank gun shells, and eleven 76.2mm main gun rounds. The right
suspension was damaged, the road wheels and suspension arms were perforated, and the idler
wheel was wobbling on its mount, but the Tiger drove a further sixty kilometers away from the
battle. 18
After their inability to defeat Soviet tanks with their Panzers during Operation
Barbarossa, the Germans sought to recapture qualitative superiority in armor and firepower. The
Tiger I accomplished this for a time, but to what effect? In the war of extermination in the East,
the number of tanks destroyed by the Tigers made very little difference to a people not only
fighting for their homes and country but for their very right to existence. For example, in a report

This report is substantiated by the firsthand accounts of the authors of the combat history of Battalion
503, including Zabel's death in a Tiger after his promotion to Oberleutnant and assumption of command of 3rd
Company. See: Franz-Wilhelm Lochman, Richard Freiherr von Rosen and Alfred Rubbel, The Combat History of
German Heavy Tank Battalion 503 in World War II (Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2000), 123, and Thomas
Anderson and J. Spencer-Smith, ed., Tiger, vol 1. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 6. The original report written
by Lieutenant Zabel of 2nd Company, s.Pz.Abt 503 can be found in Robin Schaefer, “Panzer VI combat and
operational evaluation,” War History Online (November 2012), https://www.warhistoryonline.com/articles/tigerpanzer-vi-combat-and-operational-evaluation-1-252-hits-taken-in-combat-ww2-by-rob-schafer.html, accessed 12
December 2021.
18
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by Major General Khlopov, it was deemed acceptable that the T-34 would require a complete
engine rebuild somewhere between one hundred and two hundred miles after leaving the factory.
High Command reasoned this was tolerable as it was presumed the tank would be destroyed long
before it reached that point, and as it was cheaper to produce a new tank than repair a destroyed
one, and manpower was considered expendable from the mildest perspective, the Soviets were
more than willing to wage a war of attrition to hold back the Germans.19
From an analytical perspective, the Tiger was a design required by Guderian’s doctrinal
theories, a design rejected as unnecessary based on the expected conduct of the coming war. The
war would be swift, based on maneuver, and heavier vehicles would get in the way – why break
through a fortified position when the faster light and medium tanks could outflank the position,
surround it, and starve it out? This quest for mobility inhibited the evolution of German armor
and made research reactive rather than proactive; where Guderian argued the Panzer III and IV
would be the extent of armor development required by Germany, the Soviets had a more
practical understanding of tank evolution based on their experiences at Lake Khasan and Khalkin
Gol, which led them to develop sloped armor and welded plates such as found on the T-34. 20
From 1938-1941 German tank development stagnated, and only after encounters with
superior Soviet designs did the Germans realize they were producing inferior weapons, though
their experiences against the French and their SOMUA S35 should have indicated a higher
velocity, larger caliber cannon would be required forthwith. 21 It is important to note that, from a

See: United States Army, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen: The T-34 and KV-1 Test. Retrieved from
http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/04/aberdeen-t-34-and-kv-1-test.html.
19

20

Alvin Cox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia 1939 (Berkeley: Stanford University Press, 1990), 998.

Rather than testing their weapons against armor plating roughly equivalent to that of the enemy, the
Chief of the Ordnance office and Inspector of Artillery told Guderian in no uncertain terms that the Wehrmacht had
no interest in producing multiple shell calibers, and as such, the 37mm would be used in armor, as it was the same
21

12

historiographical perspective, the attitude toward German tank development had a generally flat
trajectory: the tanks were upgraded to extend the life of obsolete models, as in the Panzer III and
IV, where the engine and suspension were severely compromised rather than building
replacement variants. They did this for complex reasons. However, as the Germans had built new
armored vehicles on existing chassis, the costs involved with not only replacing the tank but
replacing assault guns, mobile artillery, and mobile anti-tank and -air platforms with new models
entirely was a task Germany was increasingly unlikely to accomplish after 1942. 22
For the Americans, the Tiger’s reputation followed them from Africa to France, as
several works recounting fears of American and British tankers and frustration with their own
equipment are available. These works, such as Robin Neillands’ The Battle of Normandy, 1944
substantiate “mythical” information about the Tiger to a certain extent and refutes information
based on German propaganda, such as exorbitant numbers of kills attributed to Tigers or the
"Tiger-frenzy" that occurred during the Battle of the Bulge, when reports of hundreds of Tiger
II's came to SHAEF, while there were only 45 known to be in the area, belonging to 1ST SS
Division Leibstandarte’s schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501. 23 Additionally, it appears even
American commanders not on the ground transferred attributes of the Tiger to other Panzers.
Omar Bradley wrote, "the American tankers learned that tank-for-tank their Grants and
caliber as the towed AT guns fielded by the infantry and ammunition was plentiful. See, Heinz Guderian, Panzer
Leader (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 27.
This stagnation is discussed more broadly in several works. See: Matthew Cooper, The German Army,
1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (New York: Stein and Day, 1978); Thomas Jentz, Panzer Truppen:
The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's Tank Force, vol. 1, 1933-1945 (Atglen,
PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1996); James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military
Reform (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1992).
22

23
Records indicate the 501st was at full strength based on the tables of organization for a heavy tank
battalion. This included 45 Tiger II tanks broken into three Companies of 14 Tiger IIs each plus three for the
battalion commander, his adjutant, and the signals officer. See: Gregory Walden, Tigers in the Ardennes: The 501st
Heavy SS Tank Battalion in the Battle for the Bulge (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2014), 22-25.
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Shermans were no match for the more heavily armored and better-gunned Panzers.”24 Bradley
recounts information about the Tigers in North Africa, but his inconsistency is telling; at the
battle in question, Kasserine Pass, the Germans were using the Panzer III and Panzer IVD, not
the long-barreled Panzer IV F2. Neither the III nor the IVD could match the firepower of the
Sherman, and there were neither Panzer IV F2s nor a significant amount of Tiger Is at Kasserine.
Thus, the presumption may be made that Bradley attributed the American's sound defeat to the
Tiger when only a handful participated.25
Methodology
The research methodology will be a multifaceted approach, as there are significant
questions raised as a result of deficits in academic knowledge. There is no shortage of
information available about the Tiger I and Tiger II tanks; British wartime reports outlining their
dissection of a Tiger I are easily available, as are recollections of the Tiger series as recounted in
memoirs written by the likes of Albert Speer, Otto Carius, and Heinz Guderian, to name a few.
What is lacking is a detailed analysis of the operational activities of the schwere
Panzerabteilung, both as attached to the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS. Further, through the
duration of the war, there were only fourteen such heavy tank battalions, three of them being
reconstituted and receiving new nomenclature: for example, s.Pz.Abt 502 became schwere
Panzer-Abteilung 511 in January 1945. 26 Of these, only seven have been the topic of published
histories that rely solely on firsthand accounts.
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Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Co. Inc., 1951), 40–41.

Robert Citino noted that the German attack, which included the Battle of Kasserine Pass, was
spearheaded by over two hundred German tanks, but only a dozen Tigers participated. See: Robert Citino, The
Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 91.
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The majority of these units were attached to the Heer – Army: 501 through 511 and the 301st Funklenk.
The 511 was a reconstituted 502nd and thus did not add another new s.Pz.Abt to the count and the 301st was not
equipped with the full complement of Tiger and Panzer III; instead, it was outfitted with demolition carriers. The SS
26

th

14

These questions will require research utilizing both qualitative and quantitative analysis
of information readily available through multiple publishers as well as archival data retrieved
online as well as in-person from the Bundesarchive in Berlin, Germany. This repository contains
extensive information about the Third Reich and, according to the website, houses four hundred
seventeen kilometers of physical data, which has been carefully categorized for research
purposes. Additionally, the Deutsches Panzermuseum Munster in Munster, Germany, and the
Bundeswehr Military History Museum in Dresden, Germany, have recorded firsthand accounts
from Tiger I and II tank crews. The Bovington Tank Museum in Bovington, U.K., has an
operational Tiger I as well as full history since its capture in Tunisia and also has firsthand
accounts of British crews who faced the tanks in North Africa and France. 27
Doctrinal analysis will play a significant role in the research. Prior to World War II,
armies worldwide struggled to determine the future of conflict and how to avoid the trench
warfare of the Western Front. As the Germans had traditionally detested static warfare, they had
a personal stake in regaining the ability to outmaneuver an enemy. Of note in Field Marshal
Albert Kesselring's manual was the purpose of the tanks within this doctrine: they were to be
used for defensive purposes only in exceptional situations. If this were the case, why were heavy

had three s.Pz.Abt: the 501st in 1 SS Panzerkorps, the 502nd in 11 SS Panzerkorps, and the 503rd as part of III SS
Panzerkorps. The abbreviation for the heavy tank battalion changed when it belonged to the Waffen-SS as well; the
Heer forces were designated schwere Panzerabteilung or s.Pz.Abt, whereas the SS designation was schwere SSPanzerabteilung or s.SS-Pa. For simplicity, these designations will be used here as well.
Tiger 131 belonged to the 504th s.Pz.Abt and was captured on 21 April 1943 after three shots from
British 6-pounders wounded the driver and hull gunner and disabled the gun traverse and elevation mechanism.
Tiger 131, still drivable, was abandoned by its crew and recovered by the British 48th Royal Tank Regiment. After it
was taken to Great Britain, it was repaired with captured parts and subjected to trials at the School of Tank
Technology. After trials, it was heavily dissected and rendered inoperable. It was sent to the Tank Museum in
Bovington, UK, in 1951 for display. Tiger 131 was completely disassembled and restored in 1990, and with the
addition of a Maybach HL230 engine borrowed from a Tiger II (its own engine, the Maybach HL210, had been cut
into cross sections for display), the tank became the only fully operational Tiger in the world. A full history of Tiger
131 can be found in Bruce Newsome, The Tiger tank and Allied Intelligence, vol. III: Tiger 131 from Africa to
Europe (Coronado, CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020).
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tanks introduced at a point of the war when Germany was rapidly losing the ability to maintain
its offensive operations? Did Hitler believe these tanks could truly turn the tide, or was it based
on the Clausewitzian "cult of the offensive" that had permeated German doctrine since before the
Franco-Prussian war?
Any thorough analysis of combat data will eventually encounter strong biases among the
Allied forces regarding the number of encounters with Tigers, the number of Tigers destroyed,
and the number of tanks destroyed by Tigers. One source claimed the Tigers formed the bulk of
the armored force at the Battle of the Bulge when there were less than one hundred fifty Tigers
on the Western Front, and those approaching the Ardennes in 1944 played a very limited role. 28
Such unrealistic accounts are also found in Soviet literature and propaganda. Soviet sources
claimed over seven hundred Tigers were destroyed at Kursk, when only one hundred forty-nine
Tigers actually participated. 29 Major Christopher Wilbeck’s thesis, later published as
Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (2004), also
examined the effectiveness of the s.Pz.Abt on both fronts during the same time period, but
focused on major operations such as the Battle of Kursk and the operations in France from 19441945 while also relying heavily on kill: loss ratios, i.e., how many tanks did Tigers destroy
compared to the number of Tigers destroyed, to determine the Tigers’ effectiveness. 30
The weight of kill: loss ratios as a standalone parameter must be heavily discounted.
Steven Zaloga noted in his review of Wilbeck's work that "since the author often lacks tangible

See: Danny S. Parker, “German Tiger Tanks were at the Bulge, but not in the numbers usually cited for
them,” World War II, March 1990, 8. Jean Restayn, Tiger I on the Eastern Front (Paris: Histoire and Collections,
1999), 101.
28
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Jean Restayn, Tiger I on the Eastern Front (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 1999), 101.

Christopher Wilbeck, Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II
(Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2004).
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evidence of the combat performance of the Tigers in roles other than tank-vs.-tank fighting, he
relies on Tiger battalion kill claims against Allied tanks to assess their effectiveness. The author
seems unaware that the Wehrmacht’s own intelligence service on the Eastern Front, Fremde
Heere Ost, regularly discounted German army tank kills by thirty to fifty percent.”31 Kill claims
particularly must be reduced in value due to the proliferation of false accounts which have
spread, according to Dr. Roman Töppel, due to the works of German author Franz Kurowski and
his dramatized accounts and glorification of the Wehrmacht. Of several notable “Panzer aces” –
Michael Wittman, Alfred Rubbel, Otto Carius, and Kurt Knispel – Kurowski mentioned in his
Panzer Aces, Töppel was able to interview Carius and Rubbel, who represented the 502nd
s.Pz.Abt and 503rd s.Pz.Abt respectively. Rubbel denied all of the claims Kurowski made about
the 503rd and Knispel, particularly the one hundred sixty-five tank kills attributed to Kurt
Knispel. Both Carius and Rubbel stated it was not customary practice to count tank kills, and
while some commanders may know an exact tally, those are the exception rather than the rule. 32
To overcome these biases, a thorough analysis of kills is required, both killed by the
Tigers and Tigers killed, and a more comprehensive approach is required that regard the Tiger
from a perspective greater than simple kill: loss ratios. For the purposes of this research, and as a
result of the operational realities, a Tiger rendered inoperable will be considered knocked out, as
Soviet and Allied planners recorded abandoned Tigers as destroyed even if they were not
captured and the Germans potentially would be able to recover them. Operational histories have
significant troves of data, including the names of crew members for a given Tiger, but these
Steven Zaloga, “Review of Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War
II,” The Journal of Military History, vol. 68 no.4 (2004), p. 1283-1284.
31

Roman Töppel, “The War, One Great Adventure: The Writer and ‘Historian’ Franz Kurowski,” (2018)
retrieved from
https://www.academia.edu/37429738/The_War_One_Great_Adventure_The_Writer_and_Historian_Franz_Kurows
ki_2018, accessed 17 January 2022.
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records must be substantiated as thoroughly as possible using the aforementioned archives in
Germany and the U.K. In cases where information has been taken from journals kept during the
war, such as The Combat History of German Tiger Battalion 503 in World War II, data will be
fully cross-referenced for accuracy. The history of the 503rd, for example, was written by
members of the 503rd with contributions from its remaining living members and its last
commander. These accounts cannot be taken at full face value, of course, but they will be
regarded with certain credibility unless proven otherwise. Lastly, as the Tigers had a role in the
last three years of the war, years where fighting was nearly constant, the research will be broken
down in phases; from initial deployment to the Battle of Kursk, from North Africa to the Battle
of the Bulge, from Kursk to the end of the war in the east, and the end of the war in the west.
Statistical assessments will be based on quantitative data such as kills as well as the emphasis
Allied planners placed on the tanks and the level of the response given by said planners.
Historiography
From a historiographical perspective, the Tiger series has been covered by a significant
amount of academic research and military history literature. As a weapon, the Tigers, both most
commonly referred to as Tiger I and Tiger II, were among the most heavily armed and armored
tanks when they were initially deployed in 1942 and 1944, respectively. 33 Yet, for all the
volumes committed to the memory of these tanks, the research has generally fallen into two
categories: the mechanical aspects of the tank and its technical development or as a machine that
was used in spectacular fashion by the men of the Panzerwaffe. The purpose of this research is to

Generally, literature refers to these vehicles by their more common names. This includes primary source
material as well, such as memoirs by Speer, von Mellenthin, and Guderian; as such, I have chosen to do so as well.
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combine both aspects of the Tiger through the lens of mission performance and effects on the
Allies during the course of the war.
Thomas Jentz’s Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat
Employment of Germany’s Tank Force, 1933-1942. This collection draws on primary source
material, including battle reports, personal accounts, maintenance data, replacement figures, and
numerous appendices, which serve to provide a thorough understanding of the composition of
Germany's armored forces in the war while also providing succinct information regarding
technical development and organization of the heavy tank battalions. 34
Another work by Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics, is one of
the more valuable works for this research. This book focuses on the practical application of the
Tigers and presents after-action reports, which the author believed were invaluable in
understanding the true nature of the doctrinal application of the heavy tanks. Jentz's work
provides the theoretical framework but only provides an abbreviated understanding of unit
performance and does not analyze combat effectiveness according to the parameters of this
research.
From the intelligence perspective, Bruce Newsome's four-volume work The Tiger Tank
and Allied Intelligence provides a chronological account of the development of the Tiger, Allied
reports from the first encounters with the Tiger, and information regarding its exact
specifications and capabilities as determined through British testing. This series provided an indepth look at the Tiger throughout its early history, and as it was focused on the experiences of
the Western Allies, it provided significant source material for the campaigns in North Africa.

Thomas Jentz, ed. Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of
Germany’s Tank Force, 1933-1942. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996), 7.
34
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There are several works focused on the operational history as well. Christopher
Lawrence’s Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka is a comprehensive volume that presents archival
data from both the Soviet Union and Germany to analyze the Battle of Kursk through unit
histories rather than memories of those at the battle. Through detailed analysis of reports from
both nations, Lawrence was able to present a battlefield with detailed accuracy. His The Battle of
Prokhorova: The Tank Battle at Kursk provides the same level of accuracy and reliance on
archival records, but as a standalone section of Kursk, this book is more fiscally accessible than
the larger work.
David Glantz and Jonathan House’s The Battle of Kursk also provided an in-depth
account of this battle, and it provided foundational material analyzing Soviet troops' movements
based on German deployments as well as a glimpse at the relationships between Soviet
leadership at the front. This work also relies on Soviet archival data, which allowed Glantz to
present Soviet actions with great accuracy.
Several works focus solely on the Tigers, which were given to the SS units. French
MacLean's Waffen-SS Tiger Crews at Kursk provided not only doctrinal changes made by the SS
but the Tigers in action on the southern flank of the battlefield. His narrative is supported by
German and Soviet archival data as well and is mutually supportive of other secondary sources.
Similarly, Ian Michael Wood's Tigers of the Death’s Head and Wolfgang Schneider’s Das Reich
Tigers and Totenkopf Tigers present the combat histories of two Waffen-SS divisions from 19431945. Schneider relied on combat reports, and firsthand accounts where available to recount the
effectiveness of the Tiger when employed by the Waffen -SS.
While the aforementioned works succinctly outline how the Tiger was built, why it was
built, and the exploits of those for whom it was built, none of these works provides a significant
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amount of information regarding the combat effectiveness of these vehicles both within and
outside the operational constraints German armor doctrine imposed on the deployment of the
Tiger series. Nor do these works analyze the research and development impact the vehicles had
on the conduct of operations on both the Eastern and Western Front, and what, if any, real impact
these vehicles had on the overall war effort beyond being a symptom of German overengineering, exorbitant cost, and resource drain that was typical of the Wunderwaffe which were
expected to provide miraculous victory. It could be considered that the Tigers were less a
weapon than a symbol; they were a physical representation of the military values of Nazi
Germany with the intense focus on the offensive.
As a hypothetical thought experiment, it can be theorized Germany would have been
better off building more StuG III and IV's, or more Panthers, rather than spending upwards of
fifty-four thousand manhours and 250,000 Reichsmarks per Tiger I and three hundred thousand
manhours and 800,000 Reichsmarks per Tiger II.35 Certainly, the engineering prowess needed to
design and build such tanks highlighted the Third Reich's quest for dominance in science and
technological development, and the tanks' overwhelming firepower and armor were suitable for
Dr. Goebbel's propaganda machine, but were these machines worth the sacrifices made in steel,
manhours, and other tangible resources Germany was desperately lacking?
Organization
The dissertation will be organized in generally chronological order, divided into five
chapters plus maps, diagrams, and graphs illustrating certain aspects of the Tiger I and II's

35
These are estimates, though there is more reliable information available for the Tiger I. The most
accurate estimate is The Official Wartime Report on the Tiger I produced by the School of Tank Technology at
Chobham Lane, U.K., and Schiebert's Die Tiger-familie. See: Bruce Newsome ed., PzKw VI Tiger: The Official
Wartime Reports (Coronado, CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020) and H. Schiebert, Die Tiger Familie (Friedberg, West
Germany: Waffen-Arsenal, 1979).
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combat deployments, technical aspects of importance, and comparisons between the Tigers and
their foreign counterparts, such as the IS and KV series and T-34 variants from the Soviet Union,
Churchill, Cromwell, Comet, and Sherman variants from the British Commonwealth, and
Sherman variants and early production M26 Pershings from the U.S.
The first chapter provides the introduction, presents the purpose of research and
arguments, and provides the historical background of the Tiger and heavy tank battalions. The
second chapter will outline the development of the heavy tanks from initial formation,
deployment, combat history, doctrinal organization, and the overall methodology and
historiography from the German, Allied, and Soviet perspectives. This chapter will contain a full
analysis of the evolution of German armor doctrine as well as the integration of the Tiger's
doctrinal role and mission, to include equipment, manning rosters, and tactical disposition within
that doctrine. This chapter contends that the Tiger tank was developed as a result of the fear of
static warfare Germany waged in World War I and argued that the doctrinal role of the Tiger was
based on the 'cult of the offensive' dogma that had permeated German military philosophy.
Chapter three provides an analysis of the Tigers on the Eastern Front from 1942-1945
with emphasis on the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, though smaller engagements will be
included, particularly when those engagements – such as the initial deployment outside
Leningrad – led to Tigers being defeated by the Soviets prior to the introduction of the 85mm D5T cannon found on the SU-85 and the T-34/85 and the 122mm D-25T on the up-gunned IS-85.
This chapter builds on the basic argument that the Tiger tank was not combat-effective in the
offense, lost a significant portion of its tactical flexibility through the removal of the battalion's
medium tanks, and was most effective in defensive operations where a battalion was dispersed,
which allowed for shorter movements and enhanced battalion-level support. It further expands
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the fundamental contention by arguing that the German military command failed to recognize the
tactical superiority of dispersed armor when in a static defensive posture. This method had no
doctrinal support – Guderian demanded concentration – but when it was employed, it proved to
be highly successful.
Chapter four will provide an analysis of the campaign in North Africa and the Western
Front from 1942-1945, with an emphasis on the defensive actions south of Tunis, the Italian
Campaign, and the operations after the Invasion of Normandy. This chapter will discuss British
modifications to the Sherman, such as the Sherman Firefly, which was armed with the Ordnance
QF 17-Pounder. This chapter will present further arguments in favor of the combat
ineffectiveness in the offense while supporting the argument that the tanks were capable in their
defensive role, mainly when dispersed along a front with good infantry and artillery support.
This chapter will also argue that the Tigers could be adequately defended against through the
coordinated use of mines, anti-tank guns, and artillery.
Chapter five will be the assessment and conclusion; the assessment will be based on
several tangible criteria, excluding kill: loss ratios. While kill: loss ratios will be discussed as
relevant and will be broken down by battalion, Tigers not destroyed by enemy action will not be
included in the count; for example, the Panzer Lehr division lost its first five Tiger IIs to
mechanical failure before they could be used in combat; thus, these five, and others, will not be
credited as destroyed by enemy action. Further, this information will not be used as a
determining factor, as there are indications that the data for some battalions is either incomplete
or inaccurate. This section will also discuss certain inherent flaws in both the Tiger I and II
outside the exorbitant costs; these flaws, such as the drivetrain, steering gear, and in the case of
the Tiger II, the seals, gaskets, cooling system, and metallurgical deficiencies due to the lack of
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molybdenum (vanadium served as a replacement material, and was a poor substitute) which
created low malleability that often contributed to the loss of as many tanks, or more significant
numbers of tanks, than enemy actions.
The conclusion will also have a brief comparison with the Panzerkampfwagen V Panther,
a vehicle designated as a medium tank by the Germans that was within the same weight class as
the American M26 Pershing, British Churchill, and Soviet IS-2. The Panther also had more
effective frontal armor, better gun penetration, and was lighter and faster than the Tiger while
also being more fuel efficient and cheaper to produce by nearly half than the Tiger, as the
Panther had been intended to be mass produced. The Germans were able to produce over six
thousand Panthers, even given the scale of Allied bombing, and only hypothetical discussion
could surmise the “what-if” outcomes were Germany to have abandoned Tigers altogether to
focus on the Panther.36
There is little doubt the Tiger I and Tiger II made an impact on the battlefield, but they
were only able to prolong a war that was increasingly unwinnable by 1943. The Tigers relied on
vast resources per battalion, and their fuel consumption and spare parts requirements – not to
mention the fuel for logistic support – strained the supply lines for any organization the
battalions were attached to. Of more significant concern is the failure to modify the original
doctrine to include defensive operations and OKW's refusal to abandon the concentration
principles with which they were enamored.

While the Germans designated the Panther as a medium tank, it outweighed the American M26 and the
British Churchill and was the same weight as the Soviet IS-2, all of which were recognized as heavy tanks. Further,
the Panther had a more effective armor profile in the front, as it had sloped armor, and its cannon is considered one
of the most powerful of the war, and, more importantly, it was designed to be mass-produced. See a comparison of
range data between the Panther and Tiger 1 in Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat
Supremacy. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1995), 127-129; Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks – D.W.
to Tiger I. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2000), 13, 32, 35.
36
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Chapter II
Tradition and Modernization:
The Tiger’s Link to Offensive Doctrine
The German development of armored warfare doctrine is a complicated subject that has
been clouded with more than seventy years of historical inaccuracy and apologetic revisionism.
Many of the post-war memoirs written by German generals and field marshals have been
regarded as unreliable accounts which shift the blame for the conduct – and atrocities – of the
war away from themselves and squarely on Hitler, including F.W. von Mellenthin's Panzer
Battles, Guderian’s Panzer Leader and Achtung! Panzer!, Erich von Manstein’s Lost Victories,
Hans von Luck’s Panzer Commander and Hans-Ulrich Udel’s series of works– Wir
Frontsoldanten zur Weideraufrüstung published in 1951, Stuka Pilot in 1958, and Hans-Ulrich
Rudel: Aufzeichnungen eines Stukafliegers – Mein Kreigstagebuch in 2001 (published in English
nineteen years after his death).37 Rudel is the most curious of these authors, as he was an
unrepentant Nazi. He was also a popular figure in postwar Germany, as he was highly decorated
and continued to serve as a pilot. Rudel claimed twenty-six more tank kills following the
amputation of his right leg in 1945.38

Many historians in the latter quarter of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries such as Robert
Citino, Volker Berghahn, Ronald Smelser, and Edward Davies have described von Mellenthin, Guderian, and von
Manstein’s memoirs – among others – as self-serving books with content that rarely discusses war crimes committed
under their commands that are more concerned with defending the author’s own reputation. See: Robert Citino,
“Forgotten Army, Lost Victories, “ History Net. https://www.historynet.com/forgotten-army-lost-victories/?f.
Accessed November 26, 2022; Volker Berghahn, “Preface,” in Klaus Naumann and Hannes Heer, War of
Extermination (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), xiv; Ronald Smelser and Edward Davies, The Myth of the
Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 97.
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Rudel the sole awardee of the Knight’s Cross with Golden Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds. See:
Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Mein Leben in Krieg und Freiden (Rosenheim, Germany: Deutsche Verlagsgessellschaft, 1994),
11; Walther-Peer Fallgeibel, Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939-1945: Die Inhaber der
höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkreiges aller Wehrmachtteile (Freidberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas, 2000),
35.
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Post-war revisionism led researchers to believe Guderian created German armored
warfare theory with little more than casual input from other Truppenampt officers. 39 Due to the
success of his postwar memoir Panzer Leader, the fallacy of B.F. Liddell Hart’s impact on
Guderian’s theories has permeated histories of the Second World War since Panzer Leader’s
English publication in 1952. In the same way, Guderian's impact on the principles of combined
arms warfare has become overstated.
In The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure, Matthew Cooper
alluded to discrepancies in the English language version of Panzer Leader compared to the
original version in German. In the English version, Guderian credited B.F. Liddell Hart for
specific ideas regarding the use of armored forces, but this passage did not appear in the German
version. Cooper noted this in work mentioned above in 1978, and Guderian's son recalled his
father had praised J.F.C. Fuller for his ideas (which Guderian had chosen not to present to
Truppenampt). However, little has been written to dispel the notion that Hart had contributed
significantly to the defining concepts of bewegungskrieg. 40
Moreover, not only was Hart cited as a source in Panzer Leader, but Guderian entirely
omitted the works of pioneers who did develop tank theories which later were incorporated into
German doctrine. Among these theorists were General der Arteillerie Ludwig Ritter von
Eimannsberger and Oberst Ernst Volckheim. Von Eimannsberger had been Inspector of the
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Heinz Guderian, Achtung! Panzer! (London: Cassell Publishing, 1999).

Blitzkrieg is a term that will not be used here, as it was created by Time magazine in September 1939.
Post WWII, Guderian wrote, “Nach dem anfänglichen Gelingen rascher Schläge zu Beginn des zeiten Weltkrieges
sprachen unsure Gegner daher von ‘Blitzkriegen’” (After the initial success of rapid blows at the beginning of the
Second World War, our opponents spoke about ‘Blitzkrieg.’) Instead, following Dr. Robert Citino’s example and as
the product of significant research the more accurate term bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare, will be used. See,
Robert Citino, The German Way of War (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2005); Heinz Guderian,
Erinnerungen des Soldaten (Motorbuch: Munich, 2001), 418.
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Bundesheer of the First Austrian Republic and was an early pioneer of armored warfare and the
use of combined arms mechanized divisions. Volckheim had served Germany in the First World
War and was one of the few officers with practical experience with tanks in combat. 41
Volckheim was the first to not only predict that medium and heavy tanks would become more
valuable than light tanks in a mechanized war but to emphasize the use of the tank as an anti-tank
weapon. 42 Kenneth Macksey, who wrote extensively on Guderian and the German art of war,
attempted to remove the pervasive 'Hart influence' from modern historiography. Still,
contemporary historians such as Lloyd Clark have provided far more detail regarding von
Eimannsberger and Volckheim than Guderian and provided a more thorough analysis of the
early theories than von Eimannsberger or Volckheim's contemporaries. 43
This chapter will discuss not only the advent of the Tiger but the traditional German 'art
of war' as part of the "cult of the offensive" and its influence on German armor development,
doctrinal shifts, and strategic calculation. It will illustrate how German heavy tank battalions had
greater tactical flexibility when the battalion was equipped with medium tanks in supportive and

After the Anschluss, von Eimannsberger was demoted several ranks, as were all Austrians of high
standing. In 1940 von Eimannsberger was offered a minor role in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Ost as an artillery
staff officer, a role several levels below his capabilities. Von Eimannsberger opted for retirement instead and died in
1945. His most important work, Der Kampfwagenkrieg, was not published until 1934, and his theories were
incorporated without his consult or approval in Guderian's Achtung! Panzer! in 1937.
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James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1992), 126-130.
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Ludwig von Eimannsberger and his fellow theorists are mentioned in more recent material and older
German-language publications. See, Rudolf Kiszling, Eimannsberger, Ludwig von in Neue Österreichische
Biographie ab 1815, Große Österreicher (Amalthea: Vienna, 1963), 171-175; and Wolfgang Sagmeister, General
der Artillerie Ing. Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger: Theoretiker und Verwendung von gepanzerten Großverbäden
im Kampf der verbundenen Waffen (unpublished dissertation: University of Vienna, 2006). See also: Lloyd Clark,
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Press of Kansas, 1992).
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reconnaissance roles and how much of this flexibility was lost once the battalions were equipped
with only Tigers.
When considering the bewegungskrieg doctrine holistically, there was a distinct need for
a heavy tank in the breakthrough role. The Luftwaffe had assumed this role during the relatively
limited campaigns in France and Poland. Still, as the war dragged on and production shortfalls
increased, the German military recognized they had neither produced a tank capable of breaking
through defensive positions nor one which could engage and destroy the enemy effectively.
However, rather than a proactive creation, the Tiger was a reactive vehicle built for offensives
when Germany was rapidly losing the ability to wage offensive war.
Development of Bewegungskrieg
No part of the interwar Reichswehr has been the subject of misconception and
misdirection as much as the development of a coherent tactical and strategic doctrine; moreover,
it is unfortunate that historians from the 1950s to the 1970s chose to take memoirs at face value
rather than viewing the German perspectives within the context of the period as a whole.
Historians from the last quarter of the twentieth century have attempted to correct these
misconceptions without the benefit of being able to "cross-examine" the participants and
reconcile their statements with information recorded in manuscripts, memoranda, and official
government and military orders and, for the most part, have been successful. However, some
pervasive myths remain.
First, Guderian is generally credited as the sole creator of the Panzerwaffe and
bewegungskrieg; second, Guderian faced strong resistance from the “old guard” in the High
Command and Truppenampt; third, German armor doctrine was a development taken directly
from British theorists. As in many myths, there is a measure of truth. Guderian was vital to the
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creation of the Panzerwaffe. There were a number of traditionally trained and educated officers
of high rank in the Reichswehr, but it is not unusual to find senior officers of advanced age in
command of any major nation's military, and a number of influences shaped the destiny of
German armor and doctrine.44 Intriguingly, all of these popular misconceptions not only
surrounded Guderian but were created by his hubris. 45
Had Guderian never written a single page about himself, he would likely have been
remembered as a successful general, intelligent strategist, pioneering tactician, and innovator
who helped develop the first panzer divisions. However, Guderian was not a modest man. By his
own account, he was the central figure in German armor development during the interwar period,
a position supported by his biographer Kenneth Macksey. In Guderian, Panzer General,
Macksey wrote:
As he [Guderian] read more deeply into his subject, there began to appear profound
conclusions drawn from his study of ancient and contemporary history. This led to the
pursuit of a pastime that used to absorb the old Prussian General Staff - prodigious
writing in military journals. Encouraged by General von Altrock, the Editor of the Militär
Wochenblatt, he composed articles that crystallized his thoughts and his style and, at the
same time, won him a reputation for clear exposition on controversial matters of
immediate interest in the contemporary debate surrounding the reasons for Germany
losing the last war. Nevertheless, it also won him enemies, for at this early stage the tank
enthusiasts proposed converting the cavalry to mechanized divisions. 46
The 'prodigious writing' Macksey described was little more than five articles in the Militär
Wochenblatt, and these articles were brief, basic reflections of standard tactics. 47 Guderian's first
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significant work was the derivative Achtung! Panzer!, which had become popular in the inner
circles of the Wehrmacht. Guderian’s self-aggrandization was not in full effect until the post-war
memoir Panzer Leader, as his account of German armor doctrine and development omitted all
other contributions except his own. 48 Von Eimannsberger was not mentioned in this work, and
Volckheim received only a brief mention as a contributor. Guderian also entirely omits the
officers who trained at the Kazan Tank School in the Soviet Union. This account is contrasted
with General Walther Nehring's The History of the German Panzer Corps, which was a carefully
researched, well-written, and thoroughly detailed account of the work of the German officers
who contributed to the development of German armor and armor doctrine. 49
The general foundation for bewegungskrieg was created by several offices and sources.
First, the efforts of the Truppenampt, particularly the tank and vehicle designs produced by the
Weapons Office; second, the theoretical work of Volckheim, von Eimannsberger, and J.F.C.
Fuller; third, the lessons learned at the Kazan Tank School; lastly, Hans von Seekt’s maneuver
warfare doctrine that emphasized combined arms tactics. Guderian’s role was important, but he
was by no means irreplaceable. As historian and military strategist Col. Trevor DuPuy wrote in A
Genius for War, “Guderian was undoubtedly the leader of the movement toward armor-warfare

Several works dispute most of Guderian’s claims regarding bewegungskrieg. Some recent histories
indicate that B.H. Liddell-Hart approached Guderian while he was in British captivity under the guise of an
interview. He asked Guderian to say he had based his theories on Liddell-Hart's theories, and Guderian obliged.
Liddell-Hart then, in turn, supported the idea of West German rearmament. See: Pier Battistelli, Heinz Guderian:
Leadership, Strategy, Conflict (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 5, 13, 53; Alaric Seale, “A Very Special
Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals, and the Debate on West German Rearmament,” War in
History vol. 5, no. 3 (1998), 327-357. Shimon Naveh, former head of Israeli Defense Forces Operational Theory
Research Institute, argued that Liddell Hart, not Guderian created 'blitzkrieg' "by imposing his perceptions of mobile
warfare upon the shallow concept of blitzkrieg, he created a theoretical imbroglio that has taken 40 years to
unravel." See: Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London:
Francass, 1997), 108-109.
48

49

1977).

Walther Nehring, Die Geschichte der Deutschen Panzerwaffe 1916 bis 1945 (Berlin: Propläen Verlag,

30

doctrine, but it is evident there were several other young General Staff officers with comparable
opinions and similar capability, who could readily have provided the leadership in his stead.”50
Similarly, Guderian created the idea that he and other officers inclined toward tank
warfare faced considerable resistance from the military establishment. Guderian had a fanatical
personality and was one of the rare General Staff Officers who embraced National Socialism. It
was almost the norm to witness Guderian consider any disagreement with his ideas – even the
lack of enthusiasm for the same – as being common to the reactionary ideas of older officers. He
reserved his most scathing remarks for General Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff from
1935-1938, who Guderian described as hostile to theories of modern warfare. 51 Guderian
believed Beck had "no understanding of technical matters…since he inevitably chose men with
much of his attitude to fill the more important General Staff posts, and even more so to form his
close circle, as time went on, he erected – without wishing to do so – a barrier of reaction at the
very center of the army which was to prove very difficult to overcome." Guderian argued that
Beck's unwillingness to allow the armored elements to serve as independent elements was
contrary to the vision Guderian – through the work of others – held for the Panzerwaffe.
Guderian believed Beck wished for the armor to remain little more than support for the infantry
and would approve no tank unit more significant than a brigade-sized element. Guderian wrote:
I had to win a long drawn-out fight with General Beck before he would agree to set up
the Panzer Divisions and publish the training manuals for armored troops. Finally, he
went as far as to agree to the establishment of two Panzer Divisions, while I was already
insisting on three. I described the advantages of these new formations to him in the most
glowing terms…he replied: 'No, no, I do not want to have anything to do with you
people. You move too fast for me.' When I maintained that, thanks to the recent
50
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developments of wireless, command could still be maintained despite great speed of
advance, he did not believe me.52
Guderian believed Beck was no more than a paralyzing element that prevented the Army from
developing as Guderian thought it should. Guderian's proof of this was Beck's advocation for
'delaying defense,' a method of fighting which had become the principle of the post-Versailles
German Army.
This was a most unfair and inaccurate depiction of Ludwig Beck, an intelligent and
thoughtful General who had drafted Army Regulation 300 in 1933, the foundational tactical
manual of the German Army that remained relevant doctrinally through World War II. Beck had
flirted with National Socialism in the early 1930’s and had described it as a positive force in
German life. 53 Further, the 'delaying defense' which so angered Guderian had been in place since
1922, long before Beck held the post of Chief of the General Staff.54 Beck believed that, until
Germany was adequately rearmed, this was the best means to resist Germany’s numerically
superior foes.
Though Beck often agreed with many of Hitler’s policies, such as the Remilitarization of
the Rhineland and was an advocate of heavy defense spending and a series of limited wars to
establish Germany’s sphere of influence in central Europe, he disagreed with any plans to wage
offensive wars until Germany was completely rearmed. 55 Beck disagreed with plans to subjugate
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Czechoslovakia by force in 1938– not on moral grounds, but rather as he believed such a war
could not begin until at least 1940 – and his disillusionment with Hitler grew as Beck discovered
such plans were not those of other senior military leaders, as Beck had believed, but rather they
were Hitler’s, and the military was becoming increasingly subjugated because those other senior
generals refused to stand up to the Führer. 56 This disillusionment grew during the remainder of
Beck’s military career, and after his forced retirement in 1938 he became a leading figure in the
resistance movement which sought to oust Hitler, which culminated in the July 20 Bomb Plot of
1944. 57
The image of the innovative genius struggling against an unimaginative traditionalist has
been appealing to military historians, but this image is not reflective of the struggles of German
military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s. This scenario reflects the struggles faced in the U.S.,
UK, and France by Martel, Fuller, Hart, and Eisenhower. During this time, Guderian's career was
ascendant; he was appointed to the command of 2nd Panzer Division in 1935 as a colonel when
the other two divisional commanders were generals. 58 He was promoted to major general in
August 1936. His mentor and superior at the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops, Oswald Lutz, for
whom Guderian had worked since 1931, encouraged Guderian to write Achtung! Panzer! as a
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polemical treatise that inspired strategic mechanized warfare and could promote Mobile Troops
Command.
In contrast, Dwight Eisenhower was reprimanded by the Branch Chief of the U.S. Army
infantry and threatened with court-martial if he continued to advocate for stronger tanks forces
within the infantry divisions and published documents recommending the same. 59 Thus, while
others struggled against the status quo, Guderian’s complaints against “very vocal opposition” to
armored units were all made at the same time Beck had ordered the creation of additional Panzer
battalions at the cost of twelve anti-tank battalions, the inclusion of armor in infantry formations
as an offensive weapon rather than a support weapon, and for additional Panzer brigades as a
complement to the existing Panzer divisions as a means to bridge the limitations of a rapid
expansion. 60 As James Corum wrote, “There is no German parallel to Dwight Eisenhower’s
experience.” 61
Lastly, the third myth was that German doctrine was 'borrowed' from British theorists,
particularly from B.H. Liddell Hart. This myth seems to originate from the English version of
Panzer Leader, where Guderian thanked Hart for suggestions for the further development of
German armored warfare, an idea exacerbated by Macksey’s introduction to the 1996 edition;
this passage appears in none of the German editions. 62 John Mearsheimer wrote, "(I) believe
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Liddell Hart revised the historical record to enhance his claims of having invented the blitzkrieg,
a claim Hart desperately wanted to be true, and which has become regarded as so." 63
Despite his wishes, there is little evidence to suggest that, if German theorists were aware
of Hart's work in the 1920s, they incorporated these theories into their own maneuver warfare
theories. Hart was not cited as a source in Achtung! Panzer! nor was he mentioned in the work of
von Eimannsberger or Volckheim. Hart's articles were often published in Militär Wochenblatt,
but this journal was like many others of the time and of the modern era – it was a cornucopia of
authors who published on several topics which was published based on reception rather than a
larger topical perspective. The theorists in Germany and Austria had already developed the
foundational basis for their theories, and while Hart's limited exposure in Germany may have
influenced Guderian to an extent, as Guderian's theories were derivative of other German
approaches, this should not lead to the assumption of Hart's early influence. 64
The position of the German Army at this point was firmly rooted in the twentieth century,
but its strategic direction was rooted in its Imperial past. This link was strong enough to survive
the humiliation of Versailles and its subsequent neutering. The German Army placed great
emphasis on decisive maneuver and encirclement, as taught by von Moltke the Elder and von
Schlieffen.65 Von Moltke believed new armaments produced during the Industrial Revolution,
63
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such as the breech-loading rifle, had made defensive firepower the predominant force on the
battlefield, and to this end, he theorized:
It is absolutely beyond any doubt that the man who shoots without stirring has all the
advantage of him who fires while advancing…and that, if to the most spirited dash one
opposes a quiet steadfastness, it is fire effect, nowadays so powerful, which will
determine the issue. Little success can be expected from a mere frontal attack, but very
likely a great deal of loss. We must therefore turn towards the flanks of the enemy’s
position. 66
Von Moltke regarded turning the enemy flanks as an opportunity not to be disregarded. He
believed advantages in logistics and communications could be negated if the Germans attacked
before supply and communication lines were established. He also found that the idea of rapid
mobilization could be used to counter the Alliance system that gripped Europe. Von Moltke
believed it was possible to mass an army at one front, achieve a decisive victory, and redeploy
that force to a second front where a further decisive victory could be achieved. 67
Von Moltke believed innovation, calculation, and audacity were the epitome of the art of
war and thus refused to allow his principles to be codified into rigid doctrine. He believed each
new conflict was a learning experience, and those difficult lessons should be applied to combat
with utmost expediency. “Strategy is a system,” he wrote, “of ad hoc expedients; it is more than
knowledge, it is the application of knowledge to practical life, the development of the original
idea in accordance with continually changing circumstances. It is the art of action, under the
pressure of the most difficult conditions.”68
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General Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff from 1891-1905, held no such
reservations and organized von Moltke's principles as German doctrine. Von Schlieffen rejected
the concept of attrition and instead created Vernichttungsgedanke, the concept of annihilation.
He believed decisive maneuver led to the destruction of the enemy through swift, coordinated
attacks in the flanks and rear, and these attacks would lead to confusion and disarray amongst the
enemy. 69 Victory would be earned through strategic and tactical surprise, overwhelming force at
the decisive point, and swift encirclements which enveloped a massive portion of the enemy
forces. Within the Kesselschlachten – cauldron battles – Germany could kill or capture an enemy
cut off from retreat or resupply. In his manuals, von Schlieffen wrote:
How is the enemy’s wing to be encircled? Not with one or two corps, but with one or two
armies, and the march of these armies should be directed against the enemy’s line of
retreat…This leads immediately…to disorder and confusion which given an opportunity
for a battle with an inverted front, a battle of annihilation, a battle with an obstacle in the
rear of the enemy.70
The Germans had created the precedent of finding victory on the flanks in earlier wars long
before Guderian was born. Bewegungskrieg could just have easily described the campaigns from
1850-1914 as they did those from 1939-1941. The fight against Austria-Hungary in 1866 lasted a
mere seven weeks; the Franco-Prussian War took barely six. In the Battle of Sadowa in 1866,
Prussian artillery was ineffective, which forced the Germans to send cavalry and infantry into
unbroken Austrian lines.71 Improvements in tactical and strategic deployments of artillery and
cavalry made a brutal example of Sedan in 1870, where Napoleon III was captured alongside
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104,000 men, which was the largest force taken captive in modern warfare at that time. In 1914,
facing a two-front war, Germany revived von Moltke the Elder's theories and modified the 1905
Schlieffen Plan, which expected to turn the French flank in a few weeks by cutting through
Belgium. Once France was taken care of, Germany redeployed its forces to deal with Russia. The
Russian Army, ponderous and elephantine, would not be fully mobilized, a situation Germany
expected to capitalize upon. As audacious as this plan was, it was nearly successful. The
Germans managed to advance to within thirty miles of Paris in six weeks, but tactical errors by
German commanders and the physical and logistical exhaustion of both the soldiers and supplies
allowed the Allies to halt the Germans at the Marne. This halt, the reasons for it, and the distance
the German forces were halted from the enemy capital foreshadowed the advance during
Barbarossa in 1941. 72
After the First World War, the Germans closely examined their defeat, and they realized
the military and its commanders had failed to realize two fundamental truths. First, Germany
despised wars of attrition. The nature of static warfare negated advantages in maneuver warfare
which Germany had carefully groomed, and the high attrition rate meant the Army with more
manpower – not better training or superior tactics – would inevitably be victorious. Secondly,
Germany failed to remember von Moltke's teachings, notably that contemporary inventions
revolutionized warfare and offered possibilities for not only bolstering national strategy but
recreating its very existence. The German military experienced something akin to an identity
crisis after the war, as they had to determine if their principles were indeed sound. Had maneuver
warfare been rendered obsolete when opposed by fortifications and artillery? Was a more
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cautious approach, with a vast front and no easily penetrable flank, more advantageous, as was
the French position? Moreover, would any of these changes be palatable to the military?73
Most remaining German officers were willing to support existing doctrines, and they
believed their experiences in World War I proved a greater need for mobility, not the need to
remove it. Von Seekt wrote, "In brief, the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the
employment of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality and rendered distinctly more
effective by the addition of aircraft and in the simultaneous mobilization of the whole force,
either to feed the attack or for defense." Moreover, German innovations during the war proved
that the principles of maneuver warfare, such as speed and flexibility, were not obsolete. In 1918,
storm troops carried out infiltration missions designed to create deep penetrations in the enemy
lines after an artillery bombardment softened up the defense. By attacking the headquarters
elements, supply lines, and communications, the infiltrators created panic among the enemy.
This penetration at the Schwerpunkt – focal point – set the conditions for innovation within the
existing doctrines.
The development of tracked vehicles post-WWI and their use as part of the “infiltration”
doctrine produced the concept of combined arms warfare. J.F.C. Fuller drew the correlation
between tank vs. tank warfare and hand-to-hand combat between individual soldiers in his Plan
1919. He theorized:
The fighting power of an army lies in its organization, which can be destroyed either by
wearing it down or by rendering it inoperative. The first comprises killing, wounding, and
capturing the enemy soldiers – body warfare; the second in rendering inoperative his
power of command – brain warfare; to take a single man as an example, the first method
may be compared with a succession of wounds which will eventually result in his
bleeding to death; the second – a shot through the brain. The brains of an entire army are
its Staff – Army, Corps, and Divisional Headquarters. As our present theory should be to
destroy command, not after the enemy's personnel has been disorganized but before it has
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been attacked so that it may be found in a state of disorganization when attacked. The
means proposed were a sudden eruption of squadrons of fast-moving tanks, which
unheralded would proceed to the various enemy headquarters, and either round them or
scatter them. Only after these operations had been given time to mature was the enemy's
front to be attacked in the usual way, and directly, penetration was affected, and pursuit
was to follow.74
It has been well-established that Heinz Guderian cannot be given sole credit for the innovations
which led to German armored doctrines but rather should be regarded as an influential figure
who popularized work that predated his own. This influence, when taken within the context of
historical fact, cannot be overstated. General Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th
Panzer Army which assaulted Bastogne and recipient of the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves,
Swords, and Diamonds – one of only twenty-seven such recipients – wrote after the war that:
Guderian favored from the beginning the strategic use of panzer forces – a deep thrust
into the enemy – without worrying about a possible threat to his own unprotected and farextended flanks…It was Guderian – and at first, he alone – who introduced the tank to
the Army and its use as an operative weapon. 75
The combination of existing doctrine, the infiltration tactics of the sturmtruppen, and the
integration of tracked vehicles required certain modifications to Vernichttungsgedanke. It would
have been difficult for Guderian to convince the General Staff to depart from this concept, as it
was instilled in General Staff officers. However, under the "supervision" of General Oswald
Lutz, certain aspects were changed. Vernichttungsgedanke emphasized a centralized command
structure and highly organized, well-coordinated encirclements with heavily guarded flanks. This
served the dual purpose of defeating the enemy while protecting against a breakout or relief
attempt.
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This rigid structure was replaced by unpredictability and rapid - almost headlong –
attacks which were designed to induce panic by compromising the enemy command structure by
destroying headquarters elements. One key aspect of this model was initiative. German
commanders were expected to understand the parameters for the offensive on a strategic level
and, in the absence of orders, work within that framework to accomplish tactical and strategic
goals in a practice known as Auftragstaktik – mission-based tactics – rather than more rigid
order-based tactics. 76 As brigade and battalion level commanders understood Oberkommando
des Heeres and Oberkommando der Wehrmacht’s intent (OKH and OKW, respectively),
intelligent decisions regarding a rapidly changing battlefield could be made by the commander
on the ground, rather than having to wait for follow-on orders from higher headquarters.
The armored concepts were relatively straightforward, and maintaining the initiative was
paramount for the German Army. Operational planning – Schwerpunktbildung – determined
where the focal point – the Schwerpunkt – of an offensive would most likely be successful. Once
the Schwerpunkt was determined, all available forces were concentrated in the vicinity
(Schwerpunktprinzip, or concentration principle), even at the cost of reducing strength in other
sectors. This concentration of manpower and equipment created local numerical superiority, and
thus an offensive could create a breach in the defensive lines through a coordinated effort by
tanks, Panzergrenadiers (mechanized infantry), artillery, and close air support.
It was crucial that the forces assaulting the Schwerpunkt did not allow themselves to
become decisively engaged, regardless of the defensive rate of fire. Were the assaulting elements
to become bogged down, they would become a cork in the bottleneck, they would be destroyed,
and the following elements would have neither the element of surprise nor the benefit of a
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confused and broken defense. Once the forces dedicated to the Schwerpunkt had cleared the
breach, the gap was widened, and the initial objectives were assaulted. Upon completion of the
initial objectives, commanders were encouraged to exercise initiative in locating follow-on
objectives that were in keeping with the commanders’ intent. This most often helped build the
Kesselschlacht so German forces could wear the enemy down from all sides. 77
Guderian outlined his tank development, operational development, and organizational
doctrine in Achtung! Panzer!, and though the majority of the book centered on technical details –
armor thickness, attacks using fire and maneuver, cannon size – he argued for the concentration
of tanks into divisions rather than scattering the tanks piecemeal throughout the infantry
divisions. His argument was based on two hypothetical nations, Red and Blue, who both have
armored forces and have gone to war. Red's doctrine dictated that tanks were spread throughout
the infantry formations, much as Great Britain and France had done. Blue chose to consolidate
its armor into armor divisions, which would work in concert with the infantry and other
supporting elements such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions. In this hypothetical conflict,
Guderian limited the front to three hundred miles, and of these one hundred miles cannot be
traversed by armored vehicles, one hundred miles is difficult terrain, and one hundred miles is
optimal terrain for an armored advance. Guderian hypothesized:
Red has deployed a sizeable proportion of its divisions, along with their tank
components, opposite the Blue positions in country where tanks cannot operate and are
therefore useless; a further portion have been deployed in difficult tank country where,
though not entirely wasted, their chances of successful action are small. Whatever
happens, only a fraction of Red's tank forces can be employed in the country for which
they are suited. Blue, on the other hand, has collected all its armor in the one place where
a decision can be reached and where the ground can be made use of; he therefore has the
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opportunity of going into the battle with at least double his adversary's tank strength
while assuming the defensive along the rest of the front against Red's very small-scale
tank attacks. We conclude that the suggestion that our tanks be divided among Infantry
Divisions is nothing but a return to the English tactics of 1916-17, which were even then
a failure, for the English tanks were not successful until they were used in mass at
Cambrai. 78
The armored idea hinged on the concept that the offensive force would set the pace for the
campaign unrestrained by the bulk of the field army, which would be used to destroy isolated
pockets of resistance, serve as security in occupied territory, and seize provisions and equipment.
As with any doctrine, there are limitations that must be either accounted for or removed as
efficiently as possible; the German armored warfare theories had several. Tanks required terrain
suitable for their employment if they were to be able to satisfy their objectives. In difficult terrain
where swift advances were not possible, armor could not adequately support the advance of the
field army, or rather the armor could not undermine the enemy's will to resist. The lack of heavy
support forced the infantry to assault defensive positions, thus slowing the advance. Further,
inclement conditions such as hills, marshes, and urban areas were likely to lead to failure, but
these geographic obstacles are not to be considered in the same category as impassable terrain, as
terrain disadvantages can be overcome through the use of speed and surprise, as in the Ardennes
in 1940. 79
The logistic situation was another concern for the German Army. Mobile operations are
only effective when provided adequate logistic support. In the early campaigns, rapid advances
often left the supply trains behind, as they were not, nor were they at any point in the war, fully
mechanized. The overextended supply lines were a problem that could have led to dire
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consequences had the campaigns been more prolonged, and most certainly did once the Germans
were engaged with the Soviet Union, a nation with the land resources to trade space for time. In
1940, all that stood between Trier, on the Luxembourg border, and Paris was 260 miles. In the
Soviet Union, it was 1100 miles from Berlin to Leningrad and 1800 miles from Berlin to
Stalingrad, and for every mile supplies were shipped, they were vulnerable to partisan
harassment. This not only increased shortages of fuel but the lack of replacement parts as well.
This led to a reduction in combat readiness against an enemy that was equipped with
technologically inferior but far more practical vehicles. 80
Lastly, it was found that the German offensives were vulnerable if the enemy had the
ability to withstand the assault at the Schwerpunkt and could maintain cohesion while the
Germans were in the command-and-control areas. Bewegungskrieg dictated the requirement for
local numerical superiority, even at the expense of the other regions along the front. If the enemy
was able to organize a tactical withdrawal to a more tenable defensive position, the Germans did
not have the reserves to continue widening the breach in the enemy lines, or there was
insufficient artillery support at the 'shoulders'- the flanks of the breakthrough – to decisively
engage an enemy counterattack, the Germans would be vulnerable to becoming surrounded
themselves. One such failure occurred in the Ardennes when Kampfgruppe Peiper of the 1st SS
Panzer Division Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler was repeatedly probed by portions of the French
4th Armored Division and the British 1st Army Tank Brigade and hindered by Maxime
Weygand’s “hedgehog” defense, a tactic using defense in depth in multiple reinforced positions,
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a defense which became a standard response to German breakthroughs on the Eastern Front
under the Soviet doctrine deep operation doctrine.81
Bewegungskrieg was a combination of new and old methodology refreshed by the
infusion of innovative technology. The principles created by von Moltke and von Schlieffen
were improved by the use of modern weaponry, speed, and violence of action. However,
Vernichttungsgedanke’s emphasis on precise maneuvers was casually ignored by Guderian, who
believed wild unpredictability would keep the enemy off balance. This rationale worked well in
Poland and France, where there was a limited amount of space for the defender to maneuver and
where withdrawal to a more advantageous position was a luxury the Allies would not have for an
extended period. It would not be a feasible plan in a prolonged campaign, and by 1941 several
factors led the Germans to make further innovations.
Durchbruchswagen to Panzer VI: Development of the Heavy Tank
By the 1930s, the Germans had secretly managed to develop prototype light and medium
tanks. These tanks, which eventually led to Panzerkampfwagen I through IV, were moderately
armored, fairly dependable, and modestly armed. The previously discussed armor doctrine was
still under development, which led to the Panzer III and IV having some growing pains as their
roles had not yet coalesced into a coherent form and were generally modeled as a main battle
tank (Panzer III) and as a support tank (Panzer IV). 82
The 1939 Panzer IV was the most versatile and well-designed of the first four models of
German tanks. Its suspension was extraordinary, it was well-suited to accepting larger caliber
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cannons, and the electrically powered turret rotated swiftly and smoothly, allowing German
gunners first-shot capability. As it was initially deemed a "battalion commanders' vehicle," the
Panzer IV was armed with a short 75mm howitzer. This cannon was capable of firing high
explosive and smoke shells and became considered a formidable opponent during the early
campaigns when an HE shell could do considerable damage to an enemy tank. However, the
Panzer IV was not intended to serve as a heavy tank, and Operation Barbarossa exposed the
strategic flaws in German armor development. 83
In his memoir, Major General F.W. von Mellenthin recalled the eastern offensives in
1941 as reminiscent of Jomini’s opinion of Napoleon’s Russian excursion: “Russia is a country
which is easy to get into, but very difficult to get out of.”84 The first weeks of the German
invasion of Russia appeared very easy indeed: the Luftwaffe had overwhelmed the Red Air
Force, and there were advances along the entirety of the front. Some of Hitler’s decisions were
questionable, such as the abandonment of Moscow in favor of the conquest of Ukraine. This
would have perhaps yielded better results had the Schwerpunkt been as ruthlessly pursued as the
doctrine described. However, Moscow could not be taken without a concentrated effort, as it had
been transformed from the rural metropolis it had been in 1812 into the center of Stalin's empire.
Moscow was part of a great industrial area, and as the capital, it was the center of European
Russia's railway network. However, these initial successes were short-lived, as the German
armored forces were to encounter significant disadvantages.
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First, the Soviet infrastructure was generally primitive at best, and roads that were
passable in one season were quagmires come autumn and spring. B.H. Liddell Hart postulated
that had the Soviets possessed a road network comparable to that found in western Europe, a far
greater portion of the country would have been overrun; whether or not this wider expansion,
which either met or exceeded the original goal – the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan Line – would have
led to Soviet capitulation is not the concern here, but it must be stated that even under the most
opportune circumstances any road-based movements would face conditions that were mediocre
at best. Further, consider these roads were poor when the weight of German tracked vehicles was
relatively light compared to the behemoths that were to come. 85
Second, the Germans had severely underestimated the quality of the Soviet armor. In
1940, the experiences in the Western Campaign led Hitler to order the replacement of the Panzer
III's inadequate 37mm cannon with an L/60 50mm. This order seemed reasonable, even
necessary, if Germany intended to embark on further aggressive expansion, but it was a
complicated issue. For the cannon retrofit, Waffenprüfamt 6, the ordnance office of Waffenamt,
the German Army Weapons Agency, used the considerably shorter L/42 50mm rather than the
L/60, an ordnance change which led to lower velocity and thus diminished armor penetration –
55mm at one hundred meters against a rolled steel plate set at a 30-degree angle. 86 Russian
reports collected by the People's Commissariat for Tank Industry indicated that between August
and September 1942, 54.3% of all T-34 losses were caused by the L/60 50mm cannon, not the
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L/42, which was shown to be generally ineffective against the frontal armor of either the T-34 or
KV-1. 87 The Panzer III was numerically the most widely available tank on the Eastern Front, and
most of these were retrofitted Ausf. E and F, along with new production Ausf. G and H models,
and while the Panzer III was vastly superior to the Soviet T-26 and B.T. tanks, they were heavily
outclassed by the T-34 and K.V. tanks. The 50mm L/60 Hitler had ordered in 1940 finally made
its way onto the Panzer III Ausf. J in the Spring of 1942, and this cannon could penetrate the
frontal armor of the T-34 at under five hundred meters and the K.V. tanks if tungsten-tipped
high-velocity rounds were used, a point which could have impacted the initial phases of
Barbarossa, and one which Hitler pointed out to WaPrü at his convenience later in the war. 88
Lastly, in preparation for hostilities against the Soviet Union, Hitler ordered a substantial
increase in the number of Panzer and Panzergrenadier Divisions in late 1940 which forced the
Wehrmacht to not only use all available resources to produce vehicles in sufficient quantity to
fulfill this requirement but to use inferior vehicles captured in western Europe. This had the twofold effect of spreading the German armor more thinly, in a direct affront to accepted armored
theory and the model advocated for by Guderian, and placed vehicles not suited to Eastern
Europe or Africa in combat in those theaters. The latter point is self-explanatory; the former
issue is more complex.
After the French Campaign, Hitler doubled the number of Panzer and Panzergrenadier
divisions. 89 For the Panzer divisions, this was an expansion from ten to twenty-one divisions that
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required an increase in tank production equivalent to 800-1000 new tanks per month. 90 WaPrü 6
estimated this escalation in production would cost two billion marks and employ over 100,000
skilled craftsmen – many pulled from other key armament sectors. Reluctantly, Hitler abandoned
the increase, and thus, while the total tank requirement was 561 tanks per division, or 11,781
tanks to outfit all Panzer divisions completely, there were only 4,198 operational by June 1941.
The strongest Panzer division had 199 tanks; the average was 160 organized in one regiment of
two battalions rather than the doctrinal four battalions in two regiments per brigade, with one
Panzer brigade and one infantry brigade per division – a ratio reversal between infantry and
armor in the Panzer formations. 91
By 1937, while Panzers III and IV were being developed and refined, the
Heereswaffenampt – Army Ordnance Bureau – ordered Daimler-Benz, Henschel, and MAN to
develop a 30-ton tank. German intelligence had become aware of the French Char B1(bis) and
Char 2C heavy tanks, both of which were breakthrough tanks, and the realization that there were
no German tanks that could counter these vehicles heavily influenced German planners. The
Char 2C especially concerned the Germans, as when deployed in 1923, it was the only superheavy tank in operational status, and even the Tiger II, developed 20 years later, weighed half a
ton less than the Char 2C.92
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The first attempt was the Durchbruchswagen. Released toward the end of 1937, the DW I
was quickly upgraded to the DW II. After a further two years of refinement, Henschel delivered
the VK 30.01(H), a design that incorporated a rear engine, front transmission, and vertical armor
plating – typical of German designers.93A competing design, the VK 30.01(P), was produced by
Porsche, and like the Henschel design, it fielded a 7.5cm L/24 cannon which was also found on
the Panzer IV. Hitler was not satisfied with either of these, as he believed a lower caliber, highvelocity cannon was more efficient in terms of ammunition storage than a high caliber gun.
Specifically, Wa Prüf had suggested using a 10.5cm main gun, but Hitler insisted on the proven
technology in the 7.5cm Panzerabwehrkanone 41 (7.5cm PAK 41), which incorporated the
Gerlich principal – squeeze bore technology. 94 While this cannon was theoretically suitable, the
lack of plentiful supplies of tungsten meant this cannon was never able to use its highly effective
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anti-tank rounds exclusively. 95 Ultimately, this design proved to be little more than a useful
stepping stone, and six of the completed turrets, equipped with the 7.5cm L/24, were integrated
into the Atlantic Wall on the orders of Wa Prüf Fest. 96
In June 1939, Wa Prüf 6 requested Krupp design a turret for a new tank. Wa Prüf
specified that the turret should be capable of mounting a 10.5 cm gun in either L/20 or L/28
length cannon and have an armor thickness of 100 mm. With these specifications as a baseline,
Krupp delivered the completed concept designs in October 1939. The turret was designed with
the required armor thickness, but it mounted a 10.5 cm L/25 gun with a turret ring diameter of
1.75 meters. Based on the turret weight of 8.4 metric tons, the entire tank was projected to weigh
over eighty tons when – if – it was completed. During the following year, after the campaign in
the West indicated tanks weighing over thirty tons would be forced to use only major bridges,
Krupp was directed by Wa Prüf 6 to discontinue further design improvement. 97
This hiatus was short-lived. In mid-1940, Henschel was ordered to redesign the three
D.W. hulls Kassel had delivered earlier that year to mount a new turret armed with a 10.5 cm
gun. This increased the projected weight of the VK 36.01 to 36 metric tons, an increase which
was alleviated to a degree in March 1941, when Krupp was ordered to produce six D.W. turrets,
the tapered-bore Waffe 0725 7.5 cm cannon. Further, Hitler decreed in May 1941 that Henschel
and Porsche would each produce six heavy tanks, which were to be delivered prior to the
summer of 1942. 98
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In May 1945, Kurt Arnoldt, Henschel & Sohn’s chief engineer recalled, under British
interrogation, the VK30.01 and VK36.01 had been considered parallel projects within a larger
program codenamed “Tiger,” which had the end goal of producing a larger tank than either of
those projects. Arnoldt mentioned Krupp, remembering Hitler’s fondness for the 7.5 cm PAK
41cannon, offered a new turret designed to field an 88 mm L/56 cannon adapted from the towed
anti-aircraft/anti-tank gun of the same caliber. 99 In the competition between Porsche and
Henschel in the new project, called VK45.01, a number of circumstances allowed Henschel to
gain the contract. Among these were fundamental issues with the Porsche Tiger, Porsche’s
insistence that the 8.8 cm cannon could not be mounted in the existing turrets, the compatibility
of Henschel's VK36.01 hull with the Krupp turret designed for the Porsche TYP 100 prototype,
and lastly, Ferdinand Porsche's own fanaticism for the Nazi ideology. Arnoldt, paraphrased by
the Allied transcriptionist, recalled, "Porsche was a capable engineer in many ways, but
extremely Nazi and allowed his technical advice to be influenced by his political views. He was
jealous and intolerant and was a personal friend of Hitler and Speer." 100 An interrogation of
Stiele von Heydekampf in June 1945 indicated:
Porsche had been for some time in disfavor with both the Army and the Speer Ministry
owing to the unsatisfactory performance of tanks in his design. The many changes he
demanded, and the fact that when the Army requested a new weapon, he proposed a
completely new and unorthodox design without regard to the use of existing production
facilities or past experience, were retarding production…The development of 30–35-ton
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tanks was begun in 1938. Such vehicles were being tested in 1940 and 1941, with
production anticipated for 1942. With the invasion of Russia in 1941, when the original
Russian T-34 tank was encountered and demanded the production of still heavier tanks, it
became clear that Germany desperately needed a heavy tank. As a result, the Tiger and
Panther designs and production were pushed more rapidly than any previous projects.
The program was pushed too rapidly with the result that many mechanical difficulties
were encountered in service.101
Henschel and Porsche submitted prototype designs, each using the Krupp turret, for a
demonstration at Rastenburg on April 20, 1942, on the occasion of Hitler's birthday. Henschel
designer Dr. Erwin Aders recalled that Henschel's representatives were devastated by Hitler's
enthusiasm for Dr. Porsche and his Tiger. Before the demonstration began, Hitler awarded Dr.
Porsche a War Merit Cross for his contributions to the Reich, and Hitler's staff asked Dr. Porsche
multiple technical questions about his design. Meanwhile, Hitler spent only "two or three
minutes" with the Henschel staff. As Göring was delayed, the demonstrations did not begin in
earnest until around 3:00 P.M., and at this point neither Göring nor Hitler visited the Henschel
Tiger at all.102 The Henschel team believed the result was a foregone conclusion in favor of
Porsche, and an OKW report from April 22, 1942, only mentioned Henschel had brought a
vehicle. 103
However, Porsche’s faith in Hitler’s nepotism was misplaced. The Porsche Tiger was
poorly engineered, excessively complicated, and laden with unnecessary elements. For example,
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Porsche used twin V-10 engines working to drive a single petrol-electric transmission, an
arrangement that was not only heavily reliant on copper but also rendered the system more
difficult to quickly mass produce.104 In extended testing at Kummersdorf, the Henschel tank
outperformed the Porsche in every trial due to continual breakdowns in the Porsche powertrain.
The Henschel Tiger was far from flawless, but it exceeded the expectations of army observers. 105
One key factor in Speer’s decision to award the contract – numbered SS 006-6307/41 – to
Henschel was the manufacturing techniques employed by Porsche and Henschel. 106 Porsche
designed and built each of its own components without assistance from other firms within the
Reich, and the Tiger contract would have required extensive construction to enlarge its existing
facilities. Henschel & Sohn had constructed their vehicle from components produced by other
firms; thus, sub-contracts could expedite the production of the Tiger, and no construction
subsidized by the Reich was required. Further, Henschel promised the Reich Ministry of
Armaments and War Production that their first series of Tigers would be built, delivered, and
deployed to Russia by late summer or early fall of 1942. 107 This latter point was not
inconsequential; the situation in Russia was growing desperate as the Soviets expanded their
mobilization, and in North Africa, the Americans and British were fighting in the Mediterranean
Theater. The reality facing Hitler was so desperate that he ordered the Henschel Tiger into
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immediate production, with the final revisions to come after combat experience. On October 20,
1942, OKW officially designated the Henschel firm as the source of the Panzerkampfwagen VI
Tiger Ausf. E, the Tiger I.
Organization and Tactics
The first heavy tank battalions were organized in Company strength in February 1942,
well before the first Tigers were produced. These first Companies, schwere Panzer-Kompanien
501 and 502, were assigned to s.Pz.Abt 501, which was organized on 10 May 1942. S.Pz.Abt
502 and 503 were created on 25 May and 5 May 1942, respectively.108
German military formations were structured per standard organizational doctrines. The
Kriegsstärkenachweisung (KStN) was the table of organization that determined the allowable
number of men, weapons, and vehicles. The Kriegsausrüstungsnachweisung (KAN) was the
table of allowances that determined the basic supply allowances for units of varying sizes. Both
manuals were used by the s.Pz.Abt also, but as the KAN was far more detailed and provided
even basic supplies such as canteens and typewriters, all organizational data here will refer to the
KStN. 109
With the creation of two companies for s.Pz.Abt 501 and a paper formation of s.Pz.Abt
502 and 503, KStN update 1150d was released, which organized the heavy company into two
platoons: the Commander and Senior NCO were each assigned Tigers, and the adjutant was
assigned a Panzer III; the light platoon was assigned five Panzer IIIs. The first battalion-sized
elements were organized under the KStN update 1176d, dated 15 December 1942. This guidance
Kriegsgliederung des Feldheeres May 1941-May1942 reproduced in Thomas Anderson, Tiger (Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2013), 23-24.
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was used to outfit all existing and future s.Pz.Abt organizations. 110 Each s.Pz.Abt consisted of
Battalion command and the light platoon – as organized under KStN 1150D - and two
companies, each with a Company command group and four combat platoons. In each Battalion,
the KStN outlined the following: the Battalion command group consisted of two Tigers, one
Panzer III, and a supporting light platoon of five Panzer IIIs; the Company command element
was equipped with one Tiger and two Panzer IIIs; the four combat platoons each were equipped
with two Tigers and two Panzer III's. Allowing for the Battalion Commanders' element brought
the total to twenty Tigers and twenty-five Panzer IIIs. 111 S.Pz.Abt 501 through 505 and a
schwere Panzer-Kompanie for the Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland were organized
according to these tables. 112
After reports from the Eastern Front indicated the Panzer III had neither the armor nor the
armament to conduct missions alongside the Tiger – despite their usefulness in areas in which
the Tiger was ill-equipped to perform, such as reconnaissance – the General Staff issued updated
KStN's on 5 March 1943. KStN 1150e provided three Tigers to the Battalion command element
and removed the light platoon. KStN 1176e organized the Company into three platoons of four
Tigers each, plus two for the Commander and Senior NCO. Further, the s.Pz.Abt was expanded
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from two companies to three; thus, each s.Pz.Abt was afforded forty-five Tigers plus an
assortment of signals, recon, medical support, engineers, and maintenance platoons. 113 As the
Tiger I (Sd.Kfz 181) was phased out in favor of the Tiger II (Sd. Kfz 182), the General Staff
issued KStN 1107b (fg) and 1176 (fg) on 1 June 1944. This KStN was a "freie Gliederung," – or
free outline – which allowed the General Staff to reform destroyed s.Pz.Abt with either Tiger I or
Tiger II, as available. In both the A version (1 June 1944) and the D version (1 November 1944),
the only change to the 1150e/1176e organization was the authorization for companies and
battalions to use either the Tiger I or Tiger II. This was the final organizational revision for the
German heavy tank battalions.114
The revision removing Panzer III’s from the s.Pz.Abt. organization had the effect of
removing their dedicated reconnaissance and inhibited the battalions from operating within urban
terrain, as the Tiger’s size made it unfeasible to operate within the confines of towns and cities.
A report from 13th Company, Panzer Regiment Großdeutschland indicated, based on experiences
outside Belgorod from 7-13 March 1943, that the Panzer III had not evolved to withstand hits
from enemy weapons a Tiger can weather, and the enemy preferred to target the Panzer III rather
than the Tiger. The maintenance section for a Tiger company was complicated by the addition of
a second tank model, which required additional spare parts for the Panzer III rather than
remaining focused only on the Tiger.115 This change not only had the effect of eliminating a tank
suited to reconnaissance but also negated the coordinated fires of the Tiger and Panzer III – the
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Panzer III was often used to fire high-explosive rounds at unarmored targets, while the Tigers
faced the armored threat. By removing the Panzer III, the Tiger crews were forced to engage
infantry and towed guns with greater regularity. Ironically, General Guderian agreed with
Großdeutschland's assessment and ordered the change; however, as he recognized the need for a
reconnaissance element in the heavy battalions, he requested the addition of a reconnaissance
platoon outfitted with armored half-tracks. 116 These had less armor and anti-personnel
capabilities than the Panzer III and left the maintenance sections with still another variant to
repair.
Wolfgang Schneider noted the impact a lack of adequate reconnaissance had on the
combat effectiveness of the Tiger battalions. Essentially, as recon maneuvers involve long
movements while taking care not to be spotted by the enemy, the Tiger was wholly unsuited to
this task. However, it was not always advisable to send a lightly armored vehicle with no primary
offensive weapon to scout where it was likely prepared defenses awaited. Thus, the Tigers often
attacked without sufficient intelligence regarding enemy dispositions, the commanders gained a
sense of invulnerability through combat experience in the Tiger that led them to ignore the need
for reconnaissance altogether, and they overestimated the overall effectiveness of their weapon
system. Thus, the Tiger commanders at times degraded their potential effectiveness and failed to
succeed when sent blindly against a well-prepared defense in depth which created predictable
and unnecessary losses. 117
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Combat Doctrine and Tactics
Before the first three s.Pz.Abt were deployed to combat, the crewmen received little in
the way of official guidance directing their tactical deployment. This lack of doctrinal or tactical
guidance led the s.Pz.Abt to enter combat with a trial-and-error mentality, and as these battalions
were considered strategic assets, their use was often dictated by commands at the Group level or
higher. The battalions sent combat reports to the General Staff for several months, and after
OKW reviewed the capabilities of the tanks, Merkblatt 47a/29 was issued. This leaflet indicated
the proper employment of the platoon, company, and battalion. The Tiger's mission was simple:
it was the most potent weapon of the armored forces; thus, when concentrated and used as the
focus of a direct assault into the heaviest enemy defenses, the Tiger should seek combat with
other tanks, earthworks, and anti-tank gun emplacements. Organizationally, the heavy tank
battalions would be considered Army-level resources and were not to be used for missions
outside their scope, such as in a reconnaissance role or as a guard platoon.
In addition to its role, employment, and basic instructions for the Tiger crews, the
Merkblatt outlined how the Tiger should be used in combat, how the battalion should assemble,
what an ideal assembly area should have, and the maintenance requirements for the Tiger.
Merkblatt indicated that:
Every possible rest period of the Tiger battalion must be used for technical maintenance.
After long periods of action, sufficient time must be given to maintenance and overhaul
to restore the unit to full combat strength. The maintenance section must support all other
sections and commands.” 118
The Merkblatt 47a/29 was used in coordination with H.Dv.470/7, the German Army Regulation
on the Medium Tank Company, issued in May 1941. Though the manual was designed for crews

Merkblatt für den Einsatz der schw. Panzer-Abteilung “Tiger” (Berlin: Heereswaffenamt, 1943), 4
pages. Merkblatt 47a/30.
118

59

in medium tank companies, the Mittlere Panzerkompanie tactics were deemed adequate for use
in the s.Pk.119 This manual stated the primary task and purpose for the heavy tanks at the platoon,
company, and battalion level and provided the fundamental purpose of the heavy tanks, which
was to attack against the most robust enemy defenses, break through enemy positions reinforced
by defensive works, and decisively defeat the enemy. 120 This manual provided not only essential
responsibilities for the leadership at the platoon and company level command but also described
basic gunnery fundamentals, tactical guidance, combat formations for platoon and company level
formations, fuel replenishment guidance, and, most importantly, the doctrinal guidance
containing tasks and purpose of the heavy tank battalions. It stated:
The weapons and armor, in combination with the high maneuverability, make the Tiger
the most potent combat weapon of the Panzerwaffe. The Tiger Abteilung is, therefore, a
powerful, decisive point weapon in the hands of the troop commander. Its strength lies in
concentrated, ruthlessly conducted attacks. Each dispersion reduced its striking power.
Basic preparations for employment at decisive locations guarantee great success. TigerAbteilungen…will be attached to other Panzer units in the decisive point of the battle in
order to force a decision. They may not be used up too early from being employed for
secondary tasks. They are most suited for fighting against heavy enemy tank forces and
must seek this battle. The destruction of enemy tanks creates the prerequisite for the
successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to our own lighter Panzers. 121
It should be noted that German doctrine for the heavy tanks placed heavy emphasis on engaging
enemy tanks, especially heavy tanks, and while the guidance for the platoon and company
specified fundamental actions against enemy artillery, anti-tank weapons, entrenched troops, and
heavy weapons, the battalion-level guidance provided more generalized direction against the
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"decisive points" or "taking decisive action." Even battalion-level formations were amiss, despite
specificity when outlining platoon and company formations down to the most advantageous
formation for a company-level attack.
Further doctrinal guidance for higher levels of command was published in the Tigerfibel,
an instructional pamphlet designed to be easily read while providing crucial training information
for young soldiers of the Panzerwaffe. Lieutenant Colonel Hans Christern, from the Inspectorate
of Armored Troops, who was responsible for tank training in mid-1942, tasked his friend and
subordinate Lieutenant Josef von Glatter-Götz to draft an instructional leaflet. Von Glatter-Götz
believed humor and simple presentation were required to ease the learning process, and to that
end, the writing style was more akin to the ordinary soldiers' jargon than a formal instructional
manual presented in a classroom and included admonishments such as "Read your manual well,
otherwise your Tiger goes to Hell!" To make the pamphlet more appealing to young soldiers, the
illustrations, completed by Corporal Gessinger and Sergeant Wagner, included nude portrayals
of "Tiger Elvira," who assisted with emphasizing how a technique should be used.122 One such
panel, which instructed young drivers to use the throttle gently if the Tiger's fuel tank was low to
obtain the full 200 meters/ liter of traveling distance, was accompanied by an illustration of a
nude young woman receiving a back massage – all in the interest of explaining just how gently
the throttle should be used. 123
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Though humorous in nature, the Tigerfibel provided crucial lessons for both
inexperienced crewmen and senior officers unfamiliar with the Tiger’s operational
characteristics. The manual instructed battalion commanders to issue orders to the Tiger
commanders well ahead of an operation in order to ensure the crews had ample time to perform
maintenance and refueling prior to their movement to the attack positions. Further, Tiger
formations were forbidden from being attached to infantry divisions in an attack, as the infantry
could not adequately support the Tigers in the breakthrough or in holding captured ground.
Doctrinal restrictions forbade forced marches, as they which increased mechanical breakdowns
in the Tiger, dictated the Tiger was only for decisive actions and indicated the Tigers should only
be deployed when provided support from units appropriate to the tactical situation, such as
engineer battalions, artillery, or mechanized infantry. Minimizing travel distances was of the
utmost importance, which led to the concept of establishing Tiger maintenance facilities near
railyards. They had the heavy equipment on hand that was needed to facilitate maintenance
needs. 124
From doctrinal and program guidance, it is clear that the Tiger was created as an
offensive weapon. It was deployed in the area of the battle most heavily contested, expected to
destroy enemy heavy tanks, artillery, and entrenched positions, and it was to seek decisive tank
versus tank engagements. The Tiger was fully capable of completing defensive missions by
counterattacking enemy penetrations as part of a mobile reserve, but the Tiger required
substantial support, especially from other armored formations. Moreover, its substantial
maintenance requirements meant commanders had to anticipate enemy penetrations along the
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defensive line to allow the Tiger formations to counterattack with the least amount of movement
to contact as possible. This need to use resources sparingly would be of significance on the
Eastern Front.
Tiger Battalion Training and Leadership
Soldiers who served as armor crewmen were originally trained at the PanzertruppenSchule in Wünsdorf, south of Berlin, but the school’s capacity was exceeded once Panther and
Tiger crew training was introduced. The solution was to move Panther training to Erlangen and
Tiger training to Paderborn.125 Unlike other panzers, the men selected for the Tigers were not
raw recruits. They had already been tested in battle, some in multiple theaters. Generally, men
who had experience with tanks in combat were plucked from their organizations and reassigned.
Some, like Alfred Rubbel, who was serving with the 4th Panzer Regiment in the Caucasus in
August 1942, were reassigned when the 2nd Battalion of 4th Panzer was chosen to retrieve
training on a new tank variant.126 Others, like Otto Carius, were returning to Germany on leave
when a telegram reached him with orders to report for training in Oldenburg and later
Paderborn.127
The men chosen to train on the Tiger, who would become the earliest to fill the
battalions, were experienced veterans. Most of the crew were non-commissioned officers, and
the driver, a position relegated to the most junior Private in modern NATO armies, was a
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Sergeant. 128 For the earliest group, who had been sent to Oldenburg for training, the training
regimen was initially sluggish, as there was only one Tiger on hand for training. This allowed
ample free time for camaraderie and fraternization with the locals. 129
Tiger training was moved to Paderborn for two main reasons, both very practical. First,
the terrain around Oldenburg was not suitable for combat training. Second, and more critical,
given the Tiger's teething problems, was the proximity to the factory support headquarters at
Kassel. 130 Oldenburg was nearly 300 kilometers north of Kassel, whereas Paderborn was only 84
kilometers. Further, Paderborn was the former home to the 11th Panzer Regiment. The training
facilities were more than adequate for the Tiger crews, and the equipment yard at Staumühle was
sizeable enough to store the tanks.131
As training progressed, new recruits joined the ranks of the veterans and began to become
well-disciplined units. Many of the veterans, who are recovering from wounds received in
combat, were able to complete their civilian education during their rehabilitation.132 Others were
offered the opportunity to become officers and were educated at various officer training
academies. Ulrich Koppe graduated from the Wünsdorf Officer Academy in October 1942, was
commissioned as a Reserve Lieutenant, and was assigned to Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 5, a
transitional unit for armor soldiers waiting for their next assignment. Koppe was designated a
128
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member of the newly created 505th and, as one of the first officers assigned to the new battalion,
became the provisions officer for the battalion.133
Another soldier, Otto Carius, had begun his war with a draft notice instructing him to
report for infantry training in the spring of 1940. A diminutive man, Carius had completed the
infantry training course and was on the verge of reassignment when his company commander
asked for twelve volunteers for the panzer corps. Remembering his father had explicitly
forbidden him from serving with the panzers, Carius volunteered and was retrained at Vaihingen
as part of the 7th Panzer Replacement Corps. 134 Carius was part of Operation Barbarossa and was
a loader, which, as he remembered, was "the worst position. Not only could I not see anything, I
never got to stick my nose into the fresh air." 135 Shortly after he was wounded the first time,
when a T-34 killed his Panzer, Carius was promoted to Sergeant and sent to Wünsdorf to attend
Officer Candidate Course 8. 136 After his graduation, Carius was sent to the 21st Panzer Regiment
in June 1942, and then while on leave, was reassigned to the 500th Replacement Battalion in
January 1943, where as a Lieutenant, he would undergo training as a Tiger commander. 137
The senior battalion leadership were battle-tested veterans of the panzer divisions who
had experienced combat on multiple fronts. The first commander of the 505th, Major Johannes
Kümmel, had been awarded both the 2nd and 1st Class of the Iron Cross in September 1939, the
Wound Badge in Black in 1939, the Knight’s Cross in July 1941, and the 133rd award of the Oak
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Leaves in October 1942. 138 Kümmel did not take the 505th into combat, as he was reassigned to
the headquarters staff of the 14th Panzer Corps in North Africa. His replacement, Major
Bernhardt Sauvant, had fought at Stalingrad as part of the 36th Panzer Regiment and had earned
similar awards: 2nd and 1st Class Iron Cross by October 1939, Wound Badge in Black and Silver
in 1939, Panzer Badge with ‘25’ designation, German Cross in Gold in September 1942,
Knight’s Cross in September 1942 as commander of 1st Company, 36th Panzer Regiment, and
260th award of the Oak Leaves in July 1943 – four months after assuming command of the
505th. 139 This veterancy was typical for the commanders of the heavy tank battalions but was
degraded somewhat as the war progressed.
Production, Maintenance, and Logistics
The Tiger tanks were produced at the Henschel factory in Kassel, Germany. As has been
discussed, Albert Speer chose Henschel over Porsche as Henschel had existing factory space,
whereas Porsche would have had to have expanded its existing facilities. However, this would
prove a detriment to the Tiger program, as Henschel had no space to expand its production lines
to accommodate greater demand for either the Tiger I or II. This production choice would not
only limit the quantity of Tigers which could be produced, but it also allowed Allied bombing to
disrupt production much more easily and limited the number of spare parts which could be
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produced for the Tiger battalions – all of which had exhaustive parts requirements. These
obstacles served to limit the effectiveness of the Tiger battalions.
The factory layout was basic, yet the Tiger production method was laid out in nine steps,
from the initial receipt of a new hull to the final assembly. In steps one through four, shop 3
prepared the hull with machining. As Henschel did not have the capability to weld and roll the
heavy armor for the hulls, they had been built by Krupp and Dortmund-Hoerder Huettenverein
and required machining of provided boreholes for the suspension arms, final drives, rear idler
wheels, and machine gun mounts, among others. For the fifth step, the hull was moved to shop 5,
where internal equipment such as a fuel tank, drivetrain, and suspension was added to the hull. In
step 6, road wheels were attached to the hull, torsion bars were added to the suspension, and the
lower hull and sides were painted. Step seven included any final welding work required to finish
the roadwheels, suspension, or hull, as well as the addition of the tracks and a preliminary test
drive. Any mechanical issues had to be corrected before the Tiger moved on to step 8. In step 8,
the turret assembly was added to the hull, and mechanical tests were performed. The final
procedure, step 9, was a finished paint job and application of Zimmerit anti-magnetic-mine paste.
Once this was complete, the Tiger was ready for delivery to its end user. Overall, the factory
employed over 8000 workers working in two 12-hour shifts, and each step took six hours to
complete. From start to finish, the process took fourteen days, and the assembly line carried an
average of twenty Tigers, with the final line holding ten Tigers.

67

140

The Tiger battalions required intensive maintenance in the field. It has been noted that
while the typical Panzer Regiment required two entire maintenance companies, a Tiger battalion
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required four maintenance companies.141 This standard was supplemented in later organizational
standards with an additional maintenance detachment, which performed routine maintenance,
such as damaged tracks, while heavily damaged Tigers were sent to the maintenance
companies. 142 The detachment’s duties were not limited to superficial or minor repairs, however,
as the detachment could replace an engine when necessary. This was not part of their regular
duties, and their taskings were generally repairs requiring less than half a day of work. 143
The maintenance companies were tasked with repairing Tigers which could not be
repaired by the maintenance detachment, and in cases of severe damage, the Tigers were
transferred to regional depot maintenance installations. They required the maintenance
companies to have specialty tools and heavy machinery suitable for aiding in a Tiger's
deconstruction appropriate for the amount of damage being repaired. Ultimately, the functions of
the maintenance company and detachment were not strictly doctrinal, as the tactical situation and
capability of the maintenance detachments determined the time in which Tigers were expected to
return to operational status.144
As a part of day-to-day operations, the Tiger crews were responsible for not only
performing basic checks of the mechanical equipment, but after they became more familiar with
the tank, the crews gained the ability to conduct maintenance generally reserved for the
maintenance detachment. This model is still in practice in modern mechanized armies, as the

Lukas Freidli, Repairing the Panzers: German Tank Maintenance in World War II (Sussex, UK:
Panzerwrecks, 2011), 56.
141

142

Wolfgang Schneider, Tigers in Combat III (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2016), 439.

Historical Division, European Command, “German Maintenance in World War II,” Department of the
Army Pamphlet 20-202 (1954), 17.
143

144

Ibid, 17-18.

69

crewmen are trained to conduct basic repairs of a non-specialized nature. Wolfgang Schneider,
himself an armor officer in the Bundeswehr, wrote:
…experienced crews were also in the position of being able to carry out automatically
such activities that were actually reserved for the repair personnel if these had finally
reached the limit of their physical endurance, or the time they had available, because of
continual stress. This was aided by the fact that the crew – often in the absence of the
commander – remained present when work was being carried out on the tank and so were
able to ‘look over the shoulder’ of experts and also because the tank mechanics and
drivers – at least to begin with – had completed factory training. 145
In many cases, the crews were able to strip out damaged assemblies to replace them with an
undamaged assembly in another damaged tank that had been deemed suitable for depot-level
repair. Alfred Rubbel recalled:
Maintenance of the approximately two hundred fifty other vehicles was second in priority
to that of the tanks…it is obvious that the combat readiness of the equipment was of
central concern to the battalion’s leadership. In this effort, the maintenance companies
were the Schwerpunkt. Motor Transport specialist Späth was a well-known engine
specialist. He did not limit himself to the workplace of his maintenance platoon. If a
Tiger crept back from the battle line, gasping, and wheezing on half its cylinders, Späth
and his specialists took charge of it, repairing or improvising, often under enemy fire. In
April 1945, he was awarded an Iron Cross 1st Class, a rare award for someone in his
position, a civilian who had been detailed to the front from the Maybach factory.146
The Tiger's design led to maintenance issues, with the road wheel pattern being one issue not
immediately apparent. In order to fir the L/56 8.8 cm cannon to the Tiger, the upper hull had to
extend over the tracks. To disperse the additional weight, the outer roadwheel was added, which
increased the overall track width from 520mm to 725mm. Not only did this contribute to
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logistical issues, which will be discussed, but this also made maintenance to damaged inner
roadwheels time-consuming. 147

In this case, the red wheel has been damaged. Repair requires the removal of eleven other
roadwheels.

In this example, two inner roadwheels are damaged. Exchanging these two road wheels required
the removal of eighteen other road wheels.
The interleaved pattern created other difficulties as well. On the Eastern Front, the mud
would collect between the wheels, and the cold would freeze the mud into the consistency of
concrete. The Tigerfibel author commented, "if three wheels are missing, and five are jammed,
and the jack sinks into the muddy ground, just think to yourself, in such misfortune, 'what would
the mechanic do?'" 148 This difficult situation was exacerbated by the need to ensure the wheel
nuts were kept tight, as they tended to loosen during lateral movements; the rubber also tended to
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slip off the wheels during these movements as well. 149 To add frustration to an already
potentially difficult situation, each road wheel was not identical, and thus, they were not
interchangeable. Road wheels had to be labeled to ensure they were reattached at the correct
position. 150
The tracks were often as problematic as the roadwheels, as precise track tension had to be
maintained. The track would slip off the road wheels or drive wheel, particularly during
aggressive driving, with too little tension; too much, and the stress on the track tensioner and
bearings within the final drive would cause mechanical failure. The tracks also were prone to
stretching, where bent track pins increased the overall length of the track beyond typical
tolerances. This was caused by normal use as well as a peculiar design flaw in the suspension,
which caused the track to gather atop the drive wheel sprocket when reversing. In more severe
cases, demolitions were required to separate the track so crews could remove a track link, thus
shortening the overall length and returning the length to specifications. 151
Issues such as complex track and road wheel design may seem like an engineering or
design flaw, but with further analysis, the overlapping road wheels and wide track are likely the
most advantageous arrangement for the Tiger. The tank was expected to be able to traverse offroad, and this would have been far more difficult with a narrower track configuration, whereas a
wider track dispersed the weight over more ground. 152 Along with the suspension pattern, with
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sixteen torsion bars and eight suspension arms per side, this road wheel pattern provided a
smoother ride, which decreased wear on moving parts. 153 This came at a higher cost than the
advantages provided, however, as there was no way to repair damaged wheels quickly in heavy
combat. Thus, if a Tiger was immobilized beyond hope of recovery, they were often
destroyed. 154 In North Africa, this practice led to Germans scoring more kills on Tigers than the
Allies, as Chapter Four will elaborate upon.
A crucial yet often overlooked aspect of maintenance is logistics, especially for units
fielding high-maintenance vehicles that require constant attention. As in modern combat, the
Tigers required pre-, during-, and post-operation checks and services, fluids, replacement parts,
and essential services. With any mechanical animal, the crews may have found a track tensioner
that had blown out overnight, which required replacement before the Tiger could move. This was
no more uncommon then than it is today.
Before a Tiger could join the battle, it had to be transported by rail, but the Tiger’s weight
meant the standard railcar could not transport the tank. To move the Tiger, the Reichsbahn, the
German railway system, acquired two-hundred seventy unique high-capacity flatbed cars, which
were designed to carry up to eighty-two tons. However, the rail service to the Tiger did not end
with transportation – it still required petroleum products and spare parts, and these were shipped
long distances by rail.
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The Tigers had a fuel capacity of five hundred forty liters or just over one hundred fortytwo gallons, and its fuel use was, on average, five hundred fifty liters per hundred kilometers. 155
This breaks down to 5.5 liters per kilometer or 1.45 gallons per nine-tenths of a mile. A British
wartime report provided numbers that were not consistent with either of the above figures and
asserted, "entries show that 4197 liters of petrol went into the fuel tanks of this vehicle during a
period in which 480 kilometers were covered…the apparent fuel consumption was over 10 liters
per kilometer." 156 This discrepancy can be explained once we consider that the British
information was obtained from Tiger 131, which was captured in North Africa in 1943. The
early Tigers used the Maybach HL210 P45 engine, an aluminum block V12 with 21.353 liters of
displacement. After the first two hundred fifty Tigers were produced, the powerplant became the
cast iron Maybach HL230 P45, and displacement was increased to 23.095 liters. Early engines
were governed at higher RPM, which led to higher fuel consumption.157
Discrepancies notwithstanding, these numbers only tell part of the story. The
requirements of an entire Tiger battalion, including all its associated support vehicles, were
immense. German historian, author, and vlogger provided numbers for the 503rd during
operations. Over a nine-month period, about 1.5 million liters of gasoline and two hundred fifty

Consumption figures differ by source. Thomas Jentz and Hilary Doyle gave on-road consumption as
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thousand liters of diesel were transported to the Eastern Front, or roughly nine railway tankers of
fuel per month.158 But Tigers required far more than fuel; they required large amounts of oil. The
engine alone required 28 liters of oil, the gearbox needed 32 liters of transmission fluid, the right
and left final drive took a further 8 liters of transmission oil for each, the turret required 5 liters
of transmission oil, and the ventilation system needed 7 liters of transmission oil. The crews also
had to check and fill various grease points on the Tiger, such as drive shaft universal joints,
wheel hubs, and suspension arms, to name a few. 159 Much like modern machines, a detailed
servicing schedule outlined maintenance intervals; some assemblies required daily checks, and
others, such as the turret drive, were to be changed after 2000 hours of use. 160
Spare parts for a Tiger battalion required a substantial logistical investment as well. From
5 July to 30 September 1943, the 503rd used a total of 275,919 kg of spare parts. In this 90-day
period, this total weight equaled 4.5 metric tons of spare parts used per Tiger on average or just
under 10% of the Tiger's combat weight. This is the equivalent of 50 kg of spare parts used, on
average, per day per Tiger. 161 Based on additional reports from the 501st and 506th, outside of
mechanical failures in the engine and transmission, the most replaced parts were in the
suspension. Items such as road wheels, drive sprockets, track links, and wheel rubber were
commonly damaged, either by mines or shots which sought to immobilize the Tiger.162
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As has been mentioned, long-distance movements were not recommended due to the
excessive wear on the engine and transmission. A field report written in August 1944 by Major
Schwaner, the commander of the 502nd, revealed:
… traveling 80 to 100 kilometers per day and in extreme heat was tactically demanded,
and the maintenance services proved to be unable to repair the large number of brokendown tanks despite working day and night. The suspension is not designed for such
travel. The rubber tires on the inner running wheels loosen fairly quickly under heavy
load, resulting in an increased burden for the remaining running wheel. Running
with…damaged rubber tires quickly led to the destruction of the running wheels, bearing,
and suspension arms…requiring 30 to 36 hours of maintenance if all necessary parts are
on hand…but for more severe damage, such as a shock absorber assisted radius arm, the
engine must be removed for the men to make the repair…these long distances led to
unprecedented spare parts usage, and spare parts were backed up by blocked railway
movements to Army Group North, leaving urgently needed parts on the train for fourteen
days. 163
To add a further layer of difficulty, the Tiger battalions were generally attached to various
formations as needed. It was assumed that the unit gaining the Tiger battalion would also provide
logistic support, but poor coordination between logistics officers was a common obstacle, as was
the preference logistics officers showed their own organizations. The addition of a Tiger
battalion also meant the gaining unit had to provide heavy equipment suitable for maintenance
and repair, an additional burden that proved challenging to provide in more remote areas.164 It
became common for transportation officers to work directly with the depots to ensure an
adequate number of parts was requisitioned, and battalion supply officers administered their own
parts supply to remove interference from the larger organization.165
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When it entered production, the Tiger promised to return qualitative superiority to the
German military. However, details regarding its design and production served to limit the
number of tanks produced and the number of components stockpiled in pre-production storage.
Combined, these factors served to undermine the number of operational tanks in the field, which
subsequently limited their overall effectiveness. Its very design led to mechanical failures in the
most fundamental parts – the wheels – and the extensive logistic support required by the
battalions strained a system that was underwhelming at its best.
The large number of parts required extensive rail support; the rail network in the
occupied nations of central Europe had allowed the Wehrmacht to move its forces into Poland in
preparation for Barbarossa successfully, but this was not the case in the Soviet Union. The Soviet
rail network was primitive; it had few double rail lines connecting its major cities, the Soviet
coal and water were not optimal for locomotive use even by the Soviet standards, and the Soviet
rail gauge was much wider than the railways in central Europe. Some of these issues were the
product of a modernization initiative that had not reached a crucial sector of infrastructure, but in
other cases, the rail system was primitive by design. Many bridges had been built as temporary
structures during the First World War and had no value to trains carrying heavier loads – such as
Tigers. Marshaling yards and workshop facilities near the western Soviet border had been
removed to prevent their use by the Germans in case of an invasion. 166 These factors meant
Germany had to manage a rail network that was, in part, held over from the czarist era, and as
Germany did not have the manpower surplus to handle such a daunting task, the local populace
supplemented German forces.
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Chapter III
Tigers on the Eastern Front, 1942-1945
Someone had thoughtfully provided every Tiger tank commander with a demolition
charge. With it, the gun could be destroyed effortlessly. If one's tank got a proper dead-on hit,
then it was a sure guarantee that the tank commander did not fall into Russian hands. I used the
holder to secure a bottle of schnapps. For my five-man crew, it was more soothing than any
demo charge!
-Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud 167
On the frigid morning of 10 February 1943, Kampfgruppe Sander was in a defensive
position at a train station near Rostov-on-Don. Lieutenant Colonel Erich Hoheisel, commander
of s.Pz.Abt 503 was well aware that the 503rd's first engagements as part of Army Group Don –
tasked with securing the withdrawal of Army Group B from the debacle that was the Stalingrad
encirclement– had not gone as auspiciously as expected. 168 Hoheisel’s predecessor, Lieutenant
Colonel Post, managed to prevent an enemy breakthrough near Proletarskaya and had reported
fourteen destroyed T-34 tanks to Army Group Don, but five Tigers had suffered mechanical
breakdowns, five had been damaged by hits, and one was completely destroyed but towed back
in hopes the maintenance section could manage to repair the tank. Though the majority of the
issues were caused by crews who were not entirely familiar with the tank, who were not
correctly retrained after receiving initial training on the Porsche Pz.Kpfw VI, and by
commanders who were either not familiarized with the vehicle or who lacked combat experience
on the Eastern Front, Hoheisel was concerned two of the five damaged tanks had been penetrated
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on their side by the 7.62 cm anti-tank rounds, which had previously been unable to penetrate the
Tiger. No crewmen had been lost, but the Tiger could no longer be considered impervious.
The 23rd Panzer Division, which had participated in the failed breakout of the 6th Army
at Stalingrad and found itself withdrawing westward under constant pressure from Stalin’s
“Little Saturn,” had received s.Pz.Abt 503 as an attachment, as it was expected that the Soviets
would attack Rostov-on-Don in early February. On 8 February, the s.Pz.Abt received alert orders
attaching it to Kampfgruppe Sander, led by Oberstleutnant Joachim Sander, commander of the
201st Panzer-Regiment. On the 8th, the 503rd drove from the northwest of Rostov and, throughout
the day, cleared out several towns along the northwest edge of the city, and two Panzer IIIs were
detached to support a mechanized combat engineer battalion in the southwest part of the city. On
the 9th, the 2nd Company reported to Kampfgrupe Sander at the Sapadnyj train station, and the 3rd
Company continued to secure Krassnyj-Tschaltry, a village key to maintaining open rail
usage. 169 Kampfgruppe Sander contacted Kampfgruppe von Winnig, and throughout the day,
encountered fierce resistance as the element southward to the northern bank of the Don River,
near the modern Rostov suburb of Gnilovskaya.
Into the evening of the 9th, Kampfgruppe Sander moved downriver along the Mertwyj
Donetz, the most extensive channel of the Don River delta, northwest toward Ssmernikovo and
fought through to the edge of a large ravine eight hundred meters west of the village. Unable to
link up with the Panzer-Jaegers on the eastern edge of the village, the Kampfgruppe returned to
Sapadnyj rail station, roughly 5 kilometers northeast of Ssmernikovo, and prepared defensive
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the reorganization was prudent, as the 2nd Company only had nine Tigers and eight Panzer IIIs operational, and the
3rd Company had eight Tigers and eight Panzer IIIs operational. See: Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks: Tiger I
and II Combat Tactics (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1997), 31-32.

79

positions toward the south and west. 170 On the 10th, General von Vormann, commander of the
23rd Panzer Division, ordered an attack from the southwest edge of Rostov to the northeast edge
of Nishne-Ginlowskaya (Gnilovskaya) to close a break in the front line and ultimately shorten
the defensive line. Kampfgruppe Sanders and von Winnig advanced toward the train station near
the center of Nishne-Ginlowskaya, and after sporadic fighting against pockets of Soviet infantry
embedded in buildings, the advance was halted mid-day. The tanks, especially the Tigers, were
having difficulty sliding on the icy, sloping road, so the Germans established a defensive line
along Nishne-Ginlowskaya’s main road, which bisected the town east to west, and prepared for
missions the following morning.
On the morning of the 11th, the Russians counterattacked from Nishne-Ginlowskaya, as
they moved into the western sectors of Rostov overnight. The Germans were quickly able to
repel this attack without using the s.Pz.Abt or other Panzers in the Kampfgruppen. A second
attack, west of the Sapadnyj train station, was repelled as well, and the Soviets were sent
retreating toward Ssemernikowo and the Kolkhoz, or collective farm, located west of
Ssemernikowo. 171 Intelligence reports indicated that the sector of the Don River near Rostov
witnessed reduced Soviet pressure on the German lines and indicated that the Soviets were
moving south toward Ssemernikowo. Indications were that the Soviets intended to regroup,
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reorganize, and launch a more significant assault from Ssemernikowo toward NishneGinlowskaya, or, more likely, toward the staging point at the Sapadnyj train station. 172
On the morning of the 12th, Kampfgruppe Sander initiated the assault on the farm
complex and, following doctrine, ordered s.Pz.Abt 503 to lead the charge. 3rd Zug s.Pz.Abt. 503
was tasked with leading the attack, despite Zugführer Oberstleutnant Hansen’s Tiger having
been damaged by an anti-tank shell during the fighting west of Sapadnyj, forcing him to
withdraw. Leutnant Zabel, 3rd Platoon’s acting Zugführer smashed his platoon into the farm and
its defenders and recalled later, in a report:
At the beginning of the attack, my Tiger was hit on the front of the superstructure by a
7.62 cm anti-tank shell. The track links, which had been fastened to the superstructure by
a steel bar, were ripped away. We heard a dull clang and felt a slight jolt inside the Tiger.
At the same time, we observed many near misses striking the ground to the front and the
side of the Tiger, some leaving considerable burst clouds. The closer we got to the target,
the harder the jolts became…the closer the Tiger approached the collective farm, the
greater the intensity of the enemy's defensive fire. Each hit on the Tiger was accompanied
by a sharp clang, a jolt, acid clouds of smoke, a shimmering yellow flash inside the
fighting compartment, and a detonation. The nerves of the crew were stretched to the
limit. We paid no attention to hunger, thirst, or time. Even though the attack lasted over
six hours, at the time the crew thought that only a short time has elapsed…We counted
227 hits from anti-tank rifle rounds, fourteen hits from 5.7 cm and 4.5 cm anti-tank guns,
and eleven hits from 7.62 cm guns. The right track and suspension were heavily
damaged. Several road wheels and their suspension arms were perforated. The idler
wheel had worked itself out of its mount. In spite of all this damage, the Tiger still
managed to cover an additional 60 kilometers on its own power. The hits had caused the
failure of several welded joints to crack and caused the fuel tank to start leaking. The
tracks had received several hits, but these did not significantly hinder the Tiger's
mobility. There were other technical faults as well, but up to now I do not have a full
report about the damage. In conclusion, it can be said that the armor on the Tiger can
withstand the most intense punishment that the enemy can deliver. The crew can head
into combat secure in the knowledge that they are surrounded by sufficient armor to keep
out the most determined anti-tank round. 173
“Combat Report for 2-22 February 1943,” reproduced in Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks: Tiger I
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The attack had gone well. Zabel had pushed his Tiger forward even after the recoil cylinder
failed and only withdrew after being wounded in the head. The after-action report stated that one
T-34 and five American-built light tanks were destroyed, ten anti-tank guns were taken, and
several mortars, additional anti-tank guns, and light infantry weapons were destroyed. 174
When taken in conjunction with unit histories, this report appears to confirm that the
Tigers, when deployed according to doctrine, were exceptionally combat-effective. In the case of
the action around Rostov, the Tigers were being deployed from a forward assembly area at a
train station, were moving into contact four to six kilometers from that forward position and were
at times conducting follow-on missions not exceeding twenty to eighty kilometers and were
moving a further four to eight kilometers to return to their forward assembly area for refit.
Doctrinally, this adhered to both the Merkblatt and the Mittlere Panzerkompanie manuals, as the
assembly area was at or near a railyard, where heavy equipment was available. Additionally, this
operational employment emphasized the Tiger at the focal point of the operation, as the Tigers
led the charge into the enemy positions, and the distances covered were well within the Tiger's
operational range without being overly concerned about mid-action refueling.
Of the three years and eleven months of fighting on the Eastern Front, the Tiger I or Tiger
II was deployed to the east for two years and nine months: just over 70% of the duration of the
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war in the east. While other Panzer variants indeed were deployed for a more significant
percentage of the war, no other Panzer went into combat with the expectation that it could
change the course of the war, with the exception of the Panther.175 Both tanks were expected to
have a significant impact on the Panzerwaffe, but where the Tiger was meant to push the
offensive, the Panther was a replacement for medium tanks, which had both firepower and
survivability to adequately support either a heavy tank battalion or a mechanized infantry
division. The Wehrmacht had envisioned a tank that could destroy any enemy tank it
encountered, and Hitler had wanted a monstrosity that would be the embodiment of his
Thousand Year Reich – strength, military supremacy, and the superiority of the German Volk.
Henschel and Sohn transformed this vision into reality through the use of high-carbon steel dug
from the German industrial heartland – the Ruhr Valley. 176
The Tiger was designed to act as a hammer within the constraints of the long-established
"cult of the offensive" drilled into the German military. It was not envisioned as a defensive
weapon, but the Tiger's most remarkable accomplishments on the Eastern Front came when
operating in a defensive role. Their armor and ability to destroy Soviet tanks from long distances
influenced the Soviets to design weapons able to counter their armor, which was also detrimental
to the success of other German tanks.177 In the defense, the Tiger battalions were most effective
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when dispersed along the front, where they were able to cover multiple potential avenues of
approach or as a strategic reserve where their largest movement would be toward the Soviet focal
point.
This chapter argues that on the Eastern Front, the Tigers could not be considered to have
been combat effective based on the criteria for which they were developed – the offensive. By
this point in the war, Germany could no longer launch large-scale offensives, and in the limited
offensives undertaken from 1943 to 1945, the Tiger was unable to perform to its expectations.
Further, the initial invincibility, such as was recounted by Lieutenant Zabel, gave Tiger
commanders and crew the impression they had nothing to fear from Soviet armor, while such
exploits inspired the Soviets to design more effective weapons capable of countering the heavy
tank battalions. This chapter will contend that the Tigers were not only far more effective when
in a defensive role but that their dispersal among supportive elements along the front was crucial
to their success.
From this perspective, more significant successes were achieved when the heavy tank
battalions were used as a reserve force that was prepared to shift over a distance of a few dozen
kilometers rather than a hundred or more. As the Soviet doctrine demanded significant attacks
against multiple points on the front, concentrated battalions often were unable to counterattack in
force due to mechanical failures during the march. There is a larger sample size of defensive
operations involving the Tigers during this period, and in this non-doctrinal role, the heavy tank
battalions managed tremendous success and impact on the war as a whole.
The flexibility of the heavy tank battalions, especially when paired with their Panzer III
under the earlier KStN, allowed the Tigers to conduct operations they were unsuited for without
such support, such as recon, spotting, and urban operations. Lastly, the chapter proves that Soviet
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research and development designed tanks and guns solely for the purpose of countering the Tiger
and conducted extensive research on captured Tiger's to determine weaknesses and how to
destroy the tank most effectively. Moreover, on the Eastern Front, where the Tigers were
involved in far more tank vs. tank actions, the Soviets were able to reach a point where their own
tanks were able to damage or destroy Tigers consistently, but they were willing to trade ‘tank for
tank’ in their relentless drive westward rather than employing prepared defenses, such as
coordinated minefield and artillery placement, as the Western Allies had done with consistent
success.
Initial Deployment: Missteps outside Leningrad
By the first half of 1942, Hitler was managing the use of every resource available in
minute detail in order to squeeze every last rifle, gun, tank, and airplane out of the nation as
possible. Hitler's standing order was that ever-increasing numbers of tanks of higher quality than
were used in Poland and France should be produced as quickly as possible. 178 As with every new
weapon, Hitler believed the Tiger would change the course of the war, and he demanded they
were on the Eastern Front as rapidly as possible, with any final production issues ironed out in
combat. 179
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Outside Leningrad, on 29 August 1942, amidst the thunder of falling artillery, four Tigers
of s.Pz.Abt. 502 rolled off the railcars at Mga station. 180 Once the narrow transport tracks had
been replaced with the broader combat tracks, the Tigers rolled into the woods to hunt, as their
namesake predator would have done. Unlike their namesake, the Tigers of s.Pz.Abt 502 moved
with accompaniment – a military liaison, Uebel, and an engineer, Franke, had been sent to
observe the first combat action undertaken by the Tigers and were keen to be near to the fighting
as to report their findings to OKH and the designers accurately. 181
As the Tigers rolled through the forest, they came upon an open clearing. Major Richard
Märker, commander of s.Pz.Abt 502 ordered the tanks to a halt to engage several targets to their
front. Soviet positions were dispatched; the tanks made their way closer to the main Soviet
defensive line. As the Tigers moved forward, the attack gained momentum, despite warnings
from the German infantry that the ground ahead was unsuitable for tanks. These men were
assigned to Field Marshall Erich von Manstein's 11th Army, the victors of Sevastopol. They had
been sent north with their heavy siege artillery to make quick work of the obstinate Leningrad.
These men, though not of the Panzerwaffe, had been in combat on the Eastern Front long enough
to recognize dangers to their support vehicles. 182
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Suddenly, the Soviets stopped retreating. Russian forward observers relayed positioning
information to the guns, and artillery ripped the ground apart in a shower of dirt clods and grass,
splitting the formation of four Tigers – two went to the right of a low rise, and two went left
through a slight depression. Private Matten drove the observers as close to the action as possible
and was amazed when he discovered a Tiger in the open, with its transmission destroyed from
the effort of the off-road movement. Shortly, a messenger arrived with news that a second Tiger
was ahead, also immobilized with a damaged engine. As Matten and the observers made their
way on foot to verify this, Major Märker and his Tiger approached the second Tiger. He reported
that the third Tiger was further ahead, also immobilized with a ruined transmission. Overnight,
the Tigers were recovered with assistance from three Sd.Kfz 9 Famo 18-ton halftracks. The
Russians had been unaware the Tigers were immobile and, as such, had opted not to approach
the behemoths. 183
During this time, the fall rain, which so concerned German strategists, began in earnest.
From the 7th through the 11th of September, rain made ponds of open fields and quagmires where
once were roads. By 15 September, all Tigers had been repaired and were ready to attack the
Russians once more. On the 22nd, at dawn, German artillery opened fire, clearing the way for the
Tigers.184
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opinion Halder shared. Hitler overrode this, claiming his experience on the front in the Weltkreig gave him far more
knowledge than Halder’s years of command experience. See Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1982), 261-263.
All three damaged Tigers were recovered, and their defective parts were transported to Henschel in
Kassel, Germany. The replacement parts were sent back to the front, and OKH demanded the Tigers were
immediately rendered mission capable. See Egon Kleine and Volkmar Kühn, Tiger: The History of a Legendary
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Attached to the 170th Infantry Division, the four Tigers from s.Pz.Abt 502 were in place
as the main effort against the Soviet 2nd Shock Army, which was nearly encircled. 185 Märker
attempted in vain to influence higher command to cancel the attack, as his reconnaissance reports
indicated the ground was thoroughly unsuitable for heavy tanks. However, as the Führer had
ordered the attack, Märker could not refuse despite his better judgment.
As Märker feared, the Tigers fared horribly in the marshy terrain around Lake Ladoga, on
the eastern outskirts of Leningrad. According to Märker’s gunner, Sergeant Johann Pfeffer:
I participated in this operation as the gunner in the battalion commander’s Tiger. The
driver was Sergeant Balkhausen. All that we knew before the operation was that a pocket
had formed in this area in which there were powerful enemy forces whose objective had
been to establish a ground link with Leningrad south of Lake Ladoga. Our attack was to
prevent this intention. 186
According to another report, the Tigers were still plagued by transmission issues which caused
the tanks to be less maneuverable than usual. The swampy terrain also inhibited their tactical
movement, as the Tigers were forced to stay on what little hard roadway they could find.
Eventually, this became impossible, and the Tigers began to sink into the mud,
Schachtellaufwerk-pattern road wheels became caked with clay-like mud, and maneuverability
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was further inhibited.187 The mud placed additional strain on the engine and transmission, which
led to additional mechanical failures. 188
When the Tigers did encounter Soviet resistance, it was catastrophic. The platoon leader's
Tiger was struck twice, once on the gun, rendering it inoperable, and once on the driver's hatch,
making driving more difficult. Two other Tigers were damaged more severely: one was damaged
so heavily it had to be towed back to the assembly area, and the second burned to the ground due
to engine fire. The fourth had managed to penetrate deeply enough that, once stuck in the mud, it
became the target of withering Soviet fire and could not be recovered.189 Initially, OKH refused
to allow Märker to destroy the bogged-down Tiger, but after several recovery attempts, the
Major was finally allowed to “pack it full” of explosives and destroy it.190
Near the end of November 1942, Major Märker presented a full report personally to
Hitler. In this conference with the Führer, Luftwaffe Chief-of-Staff (among other titles) Hermann
Göring, OKW Chief of Operations Staff Alfred Jodl, and others, Major Märker relayed the
concerns he had addressed prior to the attack, including detailed concerns regarding the terrain,
which he had personally observed. Märker’s concerns were ignored, and Göring went as far as to

Schachtellaufwerk pattern road wheels were an elaborate system used in German half-tracks and
armored vehicles. On the Tiger, twenty-four road wheels were interleaved on suspension arms, with minimal space
between each arm and wheel assembly. This proved disastrous in winter when frozen mud locked the wheels
together. This had the additional cost in maintenance efficiency, as when a centrally located innermost roadwheel
was damaged, replacement meant removing up to fourteen wheels. See US War Department, “Tactical and
Technical Trends,” 6 May 1942, reproduced in Bruce Oliver Newsome: The Tiger Tank and Allied Intelligence vol.
IV: Capabilities and Performance (Coronado, CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020), 66.
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present aerial photographs which depicted the terrain as perfect for tanks – though it was unclear
if any area around Leningrad was actually depicted. Against the sycophants, Märker was no
match; he was reassigned to command the 2nd Company, 31st Panzer Regiment, and was killed
on 22 February 1943. 191 After the war, General Guderian recalled this ignominious initial action,
writing:
In September of 1942, the first Tigers went into action. A lesson learned from the First
World War had taught us that it is necessary to be patient about committing new weapons
and that they must be held back until they are being produced in such quantities as to
allow their employment in mass. In the First World War, the French and the British had
used their tanks prematurely, in small numbers, and thereby failed to win the great
victory…Hitler was well aware of the facts. But he was consumed by his desire to try his
new weapon. He therefore ordered that the Tigers be committed in a quite secondary
operation, in a limited attack carried out in terrain that was utterly unsuitable; for in the
swampy forests near Leningrad heavy tanks could only move in single file along the
forest tracks, which was…exactly where enemy anti-tank guns were posted. The results
were not only heavy, unnecessary casualties, but also the loss of secrecy and the element
of surprise.192
Albert Speer, Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, also recalled in his memoirs that
Hitler had been well aware of the terrain issue:
His staff called his attention to the fact that the sector of terrain he had chosen made a
tactical deployment of the tanks impossible because of the marshy ground on both sides
of the road. Hitler did not immediately reject those concerns but only after having
thought about them. As a result, the first Tiger attack began. The Russians calmly
allowed the tanks to roll past an anti-tank position in order to fire into the less wellarmored sides of the first and last Tigers. The remaining tanks could move neither
forward nor backward nor to the side into the marshland, and they were also swiftly
knocked out. 193
Nor was Major Märker the only officer to attempt to dissuade Hitler from deploying the Tigers at
Leningrad. General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of OKH from 1938 to September 1942, wrote:
“Diary of Sergeant Pietsch, 3rd Company, s.Pz.Abt 502,” reproduced in Egon Kleine and Volkmar
Kühn, Tiger: The History of a Legendary Weapon (Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2004), 15.
191

192

Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Da Capo Books, 1996), 280.

193

Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 371-373.

90

In September 1942, the situation of Army Group North was very tense. It urgently
required constant support…Hitler's impatience made no distinction between the delivery
of a new weapon from the factory and its operational status at the front. He completely
overlooked the fact that a new tank type had to be thoroughly tested under various
conditions and that the crews had to be trained until they mastered the new
equipment…The Army General Staff employed every means to convince Hitler that this
type of weapon could not be released for employment at the front. 194
The commander of the XXX Army Corps, General of Artillerie Maximilian Fretter-Pico,
whose command encompassed the sector where the Tigers were employed, objected strenuously
to their use. 195 He had realized the focal point of the attack was to take place in an area that was
canalized, along a forest road, with little to no room for maneuver. As such, not only could the
Tigers not mutually support themselves they could not be supported properly by Panzer III’s nor
the infantry, as the terrain was unsuitable for maneuver warfare. 196
The heavy tank battalions were, at this time, also in a considerable state of disarray. From
May 1942 to July 1943, the German Army created five heavy tank battalions, but slow
production meant the battalions were not afforded their full complement of Tigers until just
before Kursk. In the initial planning for Operation Citadel, one potential obstacle to the offensive
was that the Führer would not initiate the offensive until there were enough Tigers to achieve the
overall objectives. Richard Freiherr von Rosen, who served with 2nd Company, s.Pz.Abt 502
until that Company was transferred and redesignated 3rd Company, s.Pz.Abt 503 in January

“Letter from Generaloberst Franz Halder to Major Scultetus,” January 1970, reproduced in Egon Kleine
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1943, recalled his entire s.Pz.Abt 502, except the Tigerless 2nd Company, had been transferred to
Leningrad, but rumors abounded that Major Märker had ordered the 2nd Company to deploy to
Leningrad, Tigers or not. It was also rumored 2nd Company was being transferred to 1st SS
Panzer Division Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) as it had been decided to allocate a
heavy tank battalion to each Waffen-SS Panzer division, and the shortage of experienced tankers
at this stage of the war made it advantageous for the Waffen-SS to “requisition” unemployed
Panzer men rather than train their own recruits.197
None of the rumors proved true; the 2nd Company remained at Fallingbostel troop depot,
while on the Eastern Front, the situation in late 1942 grew increasingly grim. 198 Two Soviet
Army Groups made a broad movement, overwhelming the Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian
forces defending the 6th Army, and met at Kalach-na-Donu. Operation Uranus smashed through
the overextended and undersupplied Axis lines, and with each passing day, the pocket of
resistance occupied by the 6th Army became deeper behind Soviet lines.
Based on the limited deployment of the Tigers in 1942, the Tigers cannot be considered
to have been combat effective. The decision to deploy the Tigers to a poor sector in a secondary
engagement, where the terrain was thoroughly unsuitable for tanks, was an unsound tactical
decision. This was compounded by the inability of the Nazi inner circle to accept that aerial
reconnaissance conducted before several days of torrential rain on an area of land prone to
becoming marshland may be inaccurate, which indicated a lack of trust between the High

It was later determined to attach an s.Pz.Abt to each SS Panzer Corps. The 501st s.SS-Pz.Abt. was
attached to I SS Panzer Corps, 502nd s.SS-Pz.Abt was attached to II SS Panzer Corps and 503rd s.SS-Pz.Abt was
attached to III SS Panzer Corps. There were plans for a fourth s.SS-Pz.Abt, which would have been attached to IV
SS Panzer Corps, but the tide of the war precluded spreading the Tigers any further than they already were. See:
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Command and the officers in the field. Further, had Hitler chosen to deploy the Tigers in the
sector due south of the city, between Krasnoje Selo and Slutsk, rather than into a reactionary, illplanned operation against the Sinyavino Offensive, conditions would have been far more
advantageous as there are several roads leading into the city, the terrain is more open, 8.8 cm gun
could be more successfully used, and there were a number of rail yards which could have been
occupied as assembly and maintenance areas.
The deployment from Mga was chosen as the Soviets had launched the Sinyavino
Offensive to open a relief corridor to the city. The 2nd Shock Army, 4th Guards Rifle Corps, and
8th Army of the Volkhov Front pushed westward toward the Neva River from their front lines to
the east in hopes of trapping the German XXVI Army Corps against the banks of the Neva River
and the shores of Lake Ladoga. This Soviet offensive had panicked Hitler enough for him to
change the deployment zone, as he had intended the Tigers to crack the bunkers and defeat the
anti-tank guns along the southwestern sector of the city rather than engage in a secondary
operation; however, his impulsivity won out, and the Tigers were employed unnecessarily on 21
September, when the German 11th Army had succeeded in encircling the 2nd Shock Army
without any meaningful contribution from the Tigers. As von Manstein pointed out, “any attempt
to get our infantry to grips with the enemy would have caused us excessive losses.” 199 Only
relentless artillery and Luftwaffe support sorties had been successful in the swampy forests
southwest of Leningrad. 200
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Though Hitler’s Tigers had made no lasting contribution during the Sinyavino offensive,
they were able to make an impact during Operation Iskra, the Soviet attempt to relieve Leningrad
in January 1943. After the failed Sinyavino Offensive, Soviet planners immediately began
organizing a further offensive. In the south, Operation Uranus, conducted from November 19th 23rd, 1942, had crushed the overextended and vulnerable Axis lines, encircling the German 6th
Army, the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies, and parts of the German 4th Panzer Army. 201 With
400,000 Germans, 200,000 Romanians, and a large amount of artillery and aircraft surrounded,
Stalin ordered the follow-on Operation Little Saturn and Operation Mars to begin. 202 Little
Saturn, which lasted from 12 December 1942 to 18 February 1943, was intended to enlarge the
area of recovered Soviet territory around the surrounded Axis forces and push westward in the
general direction of Morozovsk in the Rostov Oblast. 203 Mars – also known as the Second
Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive – lasted from 25 November – 20 December 1942 and was the first of
a series of offensive operations conducted against the German Army Group Center. 204 Operation
Wintergewitter (Winter Storm), the attempt to break through to the 6th Army, had failed. The
spearhead of the offensive, s.Pz.Abt 503 could not reach von Manstein's forces in time to aid in
the breakout and thus saw no combat until January 1943.205
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In the north, Operation Iskra placed renewed pressure on the German 18th Army. After
Stalingrad, Army Group North had a sizable portion of their troops reassigned to Army Group
Center, including the 11th Army, which had stopped Operation Sinyavino. 206 Under ColonelGeneral Georg Lindemann, the 18th Army had twenty-six divisions covering a front 280 miles
long. Further, there were no tactical reserves of division-level strength; each division had a
reserve of one to two battalions, and the 18th Army’s reserve was part of the 96th Infantry
Division and 5th Gebirgs (Mountain) Division.207
Operation Iskra began on 12 January 1943 as part of a wider winter counter-offensive
across the entire front. The Soviets assaulted across a narrow front toward Leningrad in an
attempt to relieve the starving city, with the reconstituted 2nd Shock Army attacking from the
west and the 67th Soviet Army attacking eastward from within Leningrad. Through sheer
attrition, described by one report from the German 170th Infantry Division as “the enemy losses
between the power station and the paper mill had been extraordinarily high, approximately 3000
dead…whole rows of dead Russians lay on the Neva ice,” 2nd Shock Army forged a salient two
kilometers deep and twelve kilometers wide around Gaitolovo, a village four kilometers
southwest of Sinyavino.208

206
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Early on the morning of the 13th, four Tigers and eight Panzer IIIs from 1st Company,
s.Pz.Abt 502 was sent to reinforce the German 96th Infantry Division. 209 A hastily organized
Kampfgruppe consisting of five battalions from the 96th Infantry Division was sent to the vicinity
of the 170th Infantry Division, which was defending the eastern perimeter of Leningrad along the
Neva River near the modern city of Kirovsk.210 Soviet forces had crossed the Neva River and
broken through the German defenses. Twenty-four T-34 tanks were steadily driving the Germans
back, and while the German infantry had managed to disable some of the T-34s, the Soviet tanks
had inflicted heavy losses on the Germans.
Moving into position, the elements of 1st Company opened fire on the T-34s and were
reported to have destroyed twelve Soviet tanks in a few minutes, which blunted the Soviet
offensive. According to Wolfgang Schneider, the platoon caused the remaining T-34s to
withdraw westward toward the Neva.211 The Germans attempted to regain the initiative and
immediately counterattacked, but the poor weather prevented the use of air support. The German
counter-offensive failed to break the Soviet advance. 212
On the 14th and 15th, the Soviet advance eastward from the Neva slowly encircled
Schlüsselburg (modern Shlisselburg). The town, situated at the mouth of the Neva on the shores
of Lake Ladoga, held until 18 January, but Colonel-General Lindemann realized the town could
no longer hold out and so ordered the German defenders to break out to the southeast, in the
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direction of Sinyavino. At the same time, a counterattack against the Soviet Volkhov Front in the
east was expected to secure Pesselok 5, north of Sinyavino, near the center of the corridor
through which German forces were retreating to avoid encirclement against the banks of Lake
Ladoga. 213 During the heavy fighting, though the 227th Infantry Division was mauled, s.Pz.Abt
502 destroyed seven Soviet tanks and blunted the Soviet assault enough that the defenders of
Schlüsselburg were able to break out and rejoin the 18th Army with the majority of their
equipment and their wounded.214 In the fighting, three Panzergrenadier battalions suffered such
heavy casualties that the 227th disbanded those battalions to reinforce other grenadier
battalions. 215 Five Tigers were lost or destroyed– two to self-destruction, one to enemy fire that
was later recovered, and two were bogged down and recovered by the Soviets – leaving only one
operational Tiger and two Panzer III tanks in the 502nd. 216
This was the first instance of a Tiger tank falling into Soviet hands, and both tanks were
shipped to Kubinka. Soviet testing on the captured tanks, which coincided with testimony from
German POWs who provided information on a new heavy tank, led the GABTU (Soviet Head
Armor and Tank Directorate) to order an increase in penetration values for the 85mm gun to 100-
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110mm of armor at 2000 meters, to produce a 100mm tank gun that could penetrate 120-130mm
or armor at 2000 meters, to design and produce an AP shell for the 76mm gun that can penetrate
the Tiger’s side armor at 600 meters, and to design a 76mm round that could penetrate the
Tiger’s frontal armor at 500 meters.217
The directives sent to the directors of Factory 8, the People's Commissariat of Armament,
and the People's Commissariat of Tank Manufacture indicate the Tiger had proven to be
vulnerable to few armaments fielded by the Soviets in early 1943, the Tigers were able to
effectively engage and destroy enemy tanks from long ranges, including the KV-1, and that the
Tigers were able to break through enemy defenses effectively when employed correctly
successfully. While kill: loss claims are heavily discounted for the purposes of this research, the
effectiveness of the Tiger in engaging Soviet heavy tanks effectively while being relatively
impervious to 75mm guns and the 76.2mm gun mounted in the KV-1 deeply concerned Soviet
High Command, as extensive trials of the 76.2mm F-34 AP shell, widely used in the T-34 and
KV-1, indicated it was ineffective against the Tiger at ranges over 500 meters. 218 A summary of
actions from 12 January to 5 February reported to the 18th Army command on 2 April 1943
indicated that:
The enemy does not have anything to oppose us of equal value to the Panzer VI Tiger.
Not more than four Tigers were in operation at the same time. In open terrain, these few
Tigers totally dominated the battlefield. The Tigers knocked out 160 enemy tanks
altogether.219
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Further Soviet actions between 10 February and 1 April 1943, intended to capitalize on the
success of Operation Iskra, reinforced Soviet fears of the new German tank. In the subsequent
operation, Operatsia Polyarnaya Zvezda (Operation Polar Star), s.Pz.Abt 502 was more
successful, as the battalion had received Tigers in greater numbers. Though there had been some
technical defects, the Tigers had proven they could operate in both the defensive and offensive
counterattacks. They had influenced Russian research and development of guns in both higher
caliber and in munitions capable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Tiger, and when
operating in optimal terrain as dictated by doctrine, they were capable of defeating Soviet tanks
which had been impenetrable by Panzer III and IV guns in 1941 and 1942.
The Tigers had a tremendous impact on Soviet operations during Polar Star. Tigers with
infantry support were able to recover lost territory from the Soviets on several occasions and
repelled the Soviet advance at Krasny Bor (modern Krasnoborskoye) with the destruction of
forty Soviet tanks in three days, to the loss of no German armor. 220 One account witnessed two
Tigers destroying two T-34 and four KV-1 tanks, and an order of the day from XXVI ArmeeKorps written by its commander, General Ernst von Leyser read:
Since 12 January 1943, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 has been one of the corps’ most
effective weapons in the heavy fighting in the Leningrad area. It was always employed
whenever it was imperative to achieve success in a counterattack or when the hardfighting infantry needed effective help against superior numbers of enemy tanks…the
fifty-five enemy tanks destroyed in the corps’ sector and the appreciation expressed by
the infantry are the best proof of this. The battalion has shown its devotion to duty
through the heroic death of its company commander, the wounding of the battalion
commander, and other difficult losses. 221
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By the end of the Soviet offensives in early 1943, the Tigers and their crews in the 502nd had
progressed from a failed initial deployment to a viable fighting force. The aforementioned report,
"Aktionsbericht 1. Kompanie schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502 an Armee-Kommando 18,”
indicated the Tiger battalions were most effective when adequately supported by infantry as well
as by their organic Panzer III tanks. During operations from 12 January to 5 February, the 502nd
lost six Tigers, twelve Panzer IIIs, and forty-three men. From 12-17 February, the battalion lost
three Tigers, one Panzer III, and six men. However, from 19-31 March, the battalion lost no
tanks and only three men. For context, there was a Panzergrenadier Regiment attached to the
battalion to affect local counterattacks against the Soviets in the first operation, whereas the last
operation was an anti-tank operation carried out from concealed positions against tanks in the
open. 222
As promising as the results from the Leningrad deployment may have been, the Tigers
suffered more losses as a result of breakdowns and subsequent destruction at the hands of their
crew than from enemy actions.223 Moreover, reports from other units operating in the same
sector during these Soviet offensives provided an intriguing contrast between Tigers and other
German armored units, particularly the StuG battalions. Sturmgeschütze Abteilung 226 was
equipped with forty-one StuG assault guns and was credited with 210 Soviet tanks destroyed at
the cost of 13 StuGs. 224 Further, the cost-effective StuG cost 82,500 Reichsmarks to produce,
compared to the cost of the Tiger at 250,700 Reichsmarks. The StuG was built on the tested
Panzer III chassis, and as it had no turret was relatively easy to build and maintain. The Germans
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built over 10,000 StuG III's between 1940 and 1945, compared to 1,347 Tigers from 1942-1944.
As such, StuG's could be used in more significant numbers, with greater effect, in early to mid1943. Captain Lange, commander of the 2nd Company s.Pz.Abt 502 (then under the command of
s.Pz.Abt 503 at Rostov) noted:
It must be made clear by strict orders at headquarters at all levels not to use Tiger units
below company strength…[and] the s.Pz.Abt with two companies had great potential
fighting power. An increase by a 3rd company…is inappropriate. Such massing of the
Tigers is not possible at the moment.225
Based on the experiences at Leningrad and Rostov, the Tigers could be effectively employed
when doctrinal conditions were followed succinctly. By the fall of 1943, Wa Prüf I had
determined that "the kill rates of assault gun battalions are frequently higher than those of the
tank units even though both are frequently equipped with the same armament, and the tanks have
360-degree vision." 226 In the case of the StuG, the casemate gun, which could only traverse
twenty-eight degrees without pivoting the entire vehicle, combined with its relatively low weight
(24 tons) and wide stance made it optimal for defensive and ambush operations in areas where a
Tiger would become bogged down or where there were dense forests. 227
Stalingrad: Defensive Operations, mid to late 1942
On 23 August 1942, little more than six days before the Tigers of s.Pz.Abt 502 rolled into
a precarious position outside Leningrad, and the Battle of Stalingrad began. The German 6th
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Army reached the outskirts of the city in pursuit of the Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies. 228 The
situation deteriorated from August to November 1942, and Stalingrad was surrounded during
Operation Uranus on 23 November. 229 Field Marshall Erich von Manstein's command was
reconstituted into Army Group Don and included elements trapped inside Stalingrad as well as
those just outside the encirclement.230 Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm) began favorably,
and parts of the LVII Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army were able to advance 60 km on the
first day.231 General Erhard Raus, commander of the 6th Panzer Division, recalled that his
division was able to capture Soviet artillery largely intact, and once the 6th and 23rd had beaten
the bulk of the Soviet infantry, there was a noticeable decrease in Soviet resistance. However, the
LVII Panzer Corps was unable to achieve its objectives. 232
Winter Storm made impressive gains on the first day, as Stavka had not expected a
renewed German offensive.233 General Aleksandr Vasilevsky, who had correctly surmised the
focal point of the German relief operation, had been unable to redeploy the 2nd Guards Army in
the direction of Kotelnikovov, from which Raus’ 6th Panzer launched its counter-offensive. 234 By

228

Georgy Zhukov, Recollections and Reflections, 11th ed., vol.2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 298-299.

229

Andrey Yeryomenko, Stalingrad (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1961), 131–132, 225, 306.

Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1982), 294
230

231

B.V. Sokolov, Stalin: Power and Blood (Moscow, AST-Press, 2004), 262, 264.

General Erhard Raus, Panzers on the Eastern Front: General Erhard Raus and his Panzer Divisions in
Russia 1941-1945 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Military Book Club, 2002), 128-130.
232

“Midday Conference 12 December 1942, Wolfschanze,” reproduced in General Walter Warlimont,
Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939-1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1962), 292-300, 521-534.
233

234

Aleksandr Vasilevsky, The Matter of my Whole Life (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), 243-248.

102

16 December, Army Group Don had lost both the element of surprise and the initiative.235 The
18th, von Manstein wrote, was "a crisis of the first order. East of the Don, despite the arrival of
the 17th Panzer Division, the 4th Panzer Army still had not fought to a point which offered any
prospect of its being able to thrust swiftly into the vicinity of Stalingrad.” 236 The same day, von
Manstein sent his intelligence officer, Major Eismann, into Stalingrad to brief Field Marshall
Friedrich Paulus on the state of the counter-offensive, and 6th Army's chief of staff, Lieutenant
General Arthur Schmidt, argued the best possible course of action was to increase the aerial
resupply efforts; only then would any sort of offensive action be feasible.237 By the 19th, with
LVII Panzer Corps only 30 miles from Stalingrad, von Manstein recognized there were likely to
be few more opportunities to save the 6th Army. He wrote:
The moment for which we had longed since the take-over had arrived. If the 6th Army
now began its breakout while the 4th Panzer Army either continued the attack northwards
or at least drew off other forces from the siege front, the enemy in between would find
himself between two fires, and there would, at last, be a prospect of establishing enough
contact to provide 6th Amy with the fuel, ammunition, and food it needed for continuing
its breakthrough. For this purpose, the army group had assembled transport columns
loaded up with 3,000 tons of supplies behind the 4th Panzer Army, in addition to tractors
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for mobilizing part of the 6th Army artillery. They were all to be rushed through to the
beleaguered army as soon as the tanks had cleared a route, however temporary.238
Von Manstein signaled Führer headquarters of his intentions and received no response. The day
prior, von Manstein had been unwilling to order Paulus to break out directly, and Paulus would
not do so of his own initiative; Paulus feared that, without a direct order from his commanding
officer, his violation of a Führer Directive would bring Hitler's wrath squarely upon his own
head. 239 Recognizing time was of the essence, von Manstein ordered Paulus to break out to the
southwest and evacuate Stalingrad. Paulus' Army had only enough fuel to advance more than
twenty miles and combined with his belief that his troops would not be able to disengage from
Soviet attacks – which were constant – Paulus refused to order his army to move. 240
With Paulus' inaction, Winter Storm was doomed to failure. Von Manstein's plan had
relied on the 6th Army attacking the flanks and rear of the 2nd Guards Army as they were moving
into position and the flank of the 51st Army as it advanced toward Kotelnikovov, south of the
Don River.241 Though the 6th Army had less than 100 tanks remaining and fuel for no more than
twenty miles, von Manstein expected the attack would distract the Soviets enough for the 57th
Panzer Corps to push the remaining twelve to fifteen miles. Paulus's failure to act and his refusal
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to disobey Hitler eventually doomed his army and led him into captivity as the only German
Field Marshall to even be taken prisoner. 242
There were a number of reasons Winter Storm failed. Von Manstein’s Army Group had
been promised four additional panzer divisions, yet these were mostly held in place to defend
against the possibility of further Soviet offensives in the aftermath of Operation Uranus. 243 The
Luftwaffe had been unable to supply anywhere near the daily requirement of 500 tons of food,
fuel, and ammunition into Stalingrad, despite Göring’s assurances that the Luftwaffe was more
than capable. 244 The Demyansk Pocket airlift, which had required 270 tons daily, had been
successfully executed by the Luftwaffe, and this success convinced both Göring and Hitler that
not only could the Germans undertake airlift actions on the Eastern Front but that encircled
troops should hold their territory and await aerial resupply. 245 Hitler tested that assumption and
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found it was not accurate. Lastly, s.Pz.Abt 503, which von Manstein had designated as the
spearhead for the offensive, had not arrived. The battalion had been formed in May 1942 at
Neuruppin and filled with men released from Panzer Regiments 5 and 6. 246 As events were
unfolding at Stalingrad, the 503rd had been first outfitted for the Eastern Front, then for Africa,
and once again for the Eastern Front, all while only having received a complete allocation of
Tigers after arrival at the Kalmuck Steppe region controlled by Army Group Don. 247 Without
delving into speculation, it is unfeasible the Tigers would have been able to force the final fortyeight kilometers between the 6th Panzer Division's maximum advance and the 6th Army’s
defensive perimeter unless Field Marshall Paulus had been willing to ignore Hitler’s orders and
execute breakout maneuvers. As mentioned above, willful disobedience to the Führer was not
among Paulus' personality traits.
Stalingrad to Rostov
When s.Pz.Abt 503 reached the front; their task was to halt the advance of the Soviet
Operation Little Saturn with Army Group Don.248 For Germany, the outcome of the Fall Blau
offensives in 1942 was a catastrophe; in the early months of 1943, all that could be done was
prevent the catastrophe from becoming an outright collapse on the Eastern Front, from Grozny in
the Caucasus to near Orel in the north. While Army Group B had been focused on Operation
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Fischreiher, the advance toward Stalingrad, Army Group A was tasked with Operation
Edelweiß, the advance toward the Caucasus oilfields, and these objectives were to be taken
simultaneously. 249 Army Group A, commanded by Field Marshall Wilhelm List, consisted of the
1st Panzer Army, the 11th and 17th Armies, and the 3rd Romanian Army. 250 By 12 August 1942,
the Germans were atop Mt. Elbrus, having advanced over 300 miles in two weeks. 251 However,
by 28 August, the offensive ground to a halt. As Army Group B began to encounter difficulty
outside Stalingrad, Hitler ordered some of Kleist's 1st Panzer Army to move toward Stalingrad,
including all antiaircraft and most of the Luftwaffe. After the war, Ewald von Kleist recalled:
The primary cause of our failure was the shortage of petrol. The bulk of our supplies had
to come by rail from the Rostov bottleneck, as the Black Sea route was considered
unsafe…but that was not the ultimate cause of the failure. We could still have reached
our goal if my forces had not been drawn away bit by bit to help the attack at Stalingrad.
Besides part of my Motorized Corps, I had to give up the whole of my flak corps and all
my air force except the reconnaissance squadrons. That subtraction contributed to what,
in my opinion, was a further cause of the failure. The Russians suddenly concentrated a
force of eight hundred bombers on my front, operating from airfields near Grozny.
Although only about a third of these bombers were serviceable, they sufficed to put a
brake on my resumed advance, and it was all the more effective because of my lack of
fighters and of flak.252
Little Saturn forced the Germans to retreat nearly five hundred miles westward, and Army Group
A was nearly cut off as the Soviets overran Rostov. To prevent Army Group A from becoming
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trapped in the Caucasus, S.Pz.Abt 503 was tasked with defending Rostov and securing bridges
across the Manytsch River. 253 This action kept the 503rd engaged for the first half of January
1943, but as there was no fluid front, the battalion traveled from one hot spot to the next and
covered over fifty kilometers to reach an engagement. 254 The battalion met with limited success;
the Tigers were able to destroy seven T-34 tanks and five anti-tank guns in an engagement on 7
January, two T-34s, eight anti-tank guns, and an understrength Soviet infantry battalion were
captured or destroyed on the 8th, and a further eight T-34's were destroyed on 9 January at the
cost of two Tigers and one Panzer III destroyed, but the objective on the 9th, the Soviet
bridgehead at Vesslyj, remained intact.255
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In the introduction to this chapter, Leutnant Zabel and the exploits of the Tigers attached
to Kampfgruppe Sander were recounted. While this operation can be considered successful, the
Tigers were operating in local offensive actions and the defensive rather than in their doctrinal
role as breakthrough tanks. The failure to break through and demolish the Soviet bridgehead at
Vesslyj, despite adequate support from the 128th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion,
indicated the Tiger's success rate could be limited by the amount of appropriately supported
enemy armor a battalion faced in combat. Further, rather than massing the Tigers for
breakthrough operations as doctrine required, the 1st and 2nd Companies of the 503rd were used as
“a breakwater, a rock amid the waves in the Kuberle sector, which had been abandoned in panic
by the Italian and Romanian forces.” 257
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The 503rd displayed tremendous flexibility in those missions by changing the
composition of platoon and company elements to suit mission requirements, which at times fell
outside KStN 1176d. In different engagements, the 503rd formed a company-level element of
only Panzer IIIs, and a heavy company of Tigers, with the remaining Panzer IIIs as support. That
formation was used in areas northwest of Rostov, where rugged terrain features prevented Tigers
from being effectively employed.258 This flexibility and willingness to reserve Tigers for
situations where they could be most effective rather than forcing them into poor situations and
expecting positive results indicate that the battalion and company command groups were skilled
at recognizing tactical and strategic opportunities.
The latter half of February 1943 provides further evidence of this tactical skill; from the
19th to the 22nd, the 503rd reported the destruction of twenty-three T-34s and eleven anti-tank
guns at the cost of one Tiger and one Panzer III. 259 At this point, the battalion was down to two
Tigers and five Panzer IIIs operational, and the battalion withdrew to Taganrog to refit. The
503rd reorganized under 5 March's KStN 1176e, which gave them an allocation of forty-five
Tigers and removed the Panzer III and would remain out of action until Operation Citadel. 260
The 503rd also proved to be effective at recovering their damaged Tigers, and the crews
often preferred to remain with the immobilized tank until rescue arrived rather than use
demolition charges to destroy them. In one instance, the 3rd Company sent three Tigers and three
Panzer IIIs to support the 16th Infantry Division (Motorized) in defensive operations. When
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withdrawing toward Proletarskaja, where they would rejoin the battalion, the Tigers encountered
mechanical issues that left them stranded without support. For thirty hours, in blizzard conditions
where temperatures dropped to -40 C, the crews defended their Tigers until they could be
recovered. 261
The push and pull of offensive and defensive fighting in this region took a heavy toll on
both the Soviets and the Germans. For the Soviets, Kampfgruppe Sander claimed the destruction
of thirteen tanks, twenty-three anti-tank guns, and the elimination of several Soviet rifle
battalions. 262 However, it must be noted that the Fremde Heere Ost (FHO), the German military
intelligence service for OKH, which was responsible for the analysis of Soviet and other East
European countries before and during the war, typically discounted numbers of destroyed Soviet
tanks by 50%, according to captured Fremde Heere Ost documents. 263
The differences between the German and Soviet "kill" must also be noted. For the
Germans, it was common practice to consider a vehicle lost or destroyed only if it was a total
loss, and for the Tigers, a monthly report to OKW outlining the disposition of each tank, length
of repair, and return to service date was required; for the Soviets, a killed Soviet tank could mean
anything from a tank which was immobilized, had a damaged turret ring, or had been completely
destroyed. After the war, SS-Standartenführer Joachim Peiper of the 1st SS Panzer Division
reported:
The one who quietly and bravely did his duty caused no comment and, in his seclusion,
remained the fool. The one however who did a lot of hollering, making an elephant out of
every attacking mouse was officially commended and on top of it received quick aid in
261
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cases of emergency. Untrue reporting is an innermost disease of any army and must
always lead to a false estimate of the situation and to wrong conclusions.264
From the Soviet perspective, during the Rostov engagements, the hastily assembled
Kampfgruppen Fretter-Pico and Hollidt had undefended flanks, and the 2nd Guards Army, 51st
Army, and 28th Army drove down the Don River Valley toward Rostov but were halted by the
appearance of the Tiger. According to Soviet records, the aforementioned engagement on 7
January left eighteen T-34s and twenty Tigers out of action. Comparatively speaking, the
German and Soviet counts of defeated T-34s were nearly identical; however, there is a disparity
of eighteen Tigers destroyed between the Soviet and German records. 265
Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, Chief of Staff of the 4th Panzer Army during the
Battle of Stalingrad and its subsequent retreat from the Volga in the face of Little Saturn,
recalled:
Having regard to the problems that faced von Manstein between December 1942 and
February 1943, it may be questioned whether any achievement of generalship in World
War II can approach the successful extrication of the Caucasus armies and the subsequent
riposte to Kharkov. The German military writer Ritter von Schramm spoke of a 'miracle
on the Donetz,' but there was no miracle; victory was gained by masterly judgment and
calculation. 266
Tank Archives has collected reports and documents from Great Britain, the US, the USSR, and
Germany and provides links to records available digitally. Peter Samsonov, the founder of the website, was born in
the USSR and translated Soviet documents, which provides access to non-Russian speakers. The German and Soviet
documents indicate, from a propaganda perspective, tank kills were often inflated to raise morale, but German
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As glowing as von Mellenthin's appraisal of the retreat may have been, there can be little doubt
that the German army was in the midst of a crisis by 1943. The defeats on the Eastern Front
inflicted losses Germany could not replace. Twenty-six divisions were lost in and around
Stalingrad. Including the losses in Tunisia - a further six divisions – this accounted for a loss of
nearly one-eighth of the German order of battle. The loss of manpower tells only part of the
story; the equipment lost at Stalingrad alone was enough to outfit forty-five divisions. 267
In the fall of 1942, before the Stalingrad crisis had reached a boiling point, there was an
attempt to cover Army manpower deficiencies through the "reallocation" of Kriegsmarine and
Luftwaffe personnel. Over objections from OKH, Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the
OKW, presented a proposal that the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe should ‘donate’ 20,000 and
50,000 men, respectively, to the Heer.268 While Hitler agreed, Göring quickly interceded on his
services’ behalf, arguing that “he was not going to let his good young National Socialists be
dressed up in the grey uniform of the Army.”269 Instead, the airmen were organized into twentytwo Luftwaffe divisions, and rather than filling the gaps in experienced Heer formations, the
inexperienced, poorly trained, poorly led, and inadequately equipped Luftwaffe ground forces did
little more than provide the same level of disappointment on the ground as they had in the air. 270
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Hitler’s disregard for the Army’s interests in this manner was also exacerbated by the expansion
of the Waffen-SS, which had impressed Hitler during Soviet winter offensives of 1941-1942 to
the extent that he ordered a significant expansion. Rather than divisions scattered throughout the
Heer, there was a significant reorganization, along with the addition of tank battalions.271 Three
SS divisions were reformed as Panzergrenadier divisions – Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and
Totenkopf – were not only equipped with an entire regiment of tanks but were also allocated a
company of nine Tigers.272 By mid-1943, the Waffen-SS contained fifteen divisions, 280,000
men in the field, a further 70,000 in training, and tank formations that were equivalent to or of
greater numerical strength than their Heer counterparts. Hitler believed the fighting qualities of
the SS, particularly its officers, were due in part to their National Socialist indoctrination, which
was less significant in the Heer. 273
Rostov to Kursk, late 1942 to mid-1943
By March 1943, there were five Tiger battalions: the 500th Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilungen,
the training battalion at Paderborn; the 501st, in North Africa; the 502nd, near Leningrad with
Army Group North; the 503rd, at Rostov with Army Group South; the 504th, in North Africa; the
505th, with Army Group Center in Russia. 274 Additionally, five divisions were allocated a
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company-sized element of Tigers: 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS
Panzer Division Das Reich, 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf, Panzer Grenadier Division
Großdeutschland, and 1st Fallschirm-Panzer-Division Herman Göring. 275
Though Tiger production steadily increased, and battalions received their full
complement of forty-five Tigers, the Panzerwaffe was in an overall poor condition. By February
1943, only 495 tanks were operational on the entire Eastern Front; most of these were Panzer III
and IV variants which, while having been upgraded since Barbarossa, were still quite inferior to
the T-34, both in terms of firepower and armor.276
Hitler’s decision to recall Colonel General Heinz Guderian from ‘retirement’ in February
1943 was an indication of the severity of the crisis facing the armored corps. Guderian had been
dismissed in December 1941 after an incident involving his superior, Field Marshall Günther von
Kluge. Guderian blamed the failure to capture Moscow on von Kluge’s tactically and
strategically unsound deployment of the 4th Army, which had been slow to aid Guderian’s 2nd
Panzer Group at Tula. 277 During his period of inactivity throughout 1942, Guderian wrote:
The unfair treatment that I had received began by making me feel, understandably, very
embittered. I, therefore, requested, during the early days of 1942, in Berlin, that a military
court of inquiry be set up to examine my past conduct; this would have led to the
refutation of the charges that Field Marshal von Kluge had made against me and would
have made clear the reasons underlying my past behavior. My request was turned down
by Hitler.278
For Großdeutschland, Tigers were originally added as the 13th Company. The company grew to
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In a meeting with Hitler’s adjutant, General Schmundt, on 20 February 1943, Schmundt revealed
that the tank corps was in disarray, that the General Staff and the armaments industry were
barely working cooperatively, and that the men of the Panzerwaffe were demanding the control
over the panzers be given to one who had practical knowledge and technical expertise. When
offered this appointment, Guderian refused to accept any position subordinate to either the Chief
of the Army General Staff or the Commander of the Training Army. As Guderian had suffered
serious health concerns in mid-to-late 1942, he cited the effects of “fruitless struggles for
authority’ as his primary reason for this condition.279 Guderian’s conditions also included the
desire for considerable influence over both Wa Prüf VI and the Armaments Ministry where new
designs and upgrades were concerned, and the same influence over the tank units in the Luftwaffe
and Waffen-SS as he would have over the Heer. Guderian was frank; if Hitler did not accept
these conditions, the Führer should give up the idea of his – Guderian’s – re-employment
permanently. To Guderian’s surprise, Hitler accepted his conditions, offered regret at their
falling out through 1942, and appointed Guderian Inspector-General of Armored Troops. 280
By mid-March, the Germans lost and reclaimed Kharkov, and with forces on both sides
exhausted, the onset of the spring rasputitsa halted the majority of operations. While refitting in
February prior to the Third Battle of Kharkov, Großdeutschland received its first nine Tigers in
the counter-offensive between Poltava and Belgorod. 281 A report filed with the 4th Panzer Army,
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which eventually made its way to Guderian, noted that from 7-20 March, Großdeutschland
knocked out
…two hundred fifty T-34, sixteen T-60 or T-70, and three KV-I tanks. This count can be
broken down as follows: one hundred eighty-eight by Panzer IV 7.5cm Lang, forty-one
by StuG 7.5cm Lang, thirty by Tiger, eight by 7.5cm PaK anti-tank guns, one by a direct
hit from sIG self-propelled artillery, and one by hand-employed shaped charge. 282 In this
action, Großdeutschland lost one Panzer III, one Panzer IV l/24, eleven Panzer IV L/43,
and one Tiger. 283
In response to this report, Guderian’s office, the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, noted the
following:
Due to the strong armor protection and armament of the nine Pz.Kpfw. VI, it is selfevident that this unit should be constantly employed as the lead element. It is also
necessary to employ individual Panzers for scouting. The Tiger must endure these
combat assignments without any care or necessary technical support, even including long
periods without changing the oil. The Panzers are attacking during the day and then must
stand guard at night, which prevents any form of maintenance being performed. This
resulted in the first automotive failures occurring after about five to six days in action;
this could absolutely have been prevented through routine care and maintenance. 284
While this report would indicate the Tigers were less combat effective than other armored
fighting vehicles in the Großdeutschland formation, the Tigers were reportedly able to destroy
thirty tanks to the loss of only one Tiger. This success rate indicated that Guderian's assessment
that the Tiger should be employed as the lead element was tactically sound. However, a
memorandum produced by Guderian’s office in April 1943 warned, “the Tiger is a
Schwerpunktwaffe…Dispersing them [into other units] is an idiotic squandering of this valuable
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equipment. The maintenance needs, especially for the Tiger, are not guaranteed in a normal tank
battalion." 285
After the engagements in mid-March, both sides settled into defensive positions to rest,
refit, and reorganize. In a conference with Hitler on 9 March, Guderian explained to the
assembled group, “The task of 1943 is to provide a certain number of panzer divisions with
complete combat efficiency capable of making limited objective attacks. Only in 1944 would the
German Army be prepared to launch large-scale attacks.” 286 This sentiment was echoed by the
majority of the assembled High Command, even Hitler, who proposed no ambitious plans for
1943. Von Manstein later remembered:
The question now was how the German side should continue the struggle the following
summer. Obviously, after so many major formations had been lost, there would no longer
be the forces available to mount another crucial offensive on the scale of 1941 and 1942.
What did seem possible - given proper leadership on the German side - was that the
Soviet Union could be worn down to such an extent that it would tire of its already
excessive sacrifices (some eleven million killed or captured) and accept a stalemate. At
the time in question (March), this was far from wishful thinking. 287
Von Manstein’s concern – one shared by a number of officers within OKH and OKW – was the
manner in which to conduct operations in 1943. Purely defensive tactics were rejected out of
hand, as the German forces in the east were significantly outnumbered by the Soviets. Thus,
there were not enough divisions to cover the whole from the Baltic to the Black Sea. On 1 April,
Fremde Heere Ost reported the German Army had 2,732,000 soldiers organized in 147 and 22
panzer divisions, 1,336 tanks, and 6,360 guns, compared to an estimated 5,792,000 soldiers
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organized into more than 500 division equivalents, over 6,000 tanks, and 20,000 artillery
pieces. 288 From von Manstein’s perspective, any delay in offensive operations would deny
Germany the initiative, which would potentially allow the Soviets to undertake their own
offensives while Germany was distracted by Allied landings in Western Europe, a real concern
after the collapse in North Africa. He argued:
The German command thus had very little time left in which to force a draw in the east. It
could do so only if it succeeded... In dealing the enemy powerful blows of a localized
character which would sap his strength to a decisive degree... This presupposed an
operational elasticity on our part which would give maximum effect to the still superior
quality of the German Command Staff and fighting troops. 289
Hitler had been impressed with von Manstein’s handling of the counter-offensive, which
recaptured Kharkov, and was willing to allow him sufficient leniency in planning for the next
offensive. Von Manstein thus prepared two plans: the 'backhand' and the 'forehand.' Von
Manstein preferred the ‘backhand,’ in which Germany would prepare significant defense
networks, wait for the expected Soviet offensive in southern Ukraine, flex defensively to contain
that offensive, then launch a counterattack with all available forces against the weakened
northern flank to encircle the Soviets against the Black Sea coast in southern Ukraine. His less
preferred ‘forehand’ planned for an assault on the salient at Kursk to encircle and destroy the
large concentration of armor before turning south to deal with the Soviets in Ukraine.290 If Hitler
chose the latter option, the primary concern was time; as the Soviets were recovering from their
own winter offensives, the operation had to be conducted in April, after the rasputitsa, when the
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ground had dried enough to allow armored operations but before the Red Army had completed
its own reorganization.291
In Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany,
Isabel Hull wrote “the German military of the 19th and early 20th centuries was dominated by a
philosophy known as the ‘cult of the offensive.’ This paradigm stated that it was better to
ruthlessly attack enemy forces where they are weakest in the fewest number of engagements
possible. These victories would then lead directly to a final victory over a depleted and exhausted
adversary.” 292 This concept presented an opportunity that captivated Hitler: the possibility of
destroying a sizeable portion of the Red Army in the Kursk salient. In a plan developed by
Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, a two-pronged attack at the flanks of the salient would be
undertaken; in the north, Colonel General Walter Model's 9th Army of Army Group Center, and
in the south, Colonel General Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army from Army Group South. 293
Hitler's objective was limited to clearing the salient and the Red Army forces within, which he
believed would bolster the morale of Germany’s faltering allies while also providing a
significant influx of slave labor. 294 Nor did he intend to accept that time was of the essence, as
Hitler had serious doubts about the plausibility of the operation, which were in part fueled by
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Model, who assumed, correctly, that the Soviets were strong defenses in every sector they
believed the Germans were likely to attack. 295
In his official capacity, Guderian opposed the offensive. In a conversation with Hitler,
where Guderian questioned Hitler’s misgivings regarding Kursk while offering his own
opposition to the offensive, Hitler admitted the very idea of the offensive made his stomach turn.
Guderian concluded, “Then you have the right attitude towards the situation. Leave it alone.”296
Nor was Hitler alone in his concern. Senior officers and members of the government actively
engaged in planning Citadel and others who had been dismissed into retirement had serious
misgivings about the coming offensive, even before Operational Orders 5 and 6 gave a proposed
start date of "mid-April" and 3 May, respectively. 297 Hermann Hoth, one of the more aggressive
Panzer commanders, told Manstein:
The troops, who for months have been fighting day and night without rest, have been
under severe stress. The previous orders of the Führer have led them to believe that they
had earned a certain period of rest. There will be some disappointment now if they
receive orders to leave their present, quite makeshift positions. A series of reports from
commanders, even once with reputations as “daredevils," have made it clear that the
troops at least partly have become apathetic and have only reached their current
operational goal, the Donets, under the strongest urgings of their leaders. 298
In his retirement, Field Marshall Fedor von Bock, who had been relieved of command of Army
Group B in 1942, wrote in his diary:
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…As I have no factual information, I cannot assess the situation. I do not know where the
supreme command wishes the main effort to be, do not know whether the battle in the
east can be avoided at all and know equally little as to whether the plan to wear down the
Russians with limited blows is based on positive intelligence on the state of the Russian
defensive strength. If this is, in fact, waning, then the German attack is justified. But if it
isn't, if the supreme command is again basing everything on just wishful thinking, then
the battle of attrition at Orel will be nothing but a repeat of the Battle of Verdun in 1916,
which, as everybody knows, led to the bleeding white of the German army. But we need
our forces in order to so smash the coming Anglo-American attack so that the enemy
gives up its repetition as hopeless. I don't know whether our wealth of forces is so great
that we can also be capable of major actions in the east. 299
In a two-day staff meeting in Munich on May 3rd and 4th, Hitler, Guderian, Albert Speer, Chief of
the General Staff of Oberkommando der Luftwaffe Colonel General Hans Jeschonnek, Walter
Model, Chief of the General Staff of Oberkommando des Heeres Colonel General Kurt Zeitsler,
commander of Army Group Center Field Marshall Gunther von Kluge, and von Manstein met to
discuss the Kursk situation. After Hitler described the plan that he and Zeitzler had created,
Hitler cast about the room, seeking options.300
Guderian dismissed the offensive as "reckless" and argued in favor of rebuilding strength
in both soldiers in the field and equipment and time to iron out the Kinderkrankheiten – teething
troubles – that were sure to be found in both the Panther and the Tiger. 301 Albert Speer also
argued against assaulting the salient, as the presumed losses at Kursk would not help him get
armored production in order, which in early 1943 had issues he was beginning to solve. 302 Model
raised his previous concerns; 9th Army reconnaissance showed the salient was becoming heavily
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fortified, more so with each passing day. He believed the entire operation should be canceled,
and as an aggressive, optimistic commander, Hitler tended to listen when he raised valid
concerns. 303
Von Manstein’s opinion was enigmatic. As the first of those present whom Hitler asked
for an opinion, von Manstein was in a precarious position. 304 As the Kursk Offensive had been
his idea, he was in no position to argue against it. Nor could he argue in favor of postponing it.
He recorded:
Hitler decided to postpone Citadel until June, by which time he hoped our armored
divisions would be stronger still after being fitted out with new tanks. He stuck to his
decision even after it had been pointed out to him that the unfavorable developments in
Tunisia could mean that if Citadel were put off any longer, there would be a danger of it
coinciding with an enemy landing on the continent. Nor would he recognize that the
longer one waited, the more armor the Russians would have, particularly as their tank
output undoubtedly exceeded that of Germany. As a result of delays in the delivery of our
own new tanks, the Army Group was not ultimately able to move off on Citadel until the
beginning of July, by which time the essential advantage of a ‘forehand’ blow was lost.
The whole idea had been to attack before the enemy had replenished its forces and got
over to the reserves of the winter. At the same time, it was certain that the longer we took
to launch the operation, the greater must be the threat to those of Army Group South and
the Donets-Mius salient, which had had to hand over all their available forces and, most
of all, to the Orel bulge as the jumping off base of Army Group Center’s 9th army. 305
Zeitzler and von Kluge were in favor of the offensive, as was Jeschonnek. Model was opposed
without significant modification, von Manstein was both in favor and opposed depending on the
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question posed, and Guderian and Speer were against it. Hitler was noncommittal, given the
divided nature of the positions presented by his senior officers, so he chose to postpone until 12
June. This date was postponed as well, as Hitler spent most of June watching the Italian situation
and considering other plans, which were eventually scuttled. 306 During this time, von Manstein
remained concerned about the forehand approach. As he surveyed the situation maps, a number
of other opportunities presented themselves. One idea was to lure the Soviets onto the offensive
with the industrialized and resource-rich Donbas as bait, and once their offensive stalled, deep in
Ukraine, mobile reserves would crush the Soviets from the north, drive to Mariupol, and trap the
Soviets in a Kessel larger than the encirclement of Kiev in 1941, where 701,000 Soviets had been
killed or captured.307
By June, Hitler was not in the same receptive frame of mind as at the May conference. As
von Manstein recognized the growing dangers in the Kursk salient, he made more persistent
suggestions to use mobile operations, including feigned withdrawals designed to draw the
Soviets out of the Matryoshka of death, the concentric circles of interconnected trenches, barbed
wire, minefields, pre-plotted artillery, dug-in tanks, and camouflaged machine gun nests the
salient rapidly was becoming.308 Hitler would have none of it. With each passing day, he
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dismissed operieren – operating – as he wanted his men to stand up and fight, to hold every
position to the last man.309
These postponements and indecisiveness had done little to improve the German position
but had, as von Manstein and others had feared, provided the Soviets time to prepare a hellish
defensive network it was unlikely the Germans could penetrate while also allowing the Red
Army time to rebuild their armored divisions and fill out the infantry divisions with fresh
conscripts. Further, as planning, preparation, and field training progressed, it was increasingly
unlikely Hitler would call off the offensive, regardless of his misgivings, as the idea of the
offensive carried more weight than the offensive itself. Kursk had become the Wehrmacht’s
death ride.
Operation Zitadelle: Death Ride of the Wehrmacht
By May 1943, the Wehrmacht had expanded the heavy tank battalions by a further four,
the 506th, 507th, 508th, and 509th. 310 Production had increased from the initial twenty-five tanks
per month in September 1942 to around fifty per month from April to June 1943.311 On the eve
of the Kursk Offensive, the Tiger was the most heavily armed, most lethal tank on the Eastern
Front.
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During the rasputitsa, the Soviets had been engaged in more than just preparing defenses
in the salient. There was not enough time to design, produce and deploy a tank that could counter
the Tiger, but they did begin designing tanks such as the T-34/85 and KV-85. In the meantime,
as a stopgap weapon, the Soviets developed and fielded the SU-152, a KV-2 that had been
retrofitted with a 152 mm gun designed to defeat German heavy tanks. 312 Combined with
existing designs such as the SU-76 and SU-122, the Soviets organized twenty-one SU regiments,
of which most were concentrated at Kursk; a further three were in reserve, and seventeen more
were organized and trained. 313 The SU-152 may have been a stopgap weapon, but it proved
successful as a multirole field gun – it was able to engage Tigers effectively and support infantry
assaults by destroying fortifications – and it remained in service until 1958. 314
The Soviets also formed anti-tank battalions, which were armed with 85mm antiaircraft
guns specially mounted to deliver ground fire in a manner not dissimilar to the German 88mm
gun. These battalions were assigned to tank and mechanized corps, though not all involved at
Kursk had been so reinforced before the Kursk Offensive. 315
Two s.Pz.Abt. participated in the Battle of Kursk: the 503rd as part of Army Group South,
and the 505th, attached to Army Group North.316 As units moved into position, the battalions
were attached at the Schwerpunkt, as doctrine mandated.
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The 505th, commanded by Major Bernhard Sauvant, was in the northern sector under
Army Group North, attached to the 6th Infantry Division of Lieutenant General (General der
Panzertruppe) Joachim Lemelson’s XLVII Panzer Corps. 317 Lemelson’s corps was part of
Model’s Ninth Army; this force was the largest single army ever assembled on the Eastern Front
at any point in the war. Model had five corps organized into nineteen divisions in his army,
including six panzer divisions.318 His objective was to penetrate near Orel and drive along the
railway through Olkhovatka to Kursk, where they would take the high ground north of Kursk and
meet Hermann Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army, which had driven from the south, thus completing the
Kessel. The Schwerpunkt was Lemelson’s, and he had been given three panzer divisions and the
505th s.Pz.Abt to accomplish his mission.
The 503rd, commanded by Captain Clemens-Heinrich Graf von Kagenek, was in the
southern sector under Field Marshall Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South, attached to
Lieutenant General Werner Kempf’s Army Detachment Kempf as part of III Panzer Corps,
commanded by Lieutenant General Hermann Breith. 319 However, the 503rd was not used as a
Schwerpunktwaffe; contrary to Guderian’s previous guidance that Tigers must be employed in a
concentrated effort, and against the advice of Captain von Kagenek, Breith chose to attach a
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single company to each of the III Panzer Corps three panzer divisions: 1st Company was attached
to the 6th Panzer, 2nd Company was attached to the 19th Panzer, and 3rd Company was attached to
the 7th Panzer.320
Army Group South was numerically inferior to Army Group North; there were as many
divisions – nineteen – in Model’s Ninth Army as there were in von Manstein’s entire Army
Group. However, Army Group South had an advantage not found in Army Group North – the II
SS Panzer Corps and Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland. Commanded by SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hauser, the corps consisted of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and Totenkopf
Divisions, each of which had an attached 13th company of Tigers. 321 Each SS division was
allocated varying numbers of Tigers – 1st SS had thirteen, 2nd SS had fourteen (assigned to 8th
Company), and 3rd SS had fifteen (attached as 4th Company). 322 Along with Großdeutschland’s
thirteen Tigers, this gave Army Group South an additional fifty-five Tigers alongside its s.Pz.Abt
503. However, as Army Group South lacked infantry units, this forced the 4th Panzer Army and
Army Detachment Kempf to use the Tigers and other tanks as the initial assault. 323
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On the first day of the attack in the north, 5 July, Army Group Center tasked the 505th
with penetrating the defensive belts so the panzer divisions could exploit the breakthrough. As
the terrain in this sector was crossed by several small streams, the 505th used Panzer IIIs – which
the battalion had converted into improvised bridging vehicles by removing the turrets – to avoid
sinking into the soft ground around the streams. 324 The streams were not the primary concern for
the Tiger crews; the minefields were. The 505th provided covering fire for the engineers
sweeping the minefields, which allowed the men of the 31st Engineers to open two lanes. With
support from the 6th Infantry Division’s 58th and 18th Panzergrenadier Regiments, Soviet infantry
was engaged and defeated near the Oka River.325 The attack continued toward Podolyan, and
when T-34s from the 15th Rifles Division were encountered, the battalion claimed forty-two T34s and a number of anti-tank guns destroyed with assistance from the Panzergrenadiers. 326 This
assault caused the 15th Rifles to collapse, which weakened the right flank of the Soviet 70th
Army, but this opportunity could not be exploited as the 6th Infantry Division on the 505th left
flank had not achieved its objectives, nor had the 2nd Panzer Division been committed to the
offensive. 327 Tiger commander Josef Sandner recalled:
The success of the 505th was more than Generaloberst Model had expected, with the
result that the reserves were not in a position to be committed to exploit the initial
penetrations further… Generalleutnant Großmann advocated bringing up the reserves
and committing them to the fight. The 2nd, 9th, and 18th Panzer Divisions waited.
Großmann stated, ‘… far ahead of the division lay high ground on which we could see
movements by the Russians. If the panzers had rolled through then, we would perhaps
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have reached the objective of Kursk because the enemy was completely surprised and
still weak. Valuable time was lost that the enemy used to in his reserves.’ Employment of
the 2nd Panzer division at that time, not as scheduled on the following day, may have
destroyed the entire front. 328
By the end of the first day, battlefield reports given to Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky
were grim. The minefields had affected the lead tanks, but the following tanks pushed through.
The Germans had advanced eight kilometers without committing their entire force. When
reporting the situation to Stalin, Rokossovsky was promised the 27th Army from the reserve but
instead sent that Army to the Voronezh Front, where another serious situation had developed. 329
The Voronezh Front, commanded by Army General Nicolai Vatutin, was indeed in peril.
Here, the terrain was much flatter, with small tributaries of the Donets and Razumnoe Rivers
running throughout, and though there were minefields scattered throughout the passable land,
there were multiple lanes of approach. II SS Panzer Corps advanced toward the northeast, with
the 1st SS on the left flank, the 2nd SS in the center, and the 3rd SS on the right flank. As the three
divisions rolled forward, they encountered heavy resistance from infantry, anti-tank guns, and
tank, but mine-clearing operations during the night had cleared multiple avenues of approach. 330
Advancing across a twelve-kilometer-wide front, the three divisions of the 52nd Guards Rifle
Division with forty-two Tigers and almost five hundred other tanks and assault guns at the
Schwerpunkt. 1st SS advanced toward Bykovka, 2nd SS pushed through the center, disrupting
Soviet reorganization efforts, and 3rd SS advanced toward Gremuchi. 331 By the evening, II SS
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Panzer Corps had broken the Soviet's first defensive belt, captured or destroyed numerous tanks,
and captured Bykova. 332 3rd SS had difficulty advancing through a larger branch of the Donets
but managed to advance eleven kilometers to the main road between Gonki and Belgorod,
compared to nineteen kilometers for the 1st SS and twelve kilometers for the 2nd SS.333
Großdeutcshland achieved extraordinarily little success on the first day. Advancing along
a three-kilometer front against the 67th Guards Rifle Division, two of its regiments were caught
in minefields that had not been cleared the night before and were raked by a heavy Soviet
artillery barrage. The Tigers had been ordered to capture and hold Point 229.8 to allow the 3rd
Panzer Division to cross a large creek, but the Tigers were unsuccessful. They were successful in
their efforts to take the village of Butovo.334
The 503rd also had difficulty on the opening day. While the 1st Company was able to
attack toward Mikhailovka, the 2nd Company encountered a minefield and, in attempting to cross
it, managed to take damage to all of its Tigers. 3rd Company was unable to ford the Donetz seven
kilometers south of Belgorod, but once a pontoon bridge was hastily erected, the company was
able to hold off a Soviet counterattack and claimed the destruction of thirty-four Soviet tanks.335
In the north, through the 6th and 7th, the 505th encountered several Soviet counterattacks
and, in the process gave some ground which was recovered. The objective, the Ol’Khovatka
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Heights between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka, was heavily defended by T-34s and wellentrenched anti-tank guns, and over the fifteen-kilometer-wide front, a major tank battle
involving over a thousand tanks.336 Despite inflicting heavy losses on the Soviet 16th Tank
Corps, the 505th was unable to breakthrough at Ol’Khovatka, within the second line of defense,
nor was Ponyri able to be taken, as it was heavily defended by the 307th Rifle Division. 337
After much-needed maintenance on the 9th, the 505th was able to engage toward Teploye
(Teploe), but this attack turned into a battle of attrition the Germans could not weather. The
offensive had begun with a forty-five-kilometer-wide attack front, which was reduced to forty
kilometers by the end of the 6th; by the 8th, it was only 15 kilometers wide, which allowed the
Soviets to concentrate their firepower on a much smaller area both sides viewed as strategically
vital.338 The Germans made no further advances after the 9th, and on the 11th, the 505th conducted
limited security operations against local Soviet counterattacks in the hills near Teploye. 339
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General Katukov’s 1st Tank Army significant T-34 losses, which he had relayed to Stalin when
Vatutin failed to respond to Katukov’s messages urging Vatutin to call off the counterattack. 342
By the 7th, II SS Panzer Corps had broken through the first two defense lines and were
approaching the marshes ahead of the Peel River.
At this location, the third defense line had been constructed 13 kilometers behind the
second, and the geography meant the sector was lightly defended. 343 The II SS Panzer Corps
hoped to exploit this weakness, as did the XLVII Panzer Corps, with Großdeutschland, in an
area near Oboyan, where the third defensive ring had been left unmanned only sixty kilometers
south of Kursk, roughly halfway between Kursk and Belgorod. 344 1st SS had broken into the third
defensive line, destroyed several tanks carrying infantry from the 31st Tank Corps, and captured
Hill 258.2, scattering the defending 183rd Rifle Division. 345 The 2nd SS advanced past Kalinin,
forty kilometers south of Kursk, across the Belgorod-Kursk railway but was halted by withering
fire from an armored train. Tiger S24 was destroyed, and the Regimental adjutant, SSHauptsturmführer Karl-Heinz Lorenz, was killed, along with the radio operator, SSPanzeroberschütze Ernst Schäfer. Three other crewmen were wounded grievously, one of whom
– SS-Rottenführer, Heinz Wilken – died the following morning.346
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Despite damage to several Tigers, the Company advanced through to Belenikhino,
forcing elements of the 21st Guards Tank Brigade to abandon the railway station there.347 3rd SS
attacked Krapivenskiye Dvory, twenty-eight kilometers north of Belgorod, then secured the high
ground on the west bank of the Lipovyy Donets River, fourteen kilometers east of Krapivenskiye
Dvory. 348 The Tigers generally were able to absorb Soviet fire but could not press the advance
beyond the river. The exception was artillery; Soviet artillery hit 1st Platoon’s Tiger 914, killing
SS-Unterscharführer Richard Müller. The 3rd SS reported the destruction of eighty-six Soviet
tanks to the loss of three Tigers damaged.349
As Soviet reinforcements made their way into the Voronezh Fronts area of operations, the
5th Guards Tank Army rushed toward Prokhorovka, a town thirty kilometers north of the 3rd SS
position at Krapivenskiye Dvory. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant
General Pavel Rotmistrov, wrote:
By midday, the dust rose in thick clouds, settling in a solid layer on the roadside bushes,
grain fields, tanks, and trucks. The dark red disc of the sun was hardly visible. Tanks,
self-propelled guns, artillery tractors, armored personnel carriers, and trucks were
advancing in an unending flow. The faces of the soldiers were dark with dust and exhaust
fumes. It was intolerably hot. Soldiers were tortured by thirst, and their shirts, wet with
sweat, stuck to their bodies.350
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The 10th Tank Corps managed to make Prokhorovka by the night of the 7th, and the 2nd
Tank Corps arrived at Korocha, a village forty kilometers south of Prokhorovka, on the morning
of the 8th.351 Army General Vatutin ordered an immediate counterattack against II SS Panzer
Corps on the 8th, which consisted of the 2nd and 5th Guards and 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, and an
attack by the 6th Tank Corps against the XLVII Panzer Corps, to stop the Germans from breaking
through into the undefended rear.
On the 8th, the 1st SS had taken Malye Mayachki, just twenty kilometers from
Prokhorovka. The Tigers attacked north toward Veselyy, destroying forty-two T-34’s according
to a report filed by SS-Hauptsturmführer Kling. 352 The most notable action of the day was
conducted away from the company’s main effort. That morning, when the company departed the
assembly area, Tiger 1324, commanded by SS-Sturmmann Rolf Schamp, and Tiger 1325,
commanded by SS-Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger, remained at the company maintenance
area in Teterevino. The Tigers had damage to the tracks, reducing their mobility significantly.
Mid-morning, German infantry in Teterevino received a warning that a Soviet armored force of
at least fifty tanks was incoming. Having been alerted of the Soviet advance, Staudegger and
Schamp repaired what damage they could to bring the Tigers to a state resembling combat
readiness, and they set off.353
Staudegger and Schamp found themselves facing a brigade of Soviet armor from the 10th
Tank Corps, part of the counterattack Army General Vatutin had ordered earlier in the morning.
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Moving to the northeast of the village, Staudegger, with Schamp guarding his flank, chose a
firing position next to an embankment. Over the course of the next few hours, Staudegger’s
Tiger destroyed 17 T-34s with armor-piercing shells, and when he had expended all of those,
Staudegger ordered his gunner to use high explosives, which worked to devastating effect. The
Tiger destroyed a further five T-34s, and the 10th Tank Corps withdrew. For his actions on 8
July, Staudegger would receive the Knight’s Cross, the first Tiger crewman to receive
Germany’s highest military award.354
The remainder of the 10th Tank Corps ran headlong into the 2nd and 3rd SS and were
routed. A follow-on attack by the 5th Guards Tanks Corps and the 2nd Tank Corp were also
repelled with heavy losses. The Soviet counterattack was a spectacular failure due mostly to the
piecemeal engagements; rather than a concentrated assault, the elements failed to coordinate
their advances, and the Red Army suffered dearly for this lack of communication. The 2nd
Guards Tank Corps had managed to conceal its approach through dense forests sixteen
kilometers north of Belgorod; they were detected by aerial reconnaissance, a were devastated by
Stuka's and ground attack aircraft armed with MK 103 30mm cannons, destroying nearly fifty
tanks. 355 A Soviet prisoner captured on 31 July admitted, under interrogation, that his unit had an
assault canceled as the supporting artillery had all been destroyed by the Luftwaffe. The Soviets
did not have the same effect on the German formations. 356
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For the first time in military history, an armored formation had been defeated solely
through air power. This created a dangerous precedent, as for the duration of the operation,
Soviet troop movements had to be conducted at night, which delayed the deployment of Soviet
reserves into their blocking positions.357 A radio operator for one German JU-87 dive bomber,
Hans Krohn, recalled:
Our 'cannon planes' took a terrible toll on the Russian armor. We attacked at a very low
altitude – I often feared that we were going to hit a ground obstacle with our landing gear
– and my pilot opened fire at the tanks from a distance of only 50 meters. That gave us
very little margin to pull up and get away before the tank exploded, so immediately after
the cannons were fired, I always prepared myself for a very rash maneuver. At the same
time, in that moment, I had to be very watchful because in this area, the Russian fighters
were very active, and they sure were the most serious adversaries! 358
On the 9th - 11th, II SS Panzer Corps continued to attack north in an effort to seize
Prokhorovka and Beregovoye. The first German units reached the Psel River on the 9th, and
infantry crossed the morning of the 10th to clear mines and obstacles. 359 The full effort of the II
SS was now aimed at Prokhorovka, though von Manstein was concerned Army Detachment
Kempf would not be able to advance far enough to protect the II SS’s eastern flank. On the 11th,
Kempf finally made considerable progress and seized a bridge over the Donetz in a night
operation. General Breith pushed every available truck, tank, and soldier across the bridge,
hoping Kempf could link up with the II SS and encircle the 69th Army. 360
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With an opening artillery barrage at 0800, so began the Battle of Prokhorovka. Five tank
brigades from the 5th Guards Army advanced from the hills east of the town. 361 The 1st SS was
first attacked by over fifty enemy tanks from two Corps. Then in succession, they were attacked
by thirty-five from the northeast and forty from near Yamki farm to the north.
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Supported by the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, the 1st SS counterattacked the 170th
and 181st Tank Brigades at Oktiabrsky, just outside Prokhorovka. 363 The Soviets made a local
breakthrough in the early afternoon, but the 1st SS restored its lines in a little over an hour. By
the evening, the 1st SS withdrew to the lines it had held that morning. SS-Untersturmführer
Michael Wittman, in Tiger 1331, was credited with destroying twenty-eight T-34s.364
3rd SS repelled the initial enemy attack and moved to a position five kilometers northwest
of Prelestnoe. By the evening, the 3rd SS was advancing toward the Karteschewka-Prokhorovka
road and managed to reach the crossing by 2300, but the division lost half its armor in so doing.
Though this was the furthest north Army Group South managed to push during Citadel, the
crews were suffering; the Tigers were all being patched together almost daily. 365 The II SS
Panzer Corps had managed to repel everything the 5th Guards Tank Army had sent, but neither
side could accomplish their objectives. The battle ended in a strategic victory for the Soviets, as
they had done enough to prevent a German breakthrough. 366
After the debacle in the minefield, the 503rd had somewhat better luck over the next few
days of the offensive. Supporting the 6th Panzer Division, the 503rd was tasked with spearheading
the drive to link up with the II SS Panzer Corps.367 Over nine days of fighting, the 503rd
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destroyed roughly seventy-two tanks, losing only four in combat.368 The battalion maintained an
operational rate near 60%, despite near continuous combat, and the battalion did not have to
abandon any Tigers due to remaining on the offensive, giving recovery units time to rescue
damaged tanks. 369
In Citadel, the Tigers were not employed according to accepted doctrine nor according to
Guderian’s explicit instructions. The dispersal of the heavy battalions violated the concept of
concentration Guderian’s office, the Inspectorate of Armored Troops, had issued on 14 May, but
even in cases where numbers of Tigers were concentrated, they were unable to have success at
the level expected of them.370 As there were only around one hundred forty-six Tigers at Kursk,
this is a comparatively low number of tanks for so high an expectation, given the total number of
Soviet tanks in the area. The expectation that Tigers could achieve success regardless of the odds
greatly contributed to dwindling numbers of operational Tigers in all units except the 503rd,
which maintained an offensive posture, enabling maintenance sections to repair damaged Tigers
rather than resorting to leaving them for the Soviets or destroying them. The 503rd also managed
to sustain over twenty, and on the 8th and 9th, over thirty operational Tigers from the 5th to the
13th, whereas the II SS often fell to low single digits. The exception is the 505th, which also
maintained a generally high number of operational Tigers, but this unit also received fourteen
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replacement tanks during the battle and had the highest number of losses as total write-offs, with
six. 371
While they were not able to achieve doctrinal success, the Tigers were certainly
successful in pushing the German offensive forward, in destroying enemy tanks and anti-tank
positions, and in operating on the defensive, as evidenced by the Tigers of the II SS Panzer
Corps over the last three days of the battle. This latter point is interesting, given that the 505th
was used as the Schwerpunktwaffe in a concentration, whereas the 503rd was dispersed among
three separate divisions. This indicates the Tiger was capable of success in both concentration
and when dispersed, as long as they were used in tactical situations for which they were most
suited.
While it is unfair to compare the Soviet medium T-34's capabilities to the Tigers, it is
clear the Tigers were able to destroy the T-34 far more effectively than the T-34 could operate
against the Tiger. The majority of the Tigers lost were due to minefields and artillery, though
others were damaged by anti-tank guns in fixed positions with a clear field of fire. This generally
consisted of 'mobility kills,' where the track is damaged, and the Tiger is unable to withdraw.
Again, the small number of Tigers counted as a total loss indicates the Soviets did not have
remarkable success at capturing Tigers, nor were the crews willing to hand them over without a
fight or willing to destroy them with demolition charges. Further, the sparse numbers of
operational Tigers in the II SS, where the greatest strategic success had been made, likely
contributed to the low rate of killed Tigers, as there were, in some cases, only one or two Tigers
operational for the Soviets to target.
Captain Clemens Graf von Kagenek wrote, toward the end of the battle:
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While we had been the spearhead up to that point, it was the role of ‘fireman’ that fell to
us now. Our neighbors pulled back under the growing Russian pressure, and Ivan
advanced with strong armored forces. On one such action, I was able to hastily assemble
eight tanks and we attacked across the swampy sector, behind which an alder-covered
slope rose to high ground. Then we saw an amazing picture. Rifleman from our
neighboring division were withdrawing, still in half-organized fashion, and then between
them rolled Russian tanks, firing wildly around in all directions. We were already in an
ideal position and, in a short time, knocked out more than twenty of the Russian tanks
that were moving in front of us like targets on a range. Once again, the weakness of the
T34 showed up - the tank commander in the turret could not see around him. Therefore,
none of them noticed how the neighboring tanks were going up in flames and new targets
kept coming over the hill.372
This recollection indicates the Tigers were capable of being extraordinarily successful in a
defensive position, and as their effective firing range greatly exceeded that of the T-34, they
were able to accurately target and destroy Soviet tanks before the T-34 commanders knew Tigers
were nearby.
The Long Retreat West
After the defeat at Kursk, the Germans never launched another large-scale offensive. The
remainder of their war was defensive against an enemy with limited mobility and preferred
massed attacks callous to the toll on human life.373 By mid-1943, the Germans had lost the
initiative and were subjected to Soviet offensives, which were best described as "an alternating
series of strokes at different points, each temporarily suspended when its impetus waned in the
face of stiffening resistance, each so aimed as to pave the way for the next, and all timed to react
on one another…in that offensive process, the Russian losses were naturally heavier than the
Germans,' but the Germans lost more than they could afford, following the costly failure of their
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own offensive." 374 As General Siegfried Westphal wrote, "The continual demand that the almost
impossible shall be made possible is in itself a brake on the action." 375
The defensive situation was exacerbated by Hitler's policy of 'no withdrawal.' Despite the
loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hitler believed the winter offensives of 1941-1942 justified
his belief, and he spent the remainder of the war entrenched in the position that any withdrawal
to get operational freedom would end in disaster. 376 Von Manstein, who had been relieved in
March 1944, wrote in his memoir:
The fundamental issue was between two incompatible conceptions of strategy and grand
tactics: Hitler's, which arose from his characteristics and opinions... and those based on
the traditional principles and outlook of the German general staff. On one side, we had
the conception of a dictator who believed in the power of his will not only to nail down
his armies wherever they might be but even to hold the enemy at bay. The same dictator,
however, fought shy of risks because of the inherent threat to his prestige and who, for all
his talent, lacked the groundwork of actual military ability. On the other side stood the
views of military leaders who, by virtue of their education and training, still firmly
believed that warfare was an art in which clarity of appreciation and boldness of decision
constituted the essential elements. 377
Guderian echoed this sentiment when considering the fierce fighting for a bridgehead over the
Dnieper in December 1943:
At Nikopol, Hitler wished to exploit the supplies of manganese there available. This was
an economic reason for retaining that bridgehead, though a weak one, and, as already
seen, the bridgehead was operationally harmful to us. So far as all the others were
concerned, it would have been better to give them up and retire behind the broad river
line. Thus, reserves could have been built up primarily in the form of Panzer divisions,
and with such reserves, that would have become possible to fight a mobile war and
pursue an operational plan. However, if Hitler heard the word ‘operational,' he would
lose his temper. He believed that whenever his general spoke of operations, they meant
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withdrawals, and consequently, Hitler insisted with fanatical obstinacy that ground must
be held, all ground, even when it was to our disadvantage to do so. 378
Gotthard Heinrici, one of the best defensive generals in the Wehrmacht, believed the defeat in
the east was due to:
… one main reason – that our troops were compelled to cover immense spaces without
the flexibility in the command that would have enabled them to concentrate on holding
decisive points. I doubt whether we could have worn down the Russians by the pure
defense, but we might well have been able to turn the balance by more mobile kind of
warfare, and by shortening our front so as to release forces that could be used for
effective counter strokes... Thus, they lost the initiative permanently... Hitler always
made us fight for every yard, threatening to court-martial anyone who didn't.379
Other German commanders felt mobile warfare was the only way Germany could regain the
initiative and that a static defense would only lead to more deaths and an eventual German
defeat. 380 Just as Hitler refused to accept the change on the eastern front and adapt his policies,
so too did the Tiger doctrine remain focused on the offensive; as General Inspector of Armored
Troops, Guderian never made doctrinal changes to reflect a defensive role.
In the autumn of 1943, two more heavy tank battalions were formed and sent to reinforce
Army Group South, and Großdeutschland’s heavy company was expanded to battalion size.
These units, s.Pz.Abt’s 506, 509, and the 3rd Battalion, Panzer Regiment Großdeutchland,
arrived from August to November 1943, and the reconstituted 501st, which had been destroyed in
Africa, was sent to Army Group Center in December. 381 Thus, four of seven Tiger battalions
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were operating in Ukraine, and the Tiger companies that were assigned to the three SS divisions
of II SS Panzer Corps remained as well. 382
The deployment of the two new Tiger battalions was fraught with complex, poor
communication and disarray. The 506th, attached to the 9th Panzer Division, conducted defensive
operations which consisted of local counterattacks east of Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, where the
battalion's forty-five Tigers were halted on 20 September, with six tanks damaged and one lost,
managed a successful defense on the 22nd and 23rd, and was stopped cold by heavy anti-tank fire
on the 24th, losing three Tigers.383
A common issue for the 506th and 509th was the piecemeal deployment of the individual
companies, as the 503rd had noted at the Battle of Kursk. Major Withing, the commander of the
506th, noted that the battalion suffered significant transportation issues, maintenance deficiencies,
and poor coordination with supporting units, especially infantry units, and the impact German
propaganda had on the German crews in combat. Where transportation was concerned, any
damage to a loading ramp not only increased the time required to unload a Tiger but also delayed
train traffic on the line behind the transport. In a preliminary report, he wrote:
Because of propaganda in the newspapers, the Tiger had been touted as an invulnerable
battering ram. But it can be knocked out by T-34 tanks or 7.62 cm anti-tank guns from
the front at ranges of up to 500 meters, and from the side and rear, it ranges of up to 1500
meters…Extensive propaganda in the newspapers touts the Tigers as being invulnerable
and pure life insurance, so the higher command, as well as simple infantry, must believe
that they can continuously accomplish anything with this fortress. But this is not so. From
the many direct hits on the Tigers, comparatively few penetrations were achieved. But
many Tigers were immobilized; however, the crews usually remained protected…after
the 7th day, not a single Tiger remained operational. Six were shot up, burned out,
The II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to withdraw in preparation for a move to Italy to defend the ‘soft
underbelly’ after Operation Husky on July 9-10, but due to Soviet offensives by Southwestern and Southern Fronts,
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exploded, and were written off. Even the Tiger can be wounded and must be tactically
employed the same as the other Panzers if it is to be successful and have few losses. It
should be employed as a concentrated unit and not dispersed in a broad front along the
main battle line. When because of the situation that Tigers have to be dispersed, the Tiger
behind cover in hull-down positions is superior to any approaching opponent. However,
by charging into enemy territory with a few Tigers, they can be easily lost to the
concentrated fire of the enemy defensive weapons and captured. In this case they will
have to be sacrificed due to propaganda. 384
The experience of having a battalion transferred from one hot spot to another across a
large front, which reduced time for desperately needed maintenance, was shared by the 509th. Its
commander, Major Kurt Gierga, complained that the inefficiency of the transport trains had
scattered elements of the 509th across the southern Eastern Front such that it was impossible to
know where his battalion was located. Once the battalion was consolidated, it was ordered into
heavy defensive fire at a bridge near Ustinovka, with four Tigers out of action due to damage to
the tracks and gun and two suffering armor penetrations. Further, as the battalion was shifted
from one division to another on the orders of OKH, it became necessary to give the crews
medication to prevent them from falling asleep.385
The Tigers were still, at this point in the war, difficult to destroy outright. But the Soviets
had discovered that even if they could not kill the Tiger, they could cripple it. The gunners in
tanks and who manned anti-tank guns targeted the tracks, running gear, and vision slits in the
Tiger, which proved to be nearly as effective at negating their effectiveness as an outright kill.386
The vehicle's internal communication system was also flawed, as external hits could render the
system inoperable. Major Withing complained, in his 30 September report, that "the driver could
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no longer be directed by the commander, which made command extraordinarily difficult because
the Tiger had to halt, and the engine switched off each time the commander needed to redirect
the driver. 387 Such deficiencies, in combat, could often be costly ones. In an environment where
communication is critical, tank crews left unable to act upon their commander’s orders were
rarely able to maintain combat efficiency.
In the north, the 502nd had been conducting operations around Leningrad since August
1942. In near constant action, the battalion had destroyed nearly seventy Soviet tanks while
suffering substantial losses to its own crews, particularly those in the Panzer III. While 502nd had
suffered maintenance issues as well, the majority of the Tigers were able to be recovered despite
several Soviet offensives intended to relieve Leningrad. The combat history of the 502nd noted
the frequent dispersal of its companies throughout the 18th Army, as would take place in the
southern portion of the Eastern Front, and frequent employment as a single Tiger without
infantry support.388 During the 2nd Mga Offensive, despite difficulties in tactical deployment, the
Soviets failed once again to break the Siege of Leningrad, and the 502nd claimed over 100 tanks
destroyed. 389
By early 1944, the Germans were facing offensives across all fronts. In the north, Army
Group North planned for a tactical withdrawal to the "Panther Line," which generally ran south
from Narva to Pskov in the north, through Vitebsk to Gomel in the center, through Kiev, Dniepro
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and to Mariopol in the south. 390 Otto Carius was stationed along the “Rollbahn Line,” a stretch of
railway between Tosno, Lyuban, and Chuovo, roughly halfway between Leningrad and
Novgorod. Carius remembered:
We were standing in the open and noted that our tanks were rolling towards us on the
Rollbahn over the high ground. When I identified the first tanks more clearly, I was
startled. Infantry was sitting on them. Binoculars out - yes, indeed, the Russians were
personally paying their respects. As fast as lightning, everyone was back in his seat, but
they didn't even take notice of us. They probably thought we were a knocked-out vehicle
and weren't counting on enemy contact. Just as I wanted to call out open fire my driver
lost his nerves and attempted to move out. The first Russians were no more than sixty
meters away from us. Just in the nick of time, Clajus, my gunner, cleaned their clock with
a round between the turret and the hull. The tank turned into the ditch and smoldered.
There are no more signs of life from the crew. Clajus was occupied with the remainder of
the enemy tanks. They ran into one another in a wild panic, turned around, and didn't
think at all about initiating a fight with us. Only two of the twelve T-34’s escaped our
fire… despite all precautions and despite all attempts to seal them off, the Russians had
succeeded in continuing to infiltrate our front to the old gap. They had built a long thin
‘pipeline’ through which they pumped more and more men and materiel. With our weak
forces, we were not in a position to seal off this penetrated area, cut off the Russians, and
eradicate the ensuing pocket. The danger became greater every day that the ‘'pipeline’
would burst and that the Russians would encircle us. That was the question that was often
asked during the Russian campaign: ‘Who is encircling whom?’ We were therefore
withdrawn to the west in order to prevent any further advances from out of the ‘pipeline.’
The terrain was simply not suited for tankers. We reached the train station before its
demolition. We loaded up and steamed off in the direction of Gatschina. The great haste
didn't bode well when we arrived. We discovered the sad details of the destruction of our
1st Company. It had been surrounded on the Rollbahn by Russian tanks. Lieutenant
Meyer’s platoon was almost completely annihilated. Meyer himself put his pistol to his
head when the Russians tried to take him prisoner.391
Despite all efforts to withdraw to more tactically sound positions, Hitler forbade giving the
Russians a single inch of ground. He was fully committed to his policy of no retreat, but the
Soviets were pushing the Germans back regardless of Hitler's wishes. The Leningrad-Novgorod

390

442-467.

Alastair Noble, “The Phantom Barrier: Ostwallblau 1944-1945,” War in History no. 8, vol. 4 (2001),

Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud: The Combat Career of German Panzer Commander Otto Carius
(Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 1992), 33-43.
391

149

Offensive from January to March 1944 lifted the eight-hundred-seventy-two-day siege and led
directly to the Battle of Narva, a contest for control of the Estonian Narva Isthmus, which is
bordered by Lake Peipus on the south and the Gulf of Finland to the north. 392 Walter Model, who
replaced Field Marshall Georg von Küchler as commander of Army Group North, convinced
Hitler the Army Group should create a defensive line on the west bank while holding a strong
bridgehead at Ivangorod, a town across the river from the city of Narva. 393 During the offensive,
the Soviets managed to capture Narva, but the 502nd destroyed over fifty tanks, a large number of
anti-tank guns, and heavy equipment and shattered the Soviet infantry. 394 The Germans reduced
several bridgeheads over the Narva River, and in their prepared defense at the Tannenburg Line,
they stopped the Soviet advance and stabilized the front until 10 August, when the Soviets halted
the offensive.
In six months of near-continuous fighting, the 502nd was instrumental in preventing
Soviet breakthroughs at various bridgeheads along the Narva River.395 The Tigers were often
used to conduct local counterattacks against the Soviet bridgeheads and were successful at
preventing their widening through the use of skillful flanking maneuvers that allowed them to get
behind enemy guns before they were emplaced.396 However, the Tigers were once again

Grigory Krivosheev, Vladimir Andronikov, and Petr Burikov, Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the
Twentieth Century (Moscow: Veche, 2010), 310-320.
392

Kenneth Estes, A European Anabasis – Western European Volunteers in the German Army, 1940-1945
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 177–216.
393

394

Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger in Combat I (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004), 80-81.

395

Mart Laar, Estonia in World War II (Talinn: Grenadier Press, 2005), 32-59.

Egon Kleine and Volkmar Kühn, Tiger: The History of a Legendary Weapon, 1942-1945 (Winnipeg,
Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2004), 101.
396

150

deployed in a manner not considered doctrinal. The majority of the battalion was at Pskov, where
other Soviet offensives required heavy tanks.
The Soviet armor was no longer inferior to the Tiger. The combat diary of the 502nd
mentions several occasions where Tigers are knocked out at range by ISU-152, a self-propelled
casemate-type assault gun based on the IS-2 hull.397 As a result, the Tigers began to suffer more
significant casualties among both men and machines, and the Tiger had difficulty penetrating the
sloped armor of IS series vehicles. 398 Additionally, as the ISU-152 could be employed as selfpropelled artillery, the Germans were forced to disperse their vehicles in a wider assembly area
which inhibited reaction time to Soviet attacks. 399 However, new Soviet armor and a shift in
procedures did not affect the Tiger’s effectiveness against the Soviets, as between 23 February
and 26 September, the battalion was recognized for the destruction of its five-hundredth and onethousandth tank. 400
The remainder of the German army notwithstanding, the Tigers were as successful as
could be expected given the circumstances. As always, maintenance was an issue, and the
degradation of conditions on the Eastern Front, as well as a high operational tempo for extended
periods, inevitably led to mechanical breakdowns. The 502nd often had more Tigers on hand than
the table of organization called for – on 19 April, the combat dairy claimed seventy on hand, but
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only nineteen operational – which allowed the maintenance crews to keep as many Tigers
operational as possible by scavenging from severely damaged ones. 401
A measure of the Tiger's success can be ascertained by Soviet propaganda, some of
which was based on intelligence gathered from the German's tank-to-tank radio communications.
Just as propaganda had been used to stiffen German morale on the home front, Soviet
propagandists encouraged Germans to 'help' them shorten the war. Otto Carius wrote that his
company commander, Lieutenant von Schiller, whom he had known since his arrival at the
Training Battalion at Paderborn, chastised him for not following radio protocol. He recalled:
I couldn't or simply didn't want to get used to the silly code names. During an operation,
was I always supposed to radio, 'Nightcap, this is Wood Grouse' and similar messages?
Our men felt a whole lot better when they were addressed with their real names. I
naturally made use of the code names when radioing the battalion and the supply point.
With the men up front, however, I had addressed and continued to address them with
their real names…Naturally, the Russians listened in. Because of transmissions in the
clear, they knew right away that wherever the Tigers showed up, there were also always
the same men. One time, for instance, they announced via a loudspeaker unit that our
infantry should hand me over to them. They would receive their choice of thirty soldiers
in return. They demanded that our men defang the 'bloodhound' that was forcing them to
hold out…After I was wounded at Dünaburg, the Russians announced over the radio that
I had been killed. The Soviet officer who delivered the lost map board with my name on
it to prove his success was decorated. 402
The Tigers were also used to break through small encirclements in a manner that resembled their
doctrinal use. One report from 7 April 1944 outlined a mission to support the 8th Jäger Division
that was in danger of being encircled by infantry supported by artillery and approximately thirtyfive tanks and assault guns at Vidrino, a village south of Pskov.403 If successful, the Soviet attack
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could penetrate to Pskov or Ostrov within an hour, depending on their mission objective.404 Two
Tigers were initially dispatched, with a third joining half an hour later; one Tiger knocked out
fifteen tanks, the second Tiger claimed seven, and the third managed one before being knocked
out by an ISU-152.405 This action both relieved the 8th Jäger Division, but also decisively
defeated the Soviet advance. Operations of this type were typical in the northern sector of the
Eastern Front, as the Soviets launched successive campaigns with little time to reorganize and
refit. The Soviets were capable of launching offensives, but their assaults were akin to a
sledgehammer and were often based solely on the use – and waste – of their significant
manpower reserves. The Soviets made gains, but the Germans made them pay heavily for
anything gained.
The End on the Eastern Front
By mid-1944, every Tiger battalion on the Eastern Front was used to blunt Soviet
offensives to negligible effect. In May, the 503rd had been removed from the front for a complete
refit, as most of its tanks had been lost in the Hube pocket or handed over to the 509th.406 This
left the 506th, 507th, and 509th – as well as the III Battalion of Großdeutschland assigned to Army
Group South. 407 The 501st, which had been reformed after its surrender in Tunisia in May 1943,
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was attached to Army Group Center alongside the 505th. 408 The 502nd remained in the north,
outside Narva and Pskov, attached to Army Group North.409
The Tiger had, by May 1944, been in production for 22 months; during that time, the
Tiger had forced the Allies to develop larger guns and more powerful tanks to counter the Tiger,
just as the Tiger had been rushed into production to counter the appearance of the Soviet T-34
and KV-1 in 1941. The Soviets were unsuccessful at developing a vehicle that could kill a Tiger
at ranges that exceeded the Tiger’s lethal envelope, but with the development of the T-34/85
medium, which was faster, lighter, and more maneuverable than the Tiger, and the JS-2 heavy,
with a 122mm D-25T gun capable of penetrating the Tigers frontal armor at 1200 meters, the kill
envelope was tightened significantly.410
While the Tiger was in the early phases of production, Wa Prüf 6 decided a larger tank
was needed that incorporated sloped armor and a more powerful version of the 88mm gun. 411 As
with the Tiger I, Tiger II development was pursued by both Porsche and Henschel, with a turret
and new 8.8 cm gun designed and produced by Krupp. 412 Henschel eventually won the contract,
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and the design had technical innovations such as a powered turret traverse that could rotate the
turret at 36 degrees per second and had a control lever that allowed for precise control – 0.1
degrees per second – without having to use the hand wheel, as a gunner in a Sherman or T-34
would. 413 This combination resulted in a very accurate weapon with significant penetration
power. The Turmzielfernrorh 9d (turret telescopic sight) produced by Leitz allowed a 2.5x
magnification with a width of 444 meters at 1000 meters distance, and the gunner could adjust
the focus.414 In tests, it was found that when the gun fired an armor-piercing Panzergranate
39/43 shell, it could achieve penetration of 202mm at 100 meters and 132 mm at 2,000 meters
against a slope of 30 degrees, the same slope as the JS-2 heavy tank. 415
However, the tank had several severe defects. It used the same engine as the Tiger I,
which had already been underpowered. This situation was exacerbated by the 70-ton weight of
the Tiger II, compared to 57 tons of the Tiger I.416 The steering gear, a Henschel L-801 Double
Radius, was prone to failure if used by an unskilled or poorly trained driver. 417 Further, the
engine had significant defects in its gaskets and seals and its transmission; the drivetrain had
As noted above, neither Henschel nor Porsche were involved in producing the turrets; they were Krupp's. Further,
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been designed with a 40-ton vehicle in mind, and it was powering a 70-ton tank.418 Dr. Erwin
Aders, the head of Henschel's design office, identified the source of many problems and
recorded:
In February 1943, Wa Prüf 6 required thorough compatibility between the Tiger B and
the Panther II, which was also in development by MAN, Nuremberg. The highest
possible number of complete components were to be exchangeable. Meetings were held,
and a designer from Henschel worked for a while at MAN. What was achieved was that
the following components…[went into the Tiger B from the Panther II] the engine
cooling system, engine compartment, transmission ventilation, fuel system, ventilation
for the engine exhaust pipes, engine compartment deck, engine exhaust system, and turret
hydraulic drive… the inherited components taken over in this way turned out to be
disastrous in spite of assurance by Wa Prüf 6 specifying that only tested improvement
designs be used… the numerous joints in the lines of the fuel system and the positioning
of the filler tank presented problems, primarily overheating, fuel evaporation, and fires.
The cause was partially in the unsuitable seals, partially in the standard connectors, which
had been adopted from the aircraft industry, and finally in the considerable number of
connections - about 180 - that had to be reduced to around 60 by diverting from the use of
standard parts and other measures. 419
Lastly, the main disadvantage of the tank was the cost to produce, operate, and maintain
the vehicle. As it did not enter production until mid-1944, the Tiger II was a monumental burden
on a collapsing German economy. Each tank required over 200,000 manhours to produce and
cost over 800,000 Reichsmarks – the equivalent of over $5 million in 2022 US dollars. 420 This
cost eclipsed even the exorbitantly expensive Tiger, which had a cost of 250,700 Reichsmarks. 421
From an operational perspective, the Tiger II had a range of 170 kilometers on the road and 120
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cross country on a tank of 860 liters of fuel; its Soviet cousin, the IS-2, had a range of 540
kilometers on the road and 210 kilometers cross country on a tank of 820 liters.422 Germany
could no longer afford the Tiger II's appetite, but the Reich was convinced that the Tiger II could
change the course of the war.
There was little strategic change in the deployment zones of the s.Pz.Abt. between March
and April 1944. However, in early-to-mid June, some changes were made, mainly on the
Western Front. The most notable change was the addition of the 510th, the last new heavy
battalion to be organized, and the addition of Tiger II tanks. 423 This period marked both the
extent of heavy tank battalion expansion and the greatest availability of Tigers as replacements in
the battalions. It also marked the beginning of constant defensive operations, with notable
exceptions.
On 22 June 1944, three years after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, Stalin launched
Operation Bagration against Army Group Center.424 Prior to the operation, Soviet maskirovka
(deception) strategies as part of their Deep Battle doctrine had convinced Hitler that the next
major offensive was to fall against Army Group North Ukraine (the renamed Army Group
South), and OKH redeployed significant forces from Army Group Center to counter this attack:
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almost all of its tanks, half its tank destroyers, and over a quarter of its artillery were redeployed
south. 425 The head of Fremde Heere Ost, Colonel Reinhard Gehlen, assessed there would be
Soviet offensives on every single sector of the front but emphasized the threat to Army Groups
North Ukraine and South Ukraine. After the war, he recalled:
By the spring of 1944, the military situation on the eastern front was so gloomy that I felt
safe to supply our long-term intelligence digest only and sealed envelopes to other
leading members of the general staff and to Major Baun [in charge of espionage
operations in the Soviet Union]. I had to ask them not to show the reports to anyone else
and to return the documents to me, ‘in view of the way the enemy position is viewed
therein.’426
The intelligence prompted a shift in the heavy tank battalions as well; the 501st sent nine Tigers
to the 509th to ensure it was at full strength, leaving it with twenty Tigers, and the 505th was
redeployed to Army Group North Ukraine. 427 This left only an understrength 501st with Army
Group Center.
The offensive prompted the immediate deployment of the 501st near Orscha in eastern
Belarus, a town situated near the crossroads of Mogilev in the south, Smolensk in the east,
Vitebsk in the north, and Minsk in the west. There are few records of the first few days, but there
was fierce fighting on the 23rd, which caused the battalion to withdraw. During this withdrawal, a
bridge over the Oscha (Orsjitsa) River northeast of the junction collapsed with Tiger 201 on it,
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and several other Tigers were immobilized due to a lack of fuel. 428 In other sectors, the 501st was
committed Tigers to the 14th Infantry Division and the 78th Sturm Division. 429 Tigers in these
sectors fared little better, and despite receiving five replacement Tigers at Molodetschno, the
battalion lost its last Tigers in fighting on 5 July.430 In fourteen days, the 501st was annihilated.
During this period, the battalion reported the destruction of only four T-34s, but due to
the battalion's dispersal, reports to the battalion were sporadic. This rapid collapse, not of just the
501st but the entirety of the Army Group Center, led OKH to relocate two battalions to Army
Group Center. The 507th was transferred to Baranovicze, in east central Belarus, while the 505th
was deployed at Tolotschyn (Talachin) Belarus, west of Orscha; the destination was changed
several times due to Soviet advances, and the battalion ended up dispersed along a sixty-fourkilometer stretch. 431
The 505th was responsible for containing the Soviet advance along the axis of the MinskMoscow highway, including maintaining bridgeheads over the Bobr and Beresina Rivers. 1st
Company was deployed near Krupki and destroyed sixteen Soviet tanks on the 27th, and a further
seventeen on the 28th, at the cost of three Tigers. On the 29th, the 1st Company was encircled
while conducting blocking actions and lost three tanks, but the company was relieved by the
battalion and was withdrawn across the Beresina near Bolunho-Lody. During this same time, the
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3rd Company contained Soviet advances near Ssloboda and destroyed seventeen tanks, to the loss
of three Tigers.432
During the first week of July, the 505th engaged in further blocking actions and supported
defenses against the Soviet advance. By the 6th, however, the advance westward had grown from
a walk to a run, and the battalion could no longer keep up recovery operations as it moved
further westward. On the 7th, the Soviets broke through and overran the railway, leading to the
destruction of one prime mover and several Tigers.433 On the 9th, the remaining Tigers and men
of the 505th arrived in Grodno; the combat journal claimed the battalion destroyed one hundred
twenty-eight Soviet tanks in twelve days.434
From 2 July to the 10th, the 507th conducted operations from Baranovicze. During the
fighting, which included blocking actions similar to the 505th and the rescue of Hungarian
prisoners, the battalion was slowly forced back to Slonim, fifty-four kilometers to the west. 435 By
the 5th, ground had been regained, and the battalion was once again at Baranovicze. However,
the same day, significant Soviet artillery and air raid barrages forced the front to be pulled back
twenty kilometers, and German forced in Minsk were encircled; Oberschütze Anton Seefried
noted in his journal:
We came to a village where it was quiet all day. In the afternoon, we entered a
neighboring village where all cattle were slaughtered in expectation of our being
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surrounded. When we returned to 'our' village, it had just been ravaged by aircraft, and
half of it was in flames.436
The battalion was encircled near Slonim and, on the 8th, forced a breakout to Slonim. After four
additional days of fighting, the battalion was withdrawn to Ulezly, seventy kilometers west of
Slonim, and by the 15th, the battalion was a further seventy-three kilometer west, at Podozierany,
Poland. By the 19th, the end of Bagration, the battalion was conducting operations to maintain
bridgeheads over the Narew River west of Bialystok, Poland, and over the Loknica River near
Trezeszczotki, Poland. 437 From the 2nd to the 20th of July, the 507th had withdrawn two hundred
seventy-six kilometers, but unlike the 505th, they were not taken off the line for a refit; the 507th
maintained no fewer than thirty-eight Tigers for the duration of July, often over forty operational
during August, and fell to a low of twenty-two on 11 September.438 The 507th would conduct
successful defensive operations around the Narew River. They forced several bridgeheads, which
allowed retreating Germans safe crossing. Lieutenant Gerd Eychmüller, a Zugführer in 1st
Company, wrote in his diary:
After approximately two months of defensive battles in the Army Group Center's sector,
we had so dampened down the Russians' strength that, at first, they gave up the idea of
launching out from their two strong bridgeheads at Rozan and Nasielsk on the Narew
River north of Warsaw. Panzer Battalion 507 was, therefore, able to spend four weeks
recuperating from the strain of fighting these endless retreats and to 'lick its wounds.' On
4 October 1944, we began the attempt to crush and, if possible, eliminate entirely the
bridgeheads on the River Narew. That day the Tiger of my company commander,
Oberleutnant Beilfuss, was hit, killing the driver while the commander himself was
seriously wounded and had to be transported to a military hospital... There now followed
five full days of operations, details of which I no longer remember except on 5 October
my former commander, Hauptmann Neumeyer, lost his life, and a Panzer in first platoon
was destroyed when a round from a SU-152 self-propelled gun tore off the turret of his
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Panzer… even though we and the other units with which we were deployed failed to
crush the Narew bridgeheads, and despite our fairly high losses in men and material, we
inflicted such heavy casualties on the enemy that for the remainder of 1944 he decided
not to attempt any advance any further westward. 439
The three heavy tank battalions that participated in defending against Operation Bagration could
not have been expected to blunt the Soviet offensive. Karl-Heinz Freiser estimated the Soviet
strength at 2.5 million men, 6,000 tanks and assault guns, and 45,000 guns, rocket launchers, and
mortars.440 From 22 June to 19 August, the Germans lost twenty-eight of thirty-four divisions,
suffered 450,000 casualties, and had a further 300,000 encircled in the Courland Pocket. 441 Even
if all three battalions had been at full combat strength, little could have been accomplished
against an enemy with such vast numerical superiority.
Helmut Schneider, himself a commander of 1st Company, wrote, “the soldier in the field
had felt for some time that the Eastern Front was like a growing child’s shirt: too short in the
back if you pulled it down in the front, and vice versa.” 442 The Tiger battalions were pulled in
such a way, from one defensive position to the next, from one emergency to another, and they
attempted to halt the Soviets long enough to allow as many German forces as possible to escape
captivity or death. This pull had, to Schneider, become much more acute both after the
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Normandy landings and the later Ardennes Offensive, where troops from the Eastern Front were
relocated to take place in the failed offensive against the Allies. 443
Conclusion
In just over two years of fighting, the Tigers had proven themselves to be ruthlessly
efficient at destroying Soviet armor on the offense and defensive; they were able to slow or halt
Soviet advances, maintain bridgeheads for retreating units, and extricate themselves from
encirclements if allowed the tactical flexibility to do so. At the Battle of Narva, for example, the
502nd, along with other German forces, were able to hold the Soviet Leningrad Front from
entering Estonia from February to August 1944.444 This is misleading in itself, as once the
Soviets had pushed the Germans back at Narva, Army Group North, with the 502nd and 510th,
became trapped in the Courland Pocket and repelled six Soviet offensives to clear the Baltic
region and restore Soviet borders.445 The Soviets never advanced further than forty kilometers
into the German perimeter, and when the war ended, the Soviets were within a few kilometers of
their starting positions.446
It must be further noted that the Germans had placed such faith in their heavy tanks the
502nd and 510th sent their respective 3rd Companies out of the encircled pocket by boat from
Libau, Latvia, through Danzig to Paderborn, to receive training on the Tiger II. The respective
companies then retrieved their Tiger II’s directly from the factory (the last twelve to be produced
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plus three older, refurbished tanks) in Kassel. This led to immediate defensive operations around
Kassel, which was under assault by the Western Allies. 447
The Tigers were rarely employed according to doctrine on the Eastern Front; as a
schwerpunktwaffe, they were infrequently employed in a breakthrough, and those that were
attempted were not always successful. Even in the same operation, some units would have far
greater success than others. Kursk is the best example of this, where the Tiger battalions attached
to Army Group South – the numerically inferior German formation at Kursk – had far greater
success than Army Group Center, where Tigers were employed in terrain advantageous to the
offense.
The Germans failed to make either defensive additions to the Tiger's doctrine or to scrap
the Tiger altogether in favor of a more capable, cheaper, and easier-to-maintain defensive
weapon in response to the changing situation after the autumn of 1942.448 Though doctrine did
not change, the Tiger battalions were able to adapt the existing offensive doctrine to their
defensive needs. The concentration principle, for example, which Guderian had emphasized so
heavily, was effective in two areas: in the offense, a concentrated Tiger battalion was a red flag
for the Soviets and indicated where the weight of the German offensive was to fall; in the
defense, the concentrated Tiger battalion was easier for Soviet armor to bypass, and the
concentration generally increased the maintenance and logistic requirements for that sector
untenable for the German supply lines.
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The Tigers were thus most effective when used as a reserve force rather than the main
effort when on the defensive, as the Soviets would be unsure where the heavy tanks would be
employed. When dispersed as an individual company attached to the infantry or another Panzer
division, they could cover a wider range of the defensive front, particularly in restrictive terrain.
The concentration principle certainly would have been effective once the schwerpunkt was
decisively engaged, but the Tigers should not have been viewed as the schwerpunktwaffe but
rather as a wedge that forced the breach to open further. From a comparative perspective, an
analysis of Soviet deep operations indicated the Soviet theory of tactical deep battle, where
multiple points were treated as the focal point, with reserves fully mobilized, and were used to
keep the Germans from recognizing their true objectives. 449 Deploying the Tigers in such a
manner would not only have masked the German's tactical and strategic objectives but could
have prevented tanks that were meant to break through a defensive perimeter from being used in
a manner counter to their doctrinal role, their mechanical capabilities, and the logistic realities
the Reich faced by 1943.
Moreover, the German’s rigid adherence to a doctrine that insisted upon gaining local
numerical superiority at a single focal point diminished the Tiger’s advantage in firepower. For
example, at Kursk, the 505th was assigned as the spear tip for the 2nd Panzer Division, which was
not committed to the offensive on the first day. However, the II SS Panzer Corps incorporated a
company into their divisional organization, which provided both the Panzer Division and their
Tiger Kompanie flexibility to react to evolving tactical situations as the battle progressed. While
contrary to both established doctrine and Guderian’s specific guidance regarding Tiger
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employment, dispersal into company strength rather than battalion strength provided the II SS
Panzer Corps with a greater level of “operational art” than established doctrinal guidance.
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Chapter Four:
Tigers on the Western Front: North Africa, Italy, and France
I’m afraid we, I think most people were pretty scared of Tigers, they were remarkable
things…we always believed that if you met a Tiger tank, there was no one-to-one thoughts at all.
You would need three tanks to fight a Tiger, so that two would be on the flanks trying to find
some weaker spots. 450
-Lance Corporal Reg Hunt, 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers
The Tigers involved in fighting in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe had a much
different combat environment than their counterparts on the Eastern Front. By the time the
Tigers had been developed, Germany was the master of Western Europe, and the fighting was in
North Africa, a front opened by Italy in 1940. With their ally Italy faltering in their attempt to
reclaim the territory of the Roman Empire, Germany was inclined to enter to support the Italian
war effort against the British.
With one notable exception, the Tigers took part in no major offensives on the Western
Front. Thus, not only were the Tigers being used in a defensive role, but they were also subjected
to a foe they had little recourse against – air power. American air power made up for what its
armored forces lacked, and the Tigers, relentlessly effective at destroying American and British
tanks, could not withstand strategic bombing by the American and British forces on the
continent. 451
This chapter will argue that the Tigers were not only rendered wholly ineffective in their
doctrinal role, but their defensive role was limited by Allied planners who opted to bypass Tiger
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battalions wherever possible. Both Tiger I and II had little to fear from Allied armor in Italy,
France, or North Africa, but they made easy targets for bombers. Further, their armor and
firepower inspired the development of more heavily armed and armored tanks, which were
effective against the Tigers and the other Panzers fielded by the German Army from 1943-1945.
Additionally, when the Tigers were used in localized counterattacks, they were met by the Allied
technique of deploying minefields with overwatching anti-tank guns and artillery. This practice
allowed the Tigers to be countered appropriately without having to use tanks that the Tigers were
easily able to destroy. Moreover, the introduction of handheld anti-tank weaponry allowed the
British and American infantry to counter the Tiger effectively. Lastly, the Tigers' ineffectiveness
was exacerbated by the German economy, as the Reich could neither afford to produce new
Tigers nor logistically support their efforts, though they were prepared to attempt such at the cost
of other production sectors.
This knowledge did not alter Albert Speer’s opinion of the Tiger, when, despite an
intimate understanding of the realities facing the Reich, he stated, “With ten Tiger IIs, you can
compete against 200 Shermans…you see that in itself, the Tiger II has threefold the weight of the
Panzer IV but also has about twenty times the combat value.” 452 Speer justified the Tiger as
combat effective to boost crumbling morale, and despite knowledge that economically Germany
was defeated, Speer continued to argue that even tactical superiority could prolong the war – a
local superiority the Tiger had proven capable of providing. But this ability to project tactical
superiority on the ground could not compete with the Allied strategic superiority in the air. Speer
recognized that Germany had doomed itself through resistance to superior tactics, but he was
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unable to force the cancelation of the Tiger program because the tank itself was now a symbol of
German resistance against its ideological enemies. 453
North Africa
By the fall of 1942, the war in North Africa was going poorly for the Axis. The British
victory at El Alamein and the Allied landing in Morocco and Algeria backed Rommel’s
Afrikakorps into a corner in Tunisia, where ports allowed the Germans to receive supplies they
required for defensive operations. Though German intelligence had discounted the possibility of
Allied landings in territory held by the Vichy French – who were neutral – the Torch landings
had commenced on 8 November 1942.454 Hitler considered North Africa to be vital to the war
effort, and he ordered the deployment of s.Pz.Abt 501 to the North African theater.455
The campaign had not been doomed to the failure it faced in late 1942. Rommel's drive in
July to El Alamein, sixty-five miles from Alexandria, had been one of the darkest moments of
the campaign for the British. However, Hitler had a corporal's understanding of warfare, and as
he was unskilled in military theory, he failed to capitalize on Rommel's success. American
journalist and war correspondent William Shirer argued:
…He awarded the daring leader of the Africa Korps a Field Marshall's baton, but he did
not send him supplies or reinforcements. Under the nagging of Admiral Raeder and the
urging of Rommel, the Führer had only reluctantly agreed to send the Africa Korps and a
small German Air Force to Libya in the first place. Nevertheless, he had done this only to
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prevent an Italian collapse in North Africa, not because he foresaw the importance of
conquering Egypt.456
Cicero wrote, “Armies are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at
home.” 457 There was little wise counsel to be found in Hitler or his sycophants in High
Command. By the time Hitler realized the importance of North Africa, the Americans had landed
in Algeria and Morocco. Rommel recalled, in 1944, that:
The German high command... failed to see the importance of the African theater. They
did not realize that, with relatively small means, we could have won victories in the Near
East which, with their strategic and economic value, would have far surpassed the
conquest of the Don Bend. Ahead of us lay territories containing an enormous wealth of
raw materials... which could have freed us from all our anxieties about oil. A few more
divisions for my army, with supplies for them guaranteed, would have sufficed to bring
about the complete defeat of the entire British forces in the Near East.458
Nor was the campaign decided solely on resources. Not only was Rommel hindered by both
German and Italian High Commands, but he also had shortages in men and materiel. Recalling
1942, Rommel contended:
It was apparent that the High Command's opinion had not changed from that which they
had expressed in 1941, namely, that Africa was a 'lost cause' and that any large-scale
investment of material and troops in that theatre would pay no dividends. A sadly shortsighted and misguided view. For, in fact, the supply difficulties which they were so
anxious to describe as 'insuperable' were far from being so. All that was wanted was a
real personality in Rome, someone with authority and drive to tackle and clear away the
problems involved…our government's weak policy towards Italy seriously prejudiced the
German -Italian cause in North Africa. 459
456
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For his supposed concern for North Africa, Hitler's policy was a mix of vocal support and abject
neglect. Rommel's belief that the German position toward Italy had been soft was supported by
the arrival of adequate supplies after the Allied landings in November 1942. One hundred fifteen
thousand two hundred tons of supplies were shipped, with 94,045 tons making port, a number
than nearly matched the high from July 1942.460 Rommel recorded:
… in Tunisia - when, of course, it was too late - it became perfectly possible to double
our supplies, but by that time the fact that we were up to our necks in trouble had
penetrated even to the mainland... What we found really astonishing was to see the
amount of material that they were suddenly able to ship to Tunisia, quantities out of all
proportion to anything we had received in the past... All at once, it was possible to ship
anything up to 60,000 tons a month to Tunis until March 1943, in spite of the fact that the
British and Americans then had a far tighter grip on the Mediterranean than they had in
1941-42. 461
Germany managed to ship more than just supplies across the sea from Europe. On 23 November
1942, the first three Tigers of the 501st landed in Bizerte, and given Hitler's interest in the tank, it
would be reasonable to believe the German High Command would adequately support the
battalion, but this was not the case. Rommel grasped the use of armored forces, including new
technology, almost intuitively, and he believed fully in German doctrine: concentration of
strength, a forced breakthrough, and penetration far into the enemy's strategic zones, where the
'soft' troops were located. 462 Rommel realized the potential which had been provided; High
Command had not. Rommel believed:
Of all the theaters of operation, North Africa was the one where the war took on its most
modern shape. Here were opposed fully motorized formations for whose employment the
flat desert, free of obstructions, offered hitherto unforeseen possibilities. Here only could
the principles of motorized and tank warfare, as they had been taught before 1939, be
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fully applied and, what was more important, further developed. Here only did the pure
tank battle between large, armored formations actually occur. 463
As the most capable tank killer on the battlefield in 1942 on any front, the Tiger should have
been wildly successful in North Africa, and with its supporting units the Wehrmacht may have
been able to have had greater success. With open terrain, the 88mm Kw.K L/56 cannon's flat
trajectory, long range, and high velocity were more than capable of defeating all British armor in
the theater at ranges well beyond their own effective range. For example, the American-built M3
Lee had frontal armor thickness of 57mm; the Tiger could penetrate 84mm of armor at 2000
meters. 464 But, the lack of adequate logistic and close-air support meant the German excursion
was doomed from the start.
After unloading from the cargo ship Aspromante, the battalion commander, Major HansGeorg Lüder, ordered the commander of the 1st Company, Captain Nikolai Baron von Nolde, to
form a Kampfgruppe around the four Tigers.465 This hastily formed battle group went into
combat on 1 December at Tebourba, Tunisia, a town 12 kilometers west of Tunis.466
From December 1942 to March 1943, the 501st participated in minor offensive actions
and several large-scale attacks. The battalion was slowly equipped with more Tigers, but as the
majority were diverted to the Eastern Front, the 501st received its final shipment in January
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1943. 467 Combat operations were generally undertaken in company-size strength until Operation
Ox Head when the 501st deployed in battalion strength as part of an operation to recapture
Medjez el Bab, El Aroussa, and Hunt’s Gap, a position between the British First Army and the
Afrikakorps. 468
During Ox Head, the battalion was deployed piecemeal, as multiple points needed Tigers
to blunt the advance of British and American forces. 469 Though the battalion maintained a 62%
operational rate, it was found that the majority of Tigers lost were the result of mines and
artillery action, with several rendered inoperable – and unrecoverable – through well-placed 6pounder anti-tank fire.470 One situation report outlines the employment of Tigers from 18-25
January 1943. It was reported:
After the first breakdowns, every day we managed to keep three to five operational
Tigers in combat. It would easily have been possible to repair and return damaged
Panzers in far larger numbers, if the battalion had had the necessary repair parts on hand
and if the workforce of the 2nd Platoon of the maintenance company still in Trapani had
been transported to Tunisia… One Tiger was operational after the conclusion of the
combat action. Six Tigers drove on the mines period of these six, one Tiger drove onto
mines twice. It is this Tiger that was the last one that was operational. One Tiger fell on
the first day in action because in idler wheel was damaged by a mine and no replacement
was available. This Tiger was cannibalized to establish a reserve of necessary repair parts
for the other damaged Tigers. Another Tiger fell out on the second day of action because
it became stuck in a creek bed. In the attempt to free it, the transmission drive shaft
failed, and a replacement was not available. After the conclusion of operations in this
sector, the steering gear from the cannibalized Tiger was installed and the Tiger driven
out. The battalion lost its first Tiger as a total write off on the last day of combat. An
artillery shell hit the right side, passing through the last road wheel, and pushing into the
467
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whole side without penetration. This caused the fuel tank located in close proximity to
the wall to leak period because this Tiger lay under enemy fire, it had to be driven out of
this area in order not to fall into the hands of the pursuing enemy. After this attempt was
successful, the fumes exploded. In spite of all attempts to extinguish the fire with the fire
extinguishers on hand, the Tiger burned out completely. 471
In North Africa, mud, artillery, and mines were far more of a danger than the Allied armor.
Though the 501st reported the destruction of several enemy tanks, accurate artillery and wellpositioned 6-pounders were able to prevent the Tiger from making an impact on the course of the
campaign. As the above report noted, the maintenance sections were also widely dispersed, and
the lack of FAMO heavy movers forced the battalion to destroy several Tigers, which could have
been repaired. This last point also must assume the Tiger is in a recoverable position, as the
prime recovery vehicle, the Sd.Kfz. 9 FAMO was an unarmored, eighteen-ton recovery vehicle
that was both slow and defenseless. Thus, Tigers in need of rescue had to be in a secure
position. 472
The Allied defensive tactics continued to prove a reliable counter to the Tigers. In a
manner similar to the Soviet concept of “deep operation,” the Allies pulled back successively,
laid minefields overwatched by anti-tank guns, then overwatched both with artillery. Once the
Tigers encountered difficulty in the minefields, the artillery fired and destroyed or severely
damaged the tank. This method was used particularly effectively in Ox Head, where seven Tigers
were damaged heavily and were unable to be recovered. 473 This last action rendered the 501st
combat ineffective, and with one remaining operational Tiger, they handed off their inventory to
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include Tigers that could be repaired to the incoming s.Pz.Abt 504, which arrived in Tunisia in
March 1943. 474
In Tunis, Major August Seidensticker learned of the situation in central Tunisia near
Sfax, where the Allies were attempting to drive to the sea along the Mareth Line, a system of
fortifications from Chott el Djerid, a lake that nearly bisects central Tunisia, to El Hamma and
Gabes - towns situated along the far eastern lakeshore and the Mediterranean, respectively. The
Allies sought to cut the ten-kilometer-wide strip of land which connected northern and southern
Tunisia. General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim, the Afrikakorps commander since 10 March, ordered
the 504th to stop the Allied drive. 475
From the 19th to the 24th of March, the battalion crossed over 400 kilometers from Tunis
to Sfax with few major mechanical issues. Major Seidensticker had sent his maintenance
company with the forward elements to ensure the Tigers were kept moving, and the critical
Maknassy Pass was held through the night and the following day. The unit history claims the
504th destroyed thirty-five American tanks from the US 9th Armored Division on the 20th, with
the official American report indicating the forces defending the Sened - Maknassy area had been
strengthened significantly by the inclusion of “key German personnel.” 476 From 25 March to 25
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April, the Tigers engaged and destroyed Allied armor and guns during continuous defensive
operations. The Wehrmacht daily report for 25 April indicated the number of destroyed enemy
tanks to be around 80, with the unit history claiming a further sixty-seventy by the end of
April.477
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During the last month of the North African campaign, the 504th claimed more than one
hundred destroyed tanks to the loss of one Tiger that was blown up after running out of fuel.479
Maintenance was a constant issue, and the battalion managed to keep less than ten Tigers
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operational during this period. Despite low numbers, the 504th managed a successful blocking
operation against British forces on 6 May, which prevented the Allies from advancing on the
Tunisian capital from the west. 480 The official report to Berlin indicated six Tigers had been
blown up after being immobilized by relatively minor damage in areas where the enemy could
not be repulsed. Of these, artillery damaged two; one had a damaged final drive, one ran into a
minefield while inspecting the Tiger with a damaged final drive, another was immobilized with a
damaged engine, one the last suffered damaged teeth on a drive sprocket from a track
malfunction.
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The North African campaign proved the Tiger had high survivability but that it was
vulnerable to damage from rounds that had no chance to penetrate the armor fully. Further, the
lack of recovery assets, the lack of spare parts, and the lack of concentrated maintenance
facilities – as were called for in the official doctrine – exacerbated the Tiger's mechanical
weaknesses. Additionally, though the Tiger was successful in defensive operations, its offensive
capabilities had been thwarted by successful Allied defense in depth, which relied on mines,
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artillery, and anti-tank guns once it was realized Allied armor could not be used against the Tiger
effectively.
Italy
When the Axis surrendered North Africa, the 501st was destroyed as a fighting unit.
However, the 504th had only sent its 1st Company and headquarters element to North Africa,
which left the 2nd Company in Italy. The 2nd Company had sent the majority of its Panzer IIIs to
Tunisia with the 1st Company, and while in the rear, it was outfitted with eight new Tigers.482
The defeat in North Africa coincided with the decision to update to KStN 1150e/1176e, which
removed the Panzer III and gave the heavy tank battalions a complement of forty-five Tigers. 483
In May 1943, the 508th was established and sent to assist in defense of Italy in early 1944. 484
American historian and professor Dr. Robert Citino noted a shift in the nature of
German officers from warrior-philosophers such as von Clausewitz and von Moltke to those who
were not brilliant theorists but who were exceedingly efficient at the practical application of
bewegungskrieg – men such as Erich von Manstein and Walther Model, both of which were
highly aggressive. General Paul Conrath, commander of the Panzer Division Hermann Göring,
was one such officer. When his superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, made Conrath aware
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the Allies were likely to land in Sicily, Conrath replied, “You want an immediate, reckless rush
at the enemy? I’m your man.” 485
Conrath was true to his word. When the Allies landed early in the morning of 10 July, his
division was too far north to defend against the initial landing. However, despite losses on the
winding coastal roads, the division reached the landing zone on the morning of 11 July, and with
the Tigers from the 504th in the lead, Conrath attacked with sixty tanks. Lieutenant Colonel
Derrill Daniel, a battalion Executive Officer with the 26th Infantry Regiment “Blue Spaders,” 1st
Infantry Division, recalled:
…while confusion still reigned as a result of encountering this unexpected enemy
position, the battalion was hit by a portion of the general counterattack launched by both
German and Italian units. This counterattack began at 0800 hours on 11 July, extended
across the entire front of the division, and lasted for two days…enemy tanks and infantry
ploughed through the 3rd Battalion before artillery or naval gunfire support could be
brought down (no anti-tank guns had yet reported to either the 3rd or 2nd Battalions)… by
use of extreme measures, on the part of the battalion commander, he reformed enough of
the battalion somewhat nearer to Gela, to prevent the enemy infantry from following the
tanks, and with mortars, artillery, and naval gunfire finally dispersed the infantry. The
tanks however proceeded on toward Gela… to the east of the Gela River, tanks and
infantry swarmed over the positions that the 2nd Battalion had occupied the afternoon
previously. These were taken under artillery and naval gunfire which dispersed the
infantry and caused the tanks to exercise extreme caution. By mid-afternoon, the 23rd
Field Artillery of the 26th Infantry, both in position east of the river, were firing over open
sights at tanks literally within their positions. At least one tank penetrated to the main
road about 1000 yards from the beach. By dark all of these tanks were destroyed or
driven off. The shore penetration within 1000 yards of the beach evidently gave rise to
the report that night by “Axis Sally” that the invaders had been driven into the sea at
Gela. 486
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For the Germans, naval bombardment and anti-tank gunnery were joined by aerial bombardment.
Lieutenant Hummel, commander of the 2nd Company, 504th, remembered:
We felt the Allied air superiority for the first time there. The Lightnings made things hot
for us with bombs and machine guns. Our radio communications were jammed from the
Allied ships and German-speaking radio operators gave us false messages. From then on,
we used small tricks and terms that no foreigner would understand.487
During these operations, the Tigers were unable to accomplish the mission given to the Herman
Göring Panzer Division. The appearance of the Tigers came when the 26th Infantry was in a state
of confusion, but once it was reorganized, the Americans, along with naval and aerial
bombardment, were able to repel the German attack. Further, the Tigers proved to be vulnerable
to the American 'bazooka,' a man-portable, recoilless anti-tank rocket launcher. As a stop-gap
weapon, the bazooka was effective against the Tiger's weaker side and rear armor, and though
inaccurate, it was effective at close ranges. 488 The Tigers fought successful defensive operations
until mid-August but given the small number of tanks on the island, the Tigers were unable to
prevent the inevitable loss of Sicily to the Allied invasion.
The bazooka was used as a reasonably effective tool on the Western Front. Despite its
low cost and relative inaccuracy, there were a number of occasions where bazookas were able to
immobilize or destroy Tigers. There are accounts of Tigers being knocked out by a single shot to
the side or rear, as well as recollections of Tigers immobilized by hits to their running gear or
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drive sprockets. One Medal of Honor citation, that of Technical Sergeant Charles Carey,
recounts that Carey damaged an enemy tank with a rocket, a tank reported by his comrades as a
Tiger.489 Perhaps the most innovative use of the bazooka against the Tiger was during Lieutenant
Colonel Charles Carpenter's flights when, in an L-4 Grasshopper, Lt. Col Carpenter attached
three bazookas to each wing and used them to destroy two Tigers. 490 In his plane, “Rosie the
Rocketer," Carpenter was credited with six destroyed tanks from the bazooka fire. A complete
determination would require in-depth statistical analysis, but the loss of Tigers to bazookas was
likely the most inexpensive way to lose so expensive a tank.
After the loss of Sicily, the 504th returned to Germany and was fully reconstituted. The
former 3rd Company was transferred to the Eastern Front and became the 11th Company of
Panzer Division Großdeutschland. The new battalion, commanded by Captain Kühn, was
outfitted with forty-five new Tigers in accordance with the 5 March 1943 KStN and spent the
remainder of 1943 training new personnel. It did not see action again until June 1944 in Italy. 491
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The 508th arrived in Rome between the 8th and 12th of February, in time for the Allied
landings at Anzio. The Allies had managed a successful landing but landed in reclaimed
marshland, which had been known as the Pontine Marshes. The Italians had reclaimed the land,
constructed dikes, and built pumping stations to drain the water during the 1930s. 493 The
Germans realized the strategic opportunity, stopped the pumps, and opened the dikes, which
allowed salt water conducive to the Anopheles mosquito to refill the marsh. This act of
biological warfare not only encouraged the spread of malaria, but the Germans also sought to
deny the Allies any access to food and fresh water. 494 General Lucian Truscott, commander of

US Army Center of Military History, “Assault on Sicily, 10 July 1943,” Retrieved from
https://www.history.army.mil/brochures/72-16/map1.JPG. Accessed 29 August 2022.
492

493

Frank Snowden, The Conquest of Malaria: Italy, 1900-1962 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),

494

Ibid, 186.

157.

184

the American 3rd Infantry Division, had argued against the landing at Anzio, referring to it as a
death trap. His superior, General Mark Clark, agreed, but Mediterranean Theater commander
General Eisenhower, on the way to France to oversee Operation Overlord, left the decision to
Churchill, who ordered it to commence.495
At Sicily, the Allies had faced one German Panzer Division; at Anzio, they had four
Panzer Divisions and six infantry divisions counterattacking by 16 February. 496 The 508th was
attached to the 26th Panzer Division, near the Alban Hills south of Rome, as a strategic reserve
element. 497 Though this was strictly non-doctrinal, it was by necessity; the battalion had faced a
160-kilometer road march from its detrainment at Ficulle to its positions at Anzio, and the
Tiger's mechanical difficulties made themselves known, with 60% of the battalion nonoperational due to mechanical breakdown.498
As the battalion had dispersed, only the 2nd Company was involved in the fighting at
Anzio, and it had only eight operational Tigers.499 Once at Anzio, the Tigers were held to the
roadways by the new marshland. The first action, on 16 February, was less than successful, as
were other defensive actions that attempted to reduce the beachhead. The unit history claims
several American Shermans were destroyed during this period, and though the battalion could
not reduce the beachhead, it did assist in containing it.500
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The final German effort to close the Anzio landing zone was on 29 February 1944. In this
attempt, four Tigers were knocked out, and several more were immobilized by mines. As in
North Africa, once the Tigers were immobilized, heavy artillery was called in to prevent the
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Germans from recovering their tanks or destroying the immobilized tanks, which could still fire
on Allied positions.502 This attack failed for a number of reasons, but the most significant was
the restrictive terrain created by the ill-thought-out flooding of the Pontine Marshes, which
forced the Tigers onto avenues of approach which could easily be covered by a pre-plotted
artillery strike. The unit history reports that, of the damaged Tigers, three were so severely
damaged by naval and artillery fire that they could not be repaired.503
The Battle of Anzio dragged into a stalemate by late February 1944, and the 508th was
withdrawn to Rome to reorganize and rebuild its complement of Tigers.504 While in Rome, the
508th was employed once more in a non-doctrinal role, employed in small groups or individual
tanks where German commanders needed heavy firepower. On several occasions, fractions of the
battalion were involved in fighting near Anzio, but never as an entire battalion and never as a
breakthrough force directly against the beachhead. 505 One hastily organized company,
Sondereinheit Meyer, commanded by Lieutenant Hans-Gert Meyer, had been sent to Italy ahead
of the 508th in order to provide military “stiffening” of the faltering Mussolini government.506
This Tigerkompanie of sixty men and eight Tigers was integrated into the 508th on 3 March
1944. Lieutenant Meyer's former command participated in the attack on the beachhead along the
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Pontine Marsh roads and several defensive operations to prevent enemy breakthroughs.
Lieutenant Meyer recalled:
… The operations of Kompanie Meyer in the Pontine Marshes were extremely
problematic. In most cases, the Tiger’s weight ruled out cross-country driving in the
coastal area southeast of Rome, which had only been reclaimed in the 1930s. The
partially drained area of marshes, up to 18 kilometers wide in places, was only bordered
by trees and bushes on the side facing the sea. As a result, the Tigers were mainly
restricted to the roads, which in places were insufficiently firm. Neither off the roads nor
beside them were sufficient opportunities for concealment or camouflage. This was all
the more serious given the enemies' mastery of the air, low-level air attacks, and heavy
naval gunfire…From the summer of 1944 on, that is, during the retreat from Rome, the
Tigers were used almost exclusively to reinforce the main line of resistance. The battle
lines of the 508th extended from the Ligurian Sea to the coast of the Adriatic. As a result,
we were forced to ignore the classical tenets of Panzer tactics, such as Guderian’s maxim
‘…nicht Kleckern, sondern Klotzen!’ This entailed enormous command and control and
logistical difficulties. Given the great distances involved, even platoon leaders were
unable to adequately control their crews, to say nothing of company or battalion
commanders… following the successful landing by the Americans and British on 22
January 1944, Kompanie Meyer received the incomprehensible order not to carry out its
recommended and planned attack against the landing forces. The order to attack was not
issued until four days later. But then of course, the enemy had a firm foothold on the
coast. To this day I still cannot understand why our counterattack, which at the time
would have required little infantry support, was cancelled. At that point in time, our
prospects of success would have been very good, especially since the transport ships and
landing craft would have been in range of high explosive rounds from the selected
positions. 507
Lieutenant Meyer’s account indicates that, as on the Eastern Front, Tigers were used more as
local commanders saw fit that as a part of a larger strategy to defeat the Allied invasions, and
these decisions were as inconsistent as the abilities of the individual commanders.
As the situation deteriorated, the men of the 508th noted the heroism of the
Fallschirmjäger defending Monte Cassino, while their own position at Velletri – 35 kilometers
from Anzio – was comparatively quiet. 508 However, the situation changed rapidly when Monte
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Cassino fell on 20 May 1944. Lieutenant Kurt Hirlinger, Zugführer in the 2nd Company, 508th,
in mid-1944 wrote:
…the southern front had broken. The Anglo-Americans were advancing on Rome. At that
point, the Nettuno beachhead [shown in Anzio map, pg.169] also became active. The
Anglo-American wall of flame began to advance in our sector. One night, the 2nd
Company received operations orders…the enemy had launched an attack on a broad
front. Our mission was to stop him and drive him back. No longer could he protect
himself with his concealed minefields. 509
In pure defensive operations, the 508th failed to stop the Anglo-American advance. The Allied
advance precluded the use of defensive minefields, but the artillery was a decisive factor once
more. In defensive counterattacks against the Allies from 23 May to the beginning of June, the
battalion was often able to drive 3 to 5 kilometers into American territory, but the attacks would
bog down under withering anti-tank and artillery fire that forced the Tigers to discharge smoke
and retreat as rapidly as possible. 510 Though roughly thirty Shermans were dispatched, several
Tigers were also destroyed, either through direct artillery fire or abandoned due to engine or
transmission damage from the same. 511
From the 23rd to the 25th of May, the 508th lost twenty-two Tigers, with all of these
destroyed by their own crews after receiving minimal damage. Though they were technically
recoverable, the Allied advance prevented any recovery efforts, and the crews chose to keep the
Allies from recovering the Tigers intact. Major Helmut Hudel, the commander of the 508th, was
summoned to the Führer headquarters and dismissed, as High Command blamed him for the
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failures of his battalion.512 As the Tigers were prone to breakdown in the hilly terrain, this
deployment was a tactical error at higher levels of command than the battalion commander. 513
The tactical difficulties experienced by the 508th were shared by the 504th once they had
returned to Italy. The 504th returned on 10 June 1944 and was in combat by the 20th. 514 The
combat record indicated the 504th attempted several offensives between the 20th and 30th, but all
of these were stopped by either maintenance issues or heavy artillery barrages, and in that tenday period, though numerous Shermans were destroyed, only two Tigers were confirmed
destroyed by Allied artillery.515 This trend continued throughout the Italian Campaign.
The Tigers were often used in non-doctrinal roles throughout their time in Italy. The
record of the 504th and 508th indicates that, at times, their tanks were used in an indirect fire role,
though neither unit history nor surviving archival records indicate the mission requiring such
pursuits. 516 The 504th and 508th were also not deployed as whole battalions for the majority of
their time in Italy, which is contrary to doctrine as well. The number of Allied tanks in Italy
required tank-killing tactics, and the Tigers were dispersed as they were the most capable vehicle
in the German inventory in conducting such operations. In some cases, the battalions were so
stretched that they could only manage a single Tiger for a deployment. Kurt Hirlinger recalled
that:
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The constant mechanical problems with the vehicles demonstrated the need for properly
trained and experienced specialists such as vehicle mechanics and welders and
experienced truck drivers to serve as tank drivers. As a 20-year-old salesman by trade, I
had no idea, for example, of what could be accomplished with a single cutting torch…
whenever our heavy tanks were active, the enemy adopted the tactic of holding back their
own numerically superior but technically inferior tanks, committing field artillery and
fighter bombers instead. Nevertheless, some tank commanders succeeded in identifying
concealed enemy tanks and knocking them out with one or two armor-piercing rounds.
During that difficult defensive fighting, we were glad whenever we worked with the
brave men of the 4th Fallschirmjäger. No enemy tank hunter-killer team was able to
approach our vehicles. 517
An in-depth analysis of existing unit histories indicated the 504th and 508th were consistently
used contrary to doctrine, but this deployment type was more likely than not far more effective
than attempting to concentrate an entire battalion, given the terrain restrictions and the inherent
difficulty in deploying and withdrawing from positions only accessible via poor roads and
bridges not rated for the weight of the Tiger. Both units' histories indicated that such
impediments led to the loss of individual vehicles, and a battalion strength deployment could
have led to the full complement of Tigers becoming stranded on the far side of a collapsed bridge
or roadway.
From Anzio until the end of the war, the Tigers cannot be regarded as having been
combat effective in their doctrinal role. The battalions were not used in accordance with doctrine,
as has been previously discussed. However, this cannot be attributed to enemy armor, as the
Tigers remained capable of destroying far more Shermans than were lost to Allied tank fire. The
maintenance issues in poor terrain and the density of Allied artillery was the primary mitigating
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factor. Small unit deployment in restrictive terrain was adequate, but the mechanical failures
were a diminishing factor to the 504th or 508th being able to position themselves in a timely
manner. Further, as on the Eastern Front, had either battalion concentrated in a single sector, the
Allies would have elected to attack a sector free of Tigers. The strength of the tanks themselves
was a limiting factor, as on the strategic level, it was far easier to move around a concentrated
Tiger battalion than fight through it.
Maintenance issues became less of a problem once the German lines solidified along the
Gothic Line. The 504th combat record indicated the battalion was at full or near-full operational
strength in the last quarter of 1944, which indicates enemy artillery had been reduced as a factor
due to limited movements away from the battalion's assembly areas. This served to both reduce
the length of road marches, where the majority of mechanical failures were encountered, and that
the Allies were no longer conducting operations where Tigers were expected. The static nature of
the defensive operations in Italy from late 1944 until early 1945 was the greatest factor in the rise
in operational strength.518
Lastly, the Tiger’s own crew was its own greatest enemy. The lack of prime movers and
the difficulty experienced on roads and bridges ill-suited to the Tiger’s weight proved to be
disastrous. During its time in Italy, the 508th lost seventy Tigers, with around fifty destroyed by
their own crews to prevent the tanks from being captured by the Allies. 519 The 504th suffered
heavier losses, as eighty-seven Tigers were destroyed during its deployment in Italy. 520 Of these,
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seventy-four were killed by their own crews, with twenty-nine lost to German demolitions in
April 1945 alone.521 This statistic is perhaps the most damning of all: the Allies were less
effective at destroying the Tigers than the Germans, despite overwhelming superiority in all
accounts.
France and the End in the West
On 6 June 1944, the Allies launched Operation Overlord after delays due to poor weather.
In France, the Germans had three heavy tank battalions available. The 503rd "Feldherrnhalle"
deployed to the invasion front on 26 June. 522 Two battalions were attached to the I and II SS
Panzer Corps – the 101st SS was attached to the I SS Panzer Corps, and the 102nd SS was
attached to the II SS Panzer Corps.523
It is an understatement to assert that the German High Command had no idea the
Invasion of Normandy was imminent. General Walter Warlimont wrote:
…for 24 hours, more than 5000 ships had been on the move across the Channel toward
the coast of Normandy, but there had been no reconnaissance to spot them. Equally,
neither Rommel, von Rundstedt, nor OKW have made any appreciation pointing out that,
in view of the weather and tides, landing in the immediate future was even probable…
the German command organization at all levels was in fact working in the dark because
of the complete inferiority of the Luftwaffe; this makes it all the more incomprehensible
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that comment in so far as I am aware, no notice was taken of the warning signs emanating
from the intelligence service… all the headquarters concerned were fully aware that this
phase of the war was up decisive importance, and they had been tireless in their efforts to
get the defense to as high a pitch of efficiency as was possible in view of the severe gaps
in our forces produced by five years of war; but Hitler's repeated raids on the West for
forces for other theaters had upset the balance… General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff to
Commander-in-Chief West, gave me the first indication that in all probability, this was
the invasion and that Normandy was apparently the area. He urged on behalf of his
commander-in-chief, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, that the so-called OKW reserves,
consisting of four motorized or armored divisions, should be released so that they could
move from their assembly areas to positions near the front. It was soon clear that Jodl
was fully up to date with all the information but, in the light of the latest reports was not
yet fully convinced that here and now the real invasion had begun. He did not therefore
consider that the moment had arrived to let go our last reserves and felt that Commanderin-Chief West must first try to clear up the situation with the forces of Army Group B.
General Jodl took this decision on his own responsibility, in other words without asking
Hitler; forever after it was the cause of the most bitter accusations against OKW. The
German defeat in Normandy with all its fatal consequences was, people said, primarily
due to this failure to release the OKW reserves. 524
As Warlimont further argued, blaming Jodl was an error, as it was inconceivable to release
reserves before the first enemy landing. Further, the Allied air superiority made any movement
even far behind the front impossible. 525
During the 503rd’s (Feldherrnhalle) reconstitution, the battalion was partially equipped
with the new Tiger II. 1st Company became the first unit in the German Army to receive the new
tanks; the other two companies in the battalion received the Tiger I. 526 The two SS battalions
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continued to use the Tiger I.527 These three battalions were attached to their specific units for the
duration of the Normandy campaign, a drastic shift from the push/pull on the Eastern Front.528
The 101st (501st) SS was the first heavy tank battalion to enter combat in Normandy, on
13 June, at Villers-Bocage. 529 On the 12th, Allied forces had created a gap west of Tilly-surSeulles. The British 7th Armored Division flanked west through Trungy and approached Livry
along the same general Axis of approach as the American 1st Infantry Division as it advanced
southward toward Caumont.530 SS General Sepp Dietrich recognized the danger on his left and
ordered the only reserve available into the gap as quickly as possible. This was the 101st (501st)
SS, and the march on the evening and night of the 12th into the 13th had left the crews exhausted,
which was compounded by a naval bombardment that allowed for no sleep even after the
movement. Even with only fourteen operational Tigers between the two Companies, General
Dietrich ordered the battalion to defend the left flank of I SS Panzer Corps.
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Villers-Bocage was a small village among the farms of northern France, with little to
distinguish it from any other small village among the hedgerows and farmland except French
National Route 175, which went through the center of town. RN175 was of vital importance to
both the Germans and the Allies, as it connected Avranches on the southwestern base of the
Cotentin Peninsula with the strategically important city of Caen. When the Allies landed at
Normandy, the British 'Gold,' 'Sword,' and 'Juno' beaches were all less than fifty kilometers from
Villers-Bocage.
During the early morning of the 13th, the 1st Company of the 101st SS moved eight
kilometers northeast of Villers-Bocage, along National Route 175, while the 2nd Company was
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ordered to move two kilometers northeast to near Montbrocq and was ordered to strike against
the Allies on the left flank immediately.532 2nd Company, led by SS-Lieutenant Michael
Wittmann, had only five operational Tigers, and the Company assembled on Point 213, south of
Panzer Lehr’s positions. 533
On the evening of the 12th, the British 7th Armored Division received orders to advance
south, clear out the Panzer Lehr, then advance northeast toward Caen along RN175. Field
Marshal Bernard Montgomery, whom Eisenhower considered timid, was aware that a bold strike
would challenge Eisenhower's perception of him.534 Montgomery was so confident in his
strategy that he wrote, "Will move on Villers-Bocage and Noyers tomorrow. All this very good,
and Panzer Lehr may be in grave danger tomorrow.” 535
The lead element of the 7th Armored, the 4th County of London Yeomanry (CLY), had
crept through the French countryside throughout the early morning. Expecting Germans, the
British found only jubilation as they were met with French citizens overjoyed by their liberation.
As they entered Villers-Bocage, British soldiers spotted a German eight-wheeled armored car
observing the 4th CLY from a distance, but the only tank in position to fire at the Germans, a
Cromwell, was so encumbered with external stowage it could not traverse its turret.
The 4th CLY, led by Viscount Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Cranley, was equipped with
forty-nine Cromwell tanks, eleven M3A3 Stuart light tanks, and twelve M4A4 Sherman Firefly
tanks. This Sherman variant had been retrofitted with a QF 17-pounder gun, one of the most
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capable anti-tank guns in the Allied inventory, and its armor piercing, capped, ballistic capped
(APCBC) round could penetrate 150 mm of armor at 1,000 meters – more than a match for the
Tiger I.536
By 8:30, the 4th CLY had entered the village, encountered only two German soldiers –
who immediately fled – and pushed its A Squadron along RN175 two kilometers further to Point
213, where little more than a German staff car was found. 537 The British, having not expected
combat, had chosen to move along the road in column formation rather than in a combat
formation.538 In their rush to capture Point 213, which would have given an observation point
and a defensive position, the reconnaissance units failed to conduct a thorough survey of the
woods between Point 213 and Villers-Bocage. 539 The remainder of 4th CLY struggled to keep up
with A Squadron, and they were strung out for two kilometers between the hill and the edge of
the town.540 The rapid advance and sudden stop to dispatch the staff car led to a traffic jam, and
as frustration turned to boredom, crews left their vehicles. Many began to make tea; others
wondered if there was fresh bread in the village below. 541 They were unaware that Michael
Wittmann and his 2nd Company were positioned in an apple orchard just south of Point 213. 542
The APDS (armor piercing, discarding sabot) round could penetrate 256mm of armor at 500 meters and
223mm at 1000 meters. This was enough to penetrate the Tiger II, but there is no evidence that APDS rounds were
used until late June. See: "Royal Armored Corps Training, vol III – Armament Pamphlet No. 7, SP 17-pr M10," War
Office (July 1952), 100-124; Lorrin Bird and Robert Livingston, WWII Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery (Albany, NY:
Overmatch Press, 2001), 60.
536

537

David Porter, 7th Armored Division at Villers-Bocage:13 June 1944 (London: Amber Books, 2012), 130.

538

Wolfgang Schneider, Tigers in Combat II (Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2005), 206.

539

David Porter, 7th Armored Division at Villers-Bocage:13 June 1944 (London: Amber Books, 2012),

540

Ibid, 135.

541

Ibid, 135.

542

David Porter, I SS Panzer Corps at Villers-Bocage, 13 June 1944 (London: Amber Books, 2012), 132.

130-135.

198

Michael Wittman had been serving since 1934 and joined the SS in 1936. 543 Assigned to
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Wittmann participated in the annexation of Austria and the
Sudetenland in 1937 and 1938, respectively. 544 As a Sergeant, Wittmann commanded an
armored car during the campaigns in Poland and France and was awarded the Iron Cross 2nd
Class in 1941 for actions in Greece.545 After the invasion of Russia in June 1941, Wittmann
commanded both a StuG III and a Panzer III, and for combat actions, he was awarded the Iron
Cross 1st Class and Wound Badge in black. 546 Wittmann was sent to a commissioning school for
SS officers in December 1942, and over the course of the following year, Wittmann and his
Tiger accumulated nearly seventy kills, many at the Battle of Kursk, where his platoon screened
the Leibstandarte’s left flank.547 Wittmann was awarded the Knight's Cross on 14 January 1944
and the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross on 30 January 1944, which made Wittmann the 380th
member of the Wehrmacht to earn the second grade of the prestigious award. 548
At 8:45, Wittman was warned of a column of British vehicles on RN175 moving toward
Point 213, 200 meters to his north. Realizing he had likely already been spotted, Wittman
ordered his company to hold fast, and he took the first operational Tiger he reached – Sergeant
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(SS-Unterscharführer) Sowa’s Tiger 222.549 The other Tigers had mechanical issues, and none
followed Wittmann on his individual action, but all managed to get into position to engage the
enemy on Point 213. 550
Little more than ten minutes later, Wittman’s Tiger emerged from the woods and stopped
on the soft shoulder of RN175.551 Sergeant O’Conner of the 1st Rifle Brigade was in his halftrack and managed to warn the stalled British column with the only recorded transmission of the
morning: “For Christ’s sake, get a move on! There’s a Tiger running alongside us 50 yards
away!” 552 Before the British armor crews could react, Wittmann destroyed a Cromwell, the last
vehicle in the A Squadron’s convoy, which prevented other vehicles from retreating.553 A Firefly
attempted to target the Tiger, but Wittman’s gunner was faster, and the Sherman was also
destroyed. 554 With two burning tanks blocking the road, the 4th CLY was unable to assist the
elements of the 1st Rifle Brigade, 4th CLY's Headquarters section between Point 213 and the
village, and the lead elements of B Squadron, which were entering the western edge of town. 555
Wittman then turned his attention to the stalled column leading back to Villers-Bocage.
Advancing along the road, he obliterated the majority of the 1st Rifle Brigade – thirteen M3 halftracks, three Stuart light tanks, two Sherman forward observer tanks, the Brigade Surgeon's half-
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track, and over twelve Bren and Lloyd gun carriers. 556 Vehicles burst into flame as 88mm shells
and machine gun fire shredded the British, but there were relatively few casualties as the
riflemen abandoned their vehicles for the safety of the ditches and hedgerows on the roadside. 557
Captain Christopher Milner of A Company recalled:
The enemy attended first of all to the three motor platoons by…trundling back toward
Villers, shooting up vehicles and riflemen section by section, with only the company’s
two 6-pounder anti-tank guns able to offer even a measure of resistance, which I learned
afterwards they did with considerable bravery but with little effect.558
At the edge of town, Wittmann destroyed four more Stuart light tanks and three more Cromwells
from the 4th CLY Regimental Headquarters. As he entered the village, the fourth Cromwell was
in pursuit, hoping to strike the Tiger in its rear armor. 559 A shot from a 17-pounder that
ricocheted off the front hull of the Tiger near the driver’s vision block persuaded Wittmann to
withdraw. Upon doing so, Wittmann encountered the fourth Cromwell, commanded by Captain
Pat Dyas, 4th CLY’s adjutant.560 Dyas had little hope of damaging the Tiger, but his Cromwell
managed two shots before it was destroyed.561 As Wittmann’s Tiger made its way toward the
eastern edge of town, it was hit in the drive sprocket by a 6-pounder round that immobilized the
tank but did not disable its gun. After spraying the immediate area with machine gun fire,
Wittman and his crew bailed out, evaded capture, and managed their way to the Panzer Lehr’s
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divisional headquarters, where their battle report provided information for Lehr’s deployment
against Villers-Bocage. 562
On the same day, the 3rd Company, 101st SS (501st SS), attacked near Falaise and lost ten
crewmen, including three tank commanders. The 1st Company destroyed nearly thirty tanks and
armored carriers, and the remainder of Wittman’s 2nd Company destroyed over ten tanks at Point
213. 563 Initially, the events of 13 June indicate either the British were unbelievably inept or the
Germans were incredibly skilled; however, the truth is less clear-cut. Though Wittman has been
recognized as a 'panzer ace' in literature from the mid-to-late Twentieth Century, recent analysis
created a more nuanced narrative. Rather than being simply a "devastating, single-handed
ambush" or "one of the most devastating ambushes in British military history," Wittmann's
company and its tactical disposition – with a broken-down Tiger at the head of the column – was
poor and was his solitary advance into Villers-Bocage with no gathered intelligence or
concentration of forces was a grievous error.564 Wolfgang Schneider, a German armor officer in
the Bundeswehr and prolific German military historian, argued Wittmann’s advance not only
alerted the British to the presence of heavy tanks, which inhibited the effectiveness of the
remainder of 2nd Company and Captain Rolf Möbius’ 1st Company but cost the Germans the
possibility of an even greater strategic victory against the Allies had they attacked in
coordination. 565
Moreover, the British position on the morning of the 13th was caused by a command error
rather than ineptitude. When Wittmann began his attack, Colonel Cranley, 4th CLY’s
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commander, was inspecting A Squadron’s deployment on Point 213, Major Wright, commander
of 1st Company, 1st Rifle Brigade, was also on Point 213, awaiting the officers and NCOs of his
Operations Group, and A Company, 1st Rifle Brigade had parked their vehicles off-road, which
limited the view of sentries posted along the road – sentries who were not expecting trouble and
who were distracted by freshly brewed tea.566 Thus, the command group for the 4th CLY and 1st
Rifle Brigade were in no position to issue orders, which paralyzed their commands in a time of
great need. Regardless of tactical errors on the Germans’ part, the British errors were more
critical, and the cost for this mistake was around two hundred twenty men killed, wounded, or
captured, as well as almost thirty tanks. Many of the men captured were part of A Squadron,
which had been cut off on Hill 213.567 The Tiger was exceptionally effective in its given role,
with some deviations from accepted doctrine, and the German propaganda campaign left an
impression in Britain that the military worked to stamp out. 568 Michael Wittman was promoted
to Captain (SS-Hauptsturmführer) and was awarded the Swords to his Knight’s Cross, the 71st
member of the Armed Forces awarded the third grade of the Knight’s Cross. 569
On a strategic level, the German achievement had been such that, though vastly
outnumbered in the sector, they managed to force the British to feel insecure in their positions in
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spite of having sufficient force to dominate the decisive points. The Germans were able to hold
decisive points as long as they did because the British failed to realize Villers-Bocage was not a
matter of inferiority but of poor leadership decisions in that instance and not a small measure of
bad luck. 570
At the end of June, the 503rd ‘Feldherrnhalle’ left the training grounds at Ohrdruf en
route to Caen, which was taken before the battalion could play a role. The battalion, attached to
the 21st Panzer Division, established an assembly area ten kilometers away. 571 Early on the
morning of 11 July, Lieutenant von Rosen, a Zugführer in the 503rd ‘Feldherrnhalle’ received an
alert order that indicated the British had broken through the German lines at Colombelles, a
suburb of Caen on the northeast side of the city. In less than half an hour, the battalion was on
the move. 572
As the battalion commander was ill, the commander of the 3rd Company, Captain Scherf,
filled in. This left Lieutenant von Rosen in command of the 3rd Company and the
counterattack. 573 In a successful operation, von Rosen maneuvered 1st and 2nd Platoons with
mutually supportive fire-and-maneuver tactics, which soon brought them within 200 meters of an
enemy position outside Colombelles. 574 The company destroyed twelve Shermans, captured two
more, and knocked out five anti-tank guns from the 148th Regiment of the Royal Armored
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Corps. 575 Any celebration was short-lived, however, as an artillery spotter plane appeared
promptly, and shells began creeping toward the company. No Tigers were lost, and the company
returned to its assembly area. 576
Even with significant numerical inferiority, the Tigers were still able to engage any tank
on the battlefield in mid-1944 effectively. But soon, the Tigers and their crews would encounter
an enemy no tank could defeat – Allied bombing.
On 18 June, the British launched Operation Goodwood, a limited offensive aimed at fully
capturing Caen and creating a breakthrough on Bourguebus Ridge. 577 Preliminary actions as part
of Operations Greenline and Pomegranate were feints designed to fool the Germans into
believing the main objective of Goodwood was west of the Orne River. If successful, these
operations would remove the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions from defending either against
Goodwood or the American Operation Cobra.578 Both operations were costly for the British, but
the objectives were met and exceeded, as the 2nd Panzer Division also joined the defensive
operations. 579
Of Goodwood, Lieutenant von Rosen recalled:
The offensive was prepared by 2,077 bombers, which dropped 7,800 tons of bombs, and
720 medium and heavy field pieces, which had 250,000 shells at their disposal. From
0545 to 0630, RAF bombers attacked the villages of Emieville and Cagny, as well as
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Mandeville, the assembly area of the 3rd Company. That was a black day for Tiger
battalion 503. Never before had such an Armada of bombers been employed. In
comparison, in the attack on Dresden in February 1945, “only” 1,084 aircraft with the
RAF and US Army Air Corps were employed, dropping 3,425 tons of ordinance… the
battalion staff survived the carpet bombing in the tower of the old villa where the
command post was located. The staff had no losses, but on that morning of 18 July, there
was no communication with the staff of either the 22nd Panzer Regiment or the 21st
Panzer Division. The 1st Company of 503 had lost tanks, but no personnel were killed.
Just as was the case with the neighboring 1st Battalion of the 22nd Panzer Regiment, it
was in the midst of a sea of craters. The tanks had to be dug out through intensive manual
labor. There was no report from the 2nd Company. It appeared that it had been hit least by
the carpet bombing. The 3rd Company seemed to be in the worst shape. Sergeant
Westerhausen’s tank had taken a direct hit and was thoroughly shredded. Sergeant Major
Sachs’ tank lay upside down on its turret… a number of tanks had such severe damage,
especially to the running gear, that they were immobilized. Several had been pushed as
much as a meter sideways by the air pressure. All of the tanks were buried in dirt and had
to be dug out.580
Von Rosen led the 3rd Company with six Tigers – all the company had operational – in defensive
positions near Maneville, where two Tigers were destroyed by friendly towed-88mm fire from
Cagny. 581 With gun zeroes out of alignment from the shock of the heavy bombardment, the
Tigers were able to repulse the British advance in all sectors, and the battalion was credited with
over 40 tanks killed.582 The battalion had taken substantial losses from the bombardment, but by
the end of the 20th – the end of Goodwood – the battalion had thirty-two tanks operational. 583 3rd
Company ceased to be a viable fighting force, and as such, it handed over its last four Tigers to
the 2nd Company. 3rd Company was transported to the rear to receive its Tiger II tanks. The unit
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history records that there were four hundred thirty-seven British tanks destroyed during
Goodwood, though it only claims the battalion destroyed "many." 584
Regardless of reasonable successes, the Germans recognized there were significant
obstacles to moving the Tigers into and around Normandy. General Guderian recommended a
change in tactics on 28 June, from concentration to dispersal, as well as close coordination with
infantry and Panzergrenadiers in the hedgerows and vision-restrictive terrain. 585 In addition, all
three battalions were used primarily as a mobile reserve, and they proved to be successful at
countering enemy attacks. In dispersing the three battalions behind the divisional or Corps front
line, each could quickly react to penetrations in the German defense. This was both a suitable
employment as well as a pragmatic decision, as a concentrated Tiger battalion was likely to elicit
a significant response from artillery and air support. 586
One notable difference on the Western Front was that the Tigers were destroyed at a
much higher rate than in Russia. This was not simply due to a greater concentration of airpower,
as the three battalions lost thirty-two Tigers in direct combat from 8 July to 20 August. 587 This
anomaly was due to a higher number of weapons fielded by the Americans and British that were
capable of destroying a Tiger, especially in the close confines of the Normandy battlefields. 588
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Until the collapse of the Falaise pocket, the three battalions in Normandy were successful
in destroying Allied tanks, and as General Guderian released improved doctrinal guidance, their
employment became more effective. Doctrinal evolution allowed the Tigers to use the terrain to
their advantage, and the battalions were able to counter or delay Allied advances. Their use as a
mobile reserve widely dispersed along the entirety of the front facilitated little time lost when
moving to counter the enemy. Reduced vehicle movement meant the battalions were able to
minimize mechanical issues. 589 However, the Tigers could not alter the balance of power,
shifting rapidly in favor of the Allies. After the collapse of the Falaise pocket, and by the end of
August, the 503rd, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the 101st SS and 102nd SS were lost to the Allies.590
SS-Colonel Joachim Peiper stated:
I am of the opinion that the Tiger would have fared better if one had not formed separate
battalions. Instead, one should have incorporated an organic heavy company in every
regiment. The Tigers would then have had a home, and they would have been employed
with the lighter tanks in a more flexible and tactically more appropriate manner. 591
The lost battalions were reconstituted and, bearing their new names, were deployed to their
respective combat zones. 501st SS and the 506th were deployed to Wacht am Rhein, the offensive
known as the Battle of the Bulge. 501st SS was attached to the 1st SS Panzer Division
Leibstandarte as part of Kampfgruppe Peiper – the spearhead of the 6th Panzer Army. 592 The
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506th, with twenty-two operational tanks, was attached as a mobile reserve for the 6th Panzer
Army. 593
During the last half year of warfare, the battalions as a whole were heavily engaged and
were shifted from one front to another as a stop-gap force which fragmented their command
capabilities and degraded effective record-keeping. In many cases, the Tigers were deployed to
battle zones that were conducive to their strengths; the Ardennes Offensive was not such an
operation. The winding tracks in the hilly terrain were soft, and the Tigers were unable to keep
up the quick pace required of this offensive. Thus, SS-Colonel Peiper moved the 501st-SS to the
rear of the formation. 594
Both battalions played little part in this offensive, as they were too slow to keep up with
the rapid advance, too heavy to travel off-road, and required heavy logistic and maintenance
support. The 506th lost six Tigers in combat and another two to close air support, while the 501stSS lost six as well but had to abandon ten due to lack of fuel.595 Further, less than twenty Allied
tanks were reported destroyed during the offensive. 596 This was not a reflection of the
effectiveness of the Tiger against Allied tanks but instead of the deployment. Only a few Tigers
were able to make it to the front, and there were similarly only a few Allied tanks with which to
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engage in combat. Their deployment here was not successful, and the Tigers lost could have
been employed much more effectively in other pursuits.
Conclusion
From mid-1943 until the end of the war, the number of heavy tank battalions increased
steadily in response to the progressively fraught situation on all fronts. The Tigers were deployed
to every battle zone, and many battalions were destroyed and rebuilt more than once. In the
fighting, their doctrinal role did not change, but their employment did; the Tigers were used in
every role, from schwerpunktwaffe to front-line defense, to tactical reserve. Conceptually, the
idea of concentration continued to remain problematic, as the Allies, with superior airpower,
could effectively determine the position of heavy battalions with aerial reconnaissance and target
them with naval or artillery bombardment or close air support. Defensively, the concentration
principle was potentially valid, but in practice, the mechanical difficulties, extended ranges, and
rugged terrain from one sector to another meant this principle inhibited the Tiger's overall
effectiveness.
As in Russia, the Tigers were most effective in a reserve role when dispersed throughout
different regiments or divisions, as Colonel Peiper had opined. This concept would have
provided some mitigation to the restrictive terrain encountered in all theaters of the Western
Front. Given the limited approaches northward through Italy, the Allies had few viable options
short of launching successive amphibious operations over the length of the Italian Peninsula.
Tigers proved more than capable against Allied ground forces in Italy, and their defense was
crucial to holding Italy for the duration of the war.
Offensively, the heavy tank battalions continued to play havoc with the Allied armor, but
they cannot be considered effective in their missions, as these tended to be either exceptionally
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difficult or outright impossible given the capabilities of the Wehrmacht to provide adequate
logistical support and a steady flow of spare parts. During this period – from early 1944 until the
end of the war - the most significant success was in Operation Southwind and Operation Spring
Awakening in Hungary, as in both offensives, the Tigers were highly effective, and they
continued to be so in the delaying actions fought until their surrender on 20 March.597
The doctrines used by the Western Allies differed from the Soviets in regard to the
Tigers. Whereas the Soviets had no qualms with attempting to close the gap with the Tigers to
bring them within the kill radius of their guns, the British and Americans preferred to maneuver
to avoid them. Thus, while there were undoubtedly confrontations between the Anglo-American
and German armor, they happened with far less regularity.
The Western Allies also had an advantage the Soviets did not – the ability to bomb both
German infrastructure and the heavy tank battalions. The Luftwaffe was, by 1944, overwhelmed
on every front. Allied bombing was used not only to impede German manufacturing but to
reduce the strength of armored formations as well. The effectiveness of British close air support
is recalled by Horst Weber, an SS panzergrenadier of the 21st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment who
fought with Kampfgruppe Knaust south of Arnhem during Operation Market Garden. During
fighting with the British 43rd Wessex Division, Weber remembered:
We had four Tiger tanks and three Panther tanks…we were convinced that we would gain
another victory, that we would smash the enemy forces…then the Typhoons dropped
these rockets on our tanks and shot all seven to bits. And we cried…we would see two
black dots in the sky and that always meant rockets, then the rockets would hit the tanks
which would burn. The soldiers would come out all burnt and screaming with pain.598
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Close air support had a tremendous effect on the German formations and their ability to wage
war. On 10 July, outside Mortain, Typhoons dropped eighty tons of bombs and fired nearly
twenty-one hundred rockets in an attack that ended the German counterthrust before it had time
to develop.599 The 30th Infantry Division was able to hold on due to the close air support, and
after the battle, General Eisenhower stated, “the chief credit in smashing the enemy’s spearhead
must go to the rocket-firing Typhoon aircraft of the Second Tactical Air Force…the result of the
strafing was that the enemy attack was effectively brought to a halt, and a threat was turned into
a great victory.” 600
Overall, on the Western Front, the Tiger battalions were inhibited by poor terrain, poor
deployment methodology, inadequate support, and missions for which they were unqualified.
The destruction of enemy tanks was not enough to rescue Germany from the fate that was, by
mid-1944, decided.
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Chapter Five
Conclusion
We were in a patch of woods…working on our Jagdtigers. The news came that the
Americans were in the village. We blew up the barrels of the assault guns. I had the company
assemble for the last time. I cannot express in words how I felt at this last formation and what the
faces of the soldiers revealed to me when we said goodbye…for me, the war was really over. 601
Lieutenant Otto Carius, 7 May 1945
An army is more than a simple collection of men; it is the sum of their collective
experiences. The Tiger tanks were no exception; not only was each vehicle a collection of parts
manufactured by firms across Germany the crews were men who had learned warfare across the
various battlefields of Europe. As the individual infantryman learned to trust the men to his right
and left, so too did the men in the Tigers learn to trust one another and their sixty-ton beast.
The purpose of this research was threefold. First, it was to establish that the Tigers were
not combat-effective in the offensive role for which they were created. Secondly, the Allied
research and development response created weapons that were effective against the Tiger and
more lethal to less heavily armored German tanks. Lastly, the Tiger’s most effective role was in
the defense, dispersed along a wider front where a movement to contact could be limited. As the
criteria for combat effectiveness eliminated kill claims due to reporting inaccuracy, the primary
responsibility of the Tiger – the destruction of other tanks - where it undoubtedly excelled cannot
be considered.
The Tiger program was not only ineffective in the offensive role for which it was created,
but the tank also created more problems for Germany, which the Reich had no ability to solve,
particularly in the aspects of logistics and manufacturing. Furthermore, the Tigers' success in the
defense only served to influence the Allies to produce larger caliber guns or more effective close
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air support aircraft, both of which created greater dangers to the entirety of the German army.
Lastly, the program as a whole was not cost-effective. There was very little benefit to the
German war effort in destroying a Sherman that cost less than 20% of a Tiger when the US built
over 50,000 of the M4. As the Americans built more Shermans in 1943 alone than the number of
Panzer III, Tiger I, Tiger II, and Panther that the Germans built in total meant there would never
be a number of destroyed tanks that made the Allied morale waver.
When taken as a whole, the Tiger was a costly tank that was complicated to build,
difficult to maintain in combat conditions, and required rail transport for movement from one
sector of the front to another. This latter detail was further complicated by the need for railcars
designed for the heavy weight of the tank and their availability in a conflict spanning a continent,
not to mention the thousands of kilograms of repair parts and petroleum products required per
month per battalion placed a heavy strain on German logistics.
The Tiger was exceptionally effective at destroying other tanks, but as a breakthrough
tank, it had been designed and built for an offensive war Germany was no longer fighting when it
debuted outside Leningrad in mid-1942. Only two major offensives were launched while the
Tigers were in service – the Kursk Offensive and the 1944 Ardennes Offensive. At Kursk, the
battalions achieved mixed results. The 505th failed, as the doctrine plainly stated that the
battalion could not operate effectively with only infantry support. 602 In the south, the 503rd was
split, and each division in III Panzer Corps received a company of Tigers. Though this violated
the doctrinal concentration principle, the Tigers were used in the initial assault, which failed in
large part due to extensive minefields supported by pre-plotted artillery. The II SS Panzer Corps
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had the greatest success, as the engineers had cleared avenues through the minefields the night
before the offensive. Based on the Soviet force distribution after the engagement at Prokhorovka,
it is likely that Army Group South's tank forces would have been able to drive closer to Kursk
had the offensive not been halted. However, this would not have led to victory at Kursk as the
German planners failed to understand that the strategic reserve could quickly replenish front-line
units to full strength. 603
In the 1944 Ardennes Offensive, the Tiger II was so ill-equipped for the terrain that the
501st-SS was sent to the rear of the formation so as not to hold up the offensive, and the 506th
was used as a mobile reserve for the 6th Panzer Army. Neither battalion played a large role, as
only twenty Allied tanks were reported destroyed, at the cost of twenty-two Tiger IIs. Just in
terms of cost per tank, this is extraordinarily disproportionate. When adjusted for inflation to
2022, each Sherman cost around $922,982 based on an average 1943 cost of $55,000 each. With
similar parameters, a Tiger II, which cost $300,000 to produce in 1943, is the modern equivalent
of $5,034,450.604 Based on these numbers, in terms of tank value, the operation cost the Germans
over $92 million modern American dollars in Tiger II losses alone. The tank was so unsuited to
this mission the only explanation justifying its use was that the Wehrmacht had reached the point
of desperation.605
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In terms of cost, the figures from the Ardennes Offensive underpin the larger situation
facing the German war effort. In 1944, when the Tiger II was first deployed, the United States
produced as many weapons as all Axis powers combined, equivalent to 40% of the entire
armaments production for all combatants on every front in the Second World War. 606 Given the
strategic realities Germany faced by 1944, it is almost a miracle German production continued at
all and that ammunition and vehicles continued to reach the front. Even so, Allied bombing
severely inhibited production by late 1944, and the loss of crucial factories in the west and the
loss of resources in the east strangled Tiger production. Five bomber raids between 22
September and 7 October 1944 destroyed 95% of the Henschel factory, resulting in the loss of
six hundred fifty-seven Tiger IIs.607 Another raid in December 1944 delayed production, but
manufacturing limped along until Henschel shut down in March 1944. 608 These tanks may not
have turned the tide, but they certainly would have been capable of defeating Allied tanks to
defend Germany from the encroaching enemy armies.
During the war, the Tiger's necessity was questioned, as the war was no longer offensive
in nature. One officer, General of the Artillery Fritz Brand, argued, "…the Wehrmacht had been
in transition to an artillery battle since the middle of 1943. All efforts had to be directed towards
this; all projects of over armament, such as tanks or close air support planes, were to be
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liquidated." 609 The same report claimed that one Tiger I contained enough steel to produce
twenty-one 10.5 cm light field howitzers, the standard artillery piece for the German military.
From a tactical perspective, the heavy tank battalions were impeded by a flawed doctrine
that was never updated and the failure of General Guderian's Inspectorate of Armored Forces to
provide a defensive doctrine once it was apparent Germany was not going to regain the offensive
initiative. The concentration principle, which was adhered to in German offensive warfare, was
not appropriate for a vehicle the size of the Tiger. Demanding a full battalion attack a singular
avenue of approach was an obvious indication of Germany's point of main effort, and once this
became obvious, it was not difficult to shift defensive reserves to counter the Tigers.
By their nature and the cost of parts and maintenance – not to mention initial production
– the Tigers were unlikely candidates for a feigned assault, even if using them as such may have
drawn in a significant portion of the defending army. Further, the Tigers were not designed to
exploit their own breakthrough rapidly. As witnessed at Kursk, the II SS Panzer Corps had
broken through the first two defensive perimeters, but the supporting panzer divisions were
unable to create their own breakthroughs to support the continued offensive. Aside from this, the
Tiger's limited combat radius and constant maintenance concerns meant they were unsuitable for
fighting beyond the Schwerpunkt in any case.
The Tigers were also used in ways that, while non-doctrinal, were commonly accepted,
and this caused the unnecessary loss of valuable equipment. Their deployment against minefields
is the primary example. It was acceptable to preserve manpower by allowing Tigers to plow
through minefields, but this led to greater losses than were necessary once the tactic of defense in
depth, where artillery and anti-tank guns fired with withering effect on Tigers disabled by mines
Markus Pöhlman, Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Kreiges: Eine deutsche Geschichte 1890 bis
1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 400.
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became common practice, as was discussed in the North African campaign. The first Tiger
captured by the British, Tiger 131 of the 504th, was captured in such a way; minimal damage
caused the crew to bail out, and the tank, still operational, was able to be recovered by the
British. 610
The Tigers were most effective in the defensive, in a widely dispersed formation
scattered among the panzer divisions operating along the same defensive line. As noted in
Chapter Three, Tiger formations were often able to hold bridgeheads, such as at Narva, or
pockets that had been completely encircled, as in the Courland Pocket. In the last case, the
pocket held out for almost a year, and even though the bulk of the Soviet forces had bypassed the
pocket on their way to Germany, the pocket still repelled six major attacks and remained intact
until the end of the war.
Defensive operations suited the Tiger well in North Africa and Italy as well. In Italy, the
Allies were only able to diminish the strength of the Tiger battalions by drawing them into local
attacks, luring them into minefields, then hammering the disabled tanks with artillery and antitank guns. This tactic was in use in Italy as well, but due to the canalizing terrain, a company
could hold up an Allied advance until it was forced to withdraw due to artillery and close air
support.
On the Western Front, the Tigers had more to fear from the Allied air superiority than
they did from the Allied tanks. The Sherman was woefully under-armored, but its weakness was
not its gun but rather its armor and armament compared to the Tiger. Contrary to popular myth,
the 75mm was not unable to damage the Tiger; instead, the Sherman was able to penetrate the
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Tiger's side armor at ranges of 650 meters with the M61 APCBC round in 1943.611 While this
distance is respectable, the fact remains that the Tiger I could penetrate the Sherman's 75mm
frontal armor at over 2000 meters, and the Tiger II's longer barreled L/71 8.8cm cannon was
hypothetically able to penetrate the Sherman at 3000 meters or more, though in gunnery tests the
farthest target was 2500 meters, and shots penetrated 176 mm of armor – more than double the
Sherman's armor thickness – at 2000 meters. 612 This disparity forced Allied planners to bypass
the Tigers wherever it was possible and rely on bombing and close air support – or improvised
hand-held rocket launchers, in one instance – to defeat the tanks in a manner in which the
Germans could not retaliate.
The realization that the Tigers were largely impenetrable in 1943 led the Soviets and
Western Allies to develop heavier caliber tank and assault gun armaments capable of leveling the
battlefield. The Soviets developed the SU-152 in mid-1943, and it proved more than capable of
penetrating 105mm of 90-degree armor at 1500 meters – more than a match for the Tiger's 60
mm side plates or 100 mm frontal armor, as was its successor, the ISU-152, which carried the
same gun on an IS-2 chassis. 613
The Western Allies also developed several weapons capable of countering both Tiger I
and II based on extensive studies of Tiger 131 and Tiger 231 from the 504th and 501st,
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respectively. 614 Some of these, such as the M26 Pershing, were hypothetically more than capable
of defeating both Tiger I and II but saw limited action due to the American tendency to focus on
General Leslie J. McNair’s tank destroyer doctrine, which argued American tanks were primarily
for infantry support and breakthrough exploitation while tank destroyers were the primary antitank vehicle; this doctrine limited advancements in American tank technology, such as upgrading
existing platforms or producing tanks with larger caliber guns. 615 Thus, while the Soviets and
British worked steadily to improve the tanks they fielded against the Germans, leading to an
arms race of sorts by late 1943 when the British began development of the Centurion and the
Soviets researched improvements that led to the T-34-85 and the IS series, American tank
development stagnated.
The American complacency was based on the idea that the M4 Sherman was superior to
the Panzer III and IV, a concept that was flawed after the Germans introduced the 7.5cm KwK
L/40 cannon. However, it was believed this threat was minimal, as was the threat posed by the
Tiger and Panther, which had appeared only in limited numbers by that point in the war.616 The
result was that the major development in tank research from 1943-1944 was the T23 electric
transmission. 617
There may have been little interest in upgrading tanks, but the American tank destroyers,
particularly the M36 tank destroyer, had success against the Tiger and Panther. 618 The M36,
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with a 90mm cannon, was able to destroy German heavy tanks at the range, and despite its light
armor, was an effective counter against the German heavy tanks, except the Tiger II, which it
could only penetrate in certain spots along the rear armor.619 This vehicle entered service in 1944
and was used extensively by the US First, Ninth, and Third Armies, which replaced the M10
tank destroyer and towed anti-tank guns with this vehicle. 620
The British created several variants of American vehicles that were far more effective
than the tanks and tank destroyers produced by the Americans. One, the Sherman Firefly,
mounted a QF 17-pounder on the M4A1, the M4A3, and the M4A4 to produce multiple variants
of the weapon system.621 The British did not improve the Sherman’s vulnerable armor, but the
17-pounder was more than capable of defeating both the Panther and Tiger, which influenced
Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery to equip the 21st Army Group with the Firefly prior to the
Normandy amphibious landings.622
As the Firefly was a stopgap weapon, certain deficiencies were never ironed out. For
example, the 17-pounder created a large plume of smoke and dust when it fired, which gave
away its position during the day. At night, the muzzle flash "…was so brilliant that both gunner
and commander need to blink at the moment of firing. The muzzle flash spurts out so much that,
after a shot or two, the hedge or undergrowth is likely to start burning."623 The Germans realized
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the longer barreled tanks posed a greater threat to their own armor, so British crews went to great
lengths to conceal their barrels and generally sought a new position after one or two shots. 624
The most significant aspect of all these weapons is their firepower. With the Tiger, the
Germans had sought to reclaim the qualitative advantage over their enemy – an advantage one
could argue never existed at all based on statistical data from the French tanks compared to the
German armor during the 1940 Campaign. But the Tigers did accomplish this goal spectacularly
and held that advantage until these new Allied weapons began to emerge from their factories and
were deployed on the battlefield. They were not just capable of defeating the Tigers but every
other German tank on the field as well.
As discussed, the Germans had begun the war with the belief that the Panzer III would be
the primary tank versus tank weapon, while the Panzer IV would support the infantry in its
breakthrough operations. Yet, by 1943 the Panzer III was phased out of service after a six-year
production run of 5,775 tanks. 625 This indicates the tactical situation had shifted beyond being
outgunned by the KV-1 and T-34, but that armored warfare had progressed to a point much like
the Dreadnought naval arms race prior to the First World War for Germany in particular – Hitler
wanted heavier tanks with larger armaments that were able to defeat any opposing vehicle and
survive the encounter, at least until after Kursk, when only the designs for the Tiger II survived
his newfound infatuation with the StuG.626
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Until mid-1943, the decision to produce the Tiger seemed to be reasonable. Germany had
been pushed back from Stalingrad, but the Russian counteroffensives had been halted due in no
small part to the Tigers, and even if Germany no longer had the ability to launch offensives on
the scale of Barbarossa, it certainly could launch localized offensives that could drag the war into
a stalemate. In May 1943, Germany controlled vast swathes of the Russian heartland and the
majority of Europe. The war was not going as planned, but the situation was manageable;
Germany still had the ability to implement strategies that would improve efficiency across the
armaments industry. Instead, Hitler threw his faith behind the Tiger program, as he ordered the
termination of the Tiger I in favor of the untested, more expensive Tiger II.
By 1944, the Tiger could no longer be considered a Schwerpunktwaffe, as it was being
used wherever it was deemed necessary, regardless of the existence of adequate maintenance
facilities or supply. This put the Tiger battalions in a difficult position; if they were successful
despite their mistreatment, the heavy tank battalions would be cast into increasingly difficult – or
impossible – missions for which the Tigers were not created. Every victory would have fed the
German propaganda machine further, and this would have had the additional effect of
encouraging the Allies to target the battalions and their required support facilities more heavily.
Propaganda had used men like Michael Wittman, sitting on their Tigers in pictures that
resembled crusading knights mounted on their steeds, to paint the war as an all-or-nothing
struggle of 'us' versus 'them.' Newsreels featured footage of the battles and depicted the German
soldier as defiant against the might of the Allied onslaught. 627 This forced Germany to continue
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the Tiger regardless of any misgivings they may have had due to the control Hitler held over the
armaments industry.
The soldiers in the Tiger battalions had grown concerned over the negative effects of
continued Tiger production as well. While senior commanders continued to order the battalions
into inadvisable engagements, convinced the Tiger’s firepower would prove to be an
insurmountable obstacle, the reports from junior officers paint a far different story. After a failed
defense in January 1944, Captain Lange of the 506th lamented:
our understanding still remains the same as a year ago, that the Tiger is a battering ram in
the attack and a bump stop to be used at the Schwerpunkt in the defense. It is to stand
ready in sufficient numbers for the higher command to use at the decisive moment.
However, this can occur only if, in between the main battles, time is given for care and
maintenance instead of being continuously employed as mobile bunkers…it is not
bearable that the Tigers must continuously stand as morale support behind the forward
line. 628
Captain Lange was alluding to the use of Tigers to bolster morale amongst the poorly trained
infantry. As tanks were forbidden to hold positions while under anti-tank and artillery fire, the
Tigers pulled back as soon as an enemy assault began, which also pulled the infantry away from
their defensive positions. Thus, the forward lines were not defended to the fullest unless the
panzers held firm as well.
Officers in battalions refitted with Tiger II’s – the 501st, 505th, and 506th - were no more
satisfied with the conditions on the front, particularly with the treatment of the battalions, than
they had been prior to their destruction during Operation Bagration. In a report dated 25
November 1944, Captain Fromme of the 503rd complained:
…the action was limited to small tasks, especially counterthrusts with weak infantry
forces against the enemy…however, these caused the Russians to forbid their units from
conducting any major combat attacks where Tigers were located. During this week…the
“Battle Report of Captain Lange, 15 January 1944,” reproduced in Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Tiger
Tanks: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1997), 142-144.
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Abteilung was not given enough time to perform maintenance in spite of urgent requests being
continually made. This was partially due to the situation, but also partially due to the lack of
understanding of the higher command to which the unit was subordinated…As a result of a lack
of towing capacity, the Abteilung was faced with either blowing up the broken-down Tigers
beyond the main battle line or recovering them with Tigers that were still operational. Naturally,
this resulted in mechanical breakdowns…the few operational Tigers that were left were shoved
from division to division and given tasks that were not achievable and could not be carried
out. 629
Interwar German tank design had been based on the concept of expanding and mechanizing the
infiltration and stormtrooper tactics from World War I as a way to prevent an attritional war, but
the lessons had been all but ignored. One senior German officer, Colonel Kurt Thorbeck, the
head of the Rifle Testing Commission, complained disgustedly to the General Staff in 1920 that
"the German General Staff did not properly recognize the material demands of a world war and
therefore did not correctly prepare for the war in peace." His report further excoriated the
General Staff, which, while filled with tacticians, included no technicians to present reports of
equipment deficiencies. 630 Thorbeck’s most damning condemnation, however, may as well have
been written as a post-WWII analysis: that the General Staff wasted money and effort on
equipment it did not need, or that was unlikely to provide any real benefit, such as the 82.5
million Marks spent on infantry body armor which could have been spent on tank
development. 631
The failures in the Soviet Union led the German logistical system to realize its resource
and industrial capabilities were flawed, and rather than alter the framework, German military

Report of Captain Fromme, 25 November 1944,” reproduced in Thomas Jentz, Germany’s Tiger Tanks:
Tiger I & II Combat Tactics (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1997), 152-153.
629

630
Colonel Kurt Thorbeck, The Technical and Tactical Lessons of the World War quoted in James Corum,
The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seekt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of
Kansas, 1992), 23.
631

Ibid, 23.

225

planners chose to revert to the mantra drilled into their military profession since the mid-1800s –
that of the offensive. Thus, the Tiger was not only a product of a flawed theoretical framework,
but it was also created in a nation that had a history of failing to learn the lessons from previous
wars where its focus on research and development was concerned. The concept was relatively
understandable, given that Germany was in no position to enter another war that developed into
attritional combat, and it was incredibly appealing. Invulnerable tanks need relatively low
replacement numbers, and if this tank came equipped with a cannon that could destroy any
enemy tank, the result would be an economic war of attrition that undermines the enemy's longterm ability to wage war.
An increased focus on the Panther would have allowed the panzer divisions to become
more flexible than they were given when Tiger battalions were attached. As a predecessor to the
modern main battle tank, the Panther statistically satisfied almost every requirement.632 It had the
same engine as the Tiger I, which gave it the speed and maneuverability of a light tank, but with
sloped frontal armor, it had the protection of a heavy tank. Its long-barreled 7.5cm KwK 42 L/70
was extraordinarily powerful, even when compared to tanks with cannons of a higher caliber,
and all these features came packed in a tank weighing under 50 tons. 633 From Germany’s
perspective, the Panther, unlike the Tiger, was designed with standards of increased production
efficiency in mind.634 The major drawback, outside of the 'teething troubles' witnessed with
initial production models, was the thin side armor, which made the Panther vulnerable to
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flanking fire and thus unsuitable for breakthrough assaults. However, this issue could have been
mitigated by the much lower cost in terms of time and resources, as Germany would have been
able to focus more heavily on artillery and StuGs as a means to achieve a breakthrough.
The reality was that the Tiger program only served to undermine the German industrial pool,
which could have served to focus on the production of more efficient tanks, on producing fuel
that was desperately needed by the Luftwaffe, or on raw materials that could have been allocated
to more effective weapons. The Tiger, rather than becoming a vehicle that inspired future
innovation, was the first stumbling block on a path to obsolescent that was the eventual fate of
the heavy tank on a global scale. In an echo of the naval arms race that preceded the First World
War, tank armor and armament would reach a point where no amount of armor could keep a
heavy tank alive on the modern battlefield.
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Appendix A
Abbreviations
schwere Panzerabteilung - s.Pz.Abt; heavy tank battalion
schwere SS-Panzerabteilung - s.SS-Pz.Abt; heavy tank battalion assigned to the SS
schwere Panzer-Kompanie – S.Pk; heavy tank company
Kriegsstärkenachweisung – KStN; Table of Organization
Sonderkraftfahrzeug – Sd.Kfz – special purpose vehicle; numbers were assigned to
armored, tracked, and half-tracked vehicles. Sd.Kfz 181 was assigned to the Pz.Kpfw VI Ausf. E
“Tiger”; Sd.Kfz. 182 was the Pz.Kpfw Tiger Ausf. B “Tiger II.”
Panzerkampfwagen – Pz.Kpfw; armored fighting vehicle
Ausführung – Ausf.; variant
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Appendix B
Heereswaffenampt Offices
As mentioned in Chapter Two, HWA was broken in thirteen offices and their
responsibilities were either in armaments development or testing. The offices are as follows:
Wa Prüf I: ammunition
Wa Prüf II: infantry light weapons and general equipment
Wa Prüf III: Chief Design office
Wa Prüf IV: artillery
Wa Prüf V: engineering equipment
Wa Prüf VI: tank design and development
Wa Prüf VII: signaling equipment
Wa Prüf VIII: optics and observation equipment
Wa Prüf IX: chemical weapons
Wa Prüf X: rockets
Wa Prüf XI: administration
Wa Prüf Fest: equipment and armaments for fortifications
Wa Prüf Forschung: research
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Appendix C
KStN 1150d, May 8,1942

N. Zug
Tiger

Tiger

Panzer III

L. Zug
Panzer III

Panzer III

Panzer III
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Panzer III

Panzer III

Appendix D
KStN 1176d, December 15, 1942
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Appendix E
KStN 1150e and 1176e, March 5, 1943
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Appendix F
Merkblatt 47/a29, May 20, 1943
A: Purpose, Tasks, and Organization of the schwere Panzer-Kompanie
1. The great firepower, strong armor, high terrain crossing ability even in winter, and
strong overrunning power are the characteristics of the schweren Panzerkampfwagen in the
Tiger-Kompanie. They enable the company to:
a.to attack in the first wave against strong defenses
b. to destroy heavy enemy tanks and other armored targets already at long ranges
c. to decisively defeat the enemy defenses
d. to break through positions reinforced by defensive works
2. The schwere Panzer-Kompanie is the strongest combat weapon in the Panzerwaffe. As
a rule, they will be employed within the schwere Panzer-Abteilung in order to quickly break
enemy resistance and penetrate into their defenses by utilizing concentrated effective fire
superiority while protected by string armor.
3. The heavy weight of the schwere Panzerkampfwagen restricts the use of many bridges,
calls for reinforcing bridges, or preparation of special road and bridging equipment and advance
scouting of fords.
4. The Kompanie is organized as:
a. Kampfstaffel (combat echelon)
Kompanietrupp (company headquarters) with two Pz.Kpfw. VI
1.-3. Zug (1st to 3rd Platoon) each with four Pz.Kpfw VI
b. Raederstaffel (wheeled echelon)
Kompanietrupp (company headquarters
Sanitaets-Dienst (medics)
Kfz. Instandsetzungsgruppe (vehicle maintenance section)
Gefechtsross I (combat trains I)
Gefechtsross II (combat trains II)
Gefechtsross III (combat trains III)
B: Training on the Panzerkampfwagen
5. Training on the Panzerkampfwagen VI is conducted in accordance with
the following manuals:
a. Merkblatt for the training on the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger
b. D 214 equipment instruction for the 8.8 cm Kw.K. 36
c. Firing instructions and firing exercises for the
Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger
d. D656/22 equipment description and operating instructions for
the Pz.Kpfw. VI turret
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the chassis

e. D656/21 equipment description and operating instructions for

f. Handbook for the driver of the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger
D656/23 (including preventative maintenance guide)
g. Panzer radio operation H.Dv. 421/4, D613/12, and D10008/1
h. D659/2 loading for rail transport
i. D659/4 recovery of Panzerkampfwagen
C: The individual Panzerkampfwagen
6. The individual Panzerkampfwagen IV accomplishes its combat missions
within the Zug, as an exception, in Halbzeuge (sections) and as individual Panzers to guard the
rest and assembly areas of its own unit. The loss of the platoon leader or section leader, loss of
contact with the platoon leader or section leader, rapidly changing battles, as well as close terrain
an often demand independent handling of individual Panzerkampfwagen.
7. With its main weapon, the 8.8 cm Kw.K, the Pz.Kpfw. VI engages as
priority: 1. Armored targets and bunker embrasures with Panzer-grenaten (armor-piercing
shells), 2. Nests of resistance, anti-tank guns, artillery positions, and massed targets (such as
columns and reserves) with Sprenggrenaten (high explosive shells), 3. The long range of the 8.8
cm Kw.K makes it possible to bring effective fire down on targets already at long distances.
8. Using a gunner’s quadrants, long range fire is possible at long ranges of
up to 9000 meters. Worthwhile employment of the weapon against enemy artillery or massed
targets comes into question only at ranges up to 5000 meters by good observation if the
Panzerkampfwagen cannot drive any closer to the target because of barricades and terrain
obstacles or if the targets will be available only for a moment.
9. The 8.8 cm Kw.K will be fired while halted. The schwere
Panzerkampfwagen is to be brought into firing position with its front facing toward the enemy
fire (striking angle and thicker armor protection). Take up hidden and hull-down firing positions.
10. The flat trajectory of the 8.8 cm shells requires special attention to
safety when firing over our own troops.
11. With the turret and hull machine guns, the Pz.Kpfw. VI charges into
the firefight at close and short ranges, engaging unarmored targets. Massed targets can also be
successfully engaged at ranges of up to 800 meters.
D. The Zug (platoon)
I. General
12. The Zugführer (platoon leader) is responsible for the combat readiness
of his platoon. Following orders from the company commander, he leads the platoon by radio,
example, and signals.
13. The Zug consists of four Panzerkampfwagen VI. It is organized as two
Halbzeuge. During separate employments, the Zugführer commands the 1. Halbzug and
Halbzugführer (section leader) the 2. Halbzug.
II. Formations and Movements
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14. The following are descriptions of the optimal formations for the Tiger
Zug: 1. Reihe: used for marches and assembly, formation was as a straight line from north to
south when viewed from above. Intervals for assembly was 10 meters and for marches 15
marches. 2. Linie: used for assembly, formation was as a straight line from east to west when
viewed from above. 3. Doppelreihe – used for approach marches and attacks. Intervals in combat
were 150 meters between sections and one hundred meters in depth. The formation was as a
square, with the Zugführer at either the upper right or upper left corner when viewed from above,
dependent upon the position from where he could best direct the platoon, and the Halbzugführer
was at the other upper corner, at a position from which he could assume leadership of the
platoon. 4. Keil: the most useful attack formation. Intervals were set at one hundred meters to the
front and sides. When viewed from above, the Keil resembled the Doppelreihe, and only differed
in the lower two Tigers were a 45-degree angle offset from the lead Panzerkampfwagen.
III. Combat
15. The Zug builds a combat unit within the Kompanie. Employment with
or attachment to a mittlere Panzer-Kompanie (medium tank company) or Panzer-Grenadier
(heavy, mechanized infantry) creates the exception. It can be necessary to reinforce the mittlere
Panzer-Kompanie for special missions (as the point element), to support the Panzer-Grenadiere,
by crossing rivers and engaging a position reinforced with defensive works.
16. The Zug conducts an attack by continuously shifting rapidly between
fire and movement. The Halbzeuge and individual Panzers mutually support and guard each
other’s advance. Short halts to fire and rapidly driving to the next firing position are
recommended. Long bounds are to be made, never under two hundred meters. The direction of
travel and the firing positions are to be frequently changed by utilizing cover offered by the
terrain.
E. The Kompanie
I. General
17. One of the two Pz.Kpfw. VI found in the Kompanietrupp serves as the
commander’s vehicle, and the other as a reserve vehicle. The three motorcycle passengers found
in the Kompanietrupp are used to deliver orders. When an action starts, along with the
commander’s car, they are to join Gefechstoss I (first battle push).
II. Formations and Marches
18. The following are descriptions of the optimal formations for the schwere
Panzer-Kompanie. 1. Kolonne: When viewed from above, this formation, used for assembly,
appeared as three rows of vehicles. At the head of the three rows were the Zugführer, with the
remaining three Tigers aligned. At the center row was the Kompanieführer and the second Tiger
from the headquarters, which made the center row six vehicles and the other two rows four
vehicles. 2. Doppelreihe: Used for approach marches, all Tigers were in a row facing the
direction of travel, with the exception of one Zug, which would travel beside the formation on
the side of the most likely enemy attack. 3. Keil: as described above, this formation was a narrow
attack formation. A Zug was in the lead, the other two Zuge were at a 45-degree angle behind the
lead Zug, and the two Command Tigers were in the center. This formation occupied an area
seven hundred meters wide and four hundred meters deep. 4. Breitkeil: Similar to the Keil in area
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and composition, the Breitkeil found two Zuge in the lead, the command element in the center,
and the third Zug to the rear.
III. Command
19. The same principles that apply for leading a mittlere Panzer-Kompanie apply
in general to leading the schwere Panzer-Kompanie.
IV. Marches
20. The march route requires especially thorough scouting because of the width,
length, and weight of the schwere Panzerkampfwagen. Aerial photographs are to be used to spot
hairpin curves, narrow angled streets in villages, and narrows.
In general, the schwere Panzerkampfwagen can drive over every short bridge that
will carry the Pz.Kpfw IV.
21. On long stretches, the Tiger-Kompanie cannot march within the
columns of motorized or other Panzer units, especially not in unknown terrain, because bridges
and narrows can be obstacles for the Tigers that will endanger the flow of the march for the
entire unit.
22. During night marches, especially on dark nights, it is useful to have a
crew member sit on the forward outer corner of the track guards of the schwere
Panzerkampfwagen in order to instruct the driver by shouting through the open driver’s hatch.
23. The schwere Panzerkampfwagen requires many maintenance halts. A
maintenance halt is to be ordered after the first five kilometers and then every 10 to 15
kilometers.
24. Basically, soft lanes should be used for marches because the hard
surfaced and high crowned roads cause heavy stress on the running gear, especially the inner
roadwheels. The average speed for a daytime march in 10-15 milometers per hour, by night 7-10
kilometers per hour.
V. Preparing for Action
25. The unmistakable howling of the schwere Panzerkampfwagen’s
engine, especially heard at long distances at night, requires attention to the wind direction and to
location of assembly areas far distant from the front in order to preserve the element of surprise.
26. Then after leaving the assembly area it is often necessary to take a
short halt within our own lines to again refuel in order to be able to totally exploit the small
radius of action in enemy territory.
27. After driving into the assembly area, the identifying wide and deep
tracks and furrow made by the schwere Panzerkampfwagen must be eradicated to conceal the
presence of schwere Panzerkampfwagen from enemy aerial reconnaissance.
28. If the assembly area must be entered during the day, the Kompanie is
to be widely dispersed. During marches, the schwere Panzerkampfwagen are to be camouflaged
with branches or tarpaulins.
VI. Combat
A. Attacks
29. The strength of the schwere Panzer-Kompanie’s attack lies in
concentrated employment within the schwere Panzer-Abteilung.
30. As a rule, the Kompanie’s attack formation is the Breitkeil.
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31. Continuously switching between fire and movement, the Kompanie
breaks into the opponent’s position; quickly charges through the enemy zone of resistance;
engages and silences armored targets, defensive weapons, nests of resistance, and heavy
weapons; and destroys the enemy artillery. Here it is important to destroy every anti-tank
weapon within the Kompanie’s command sector.
32. The company commander must strive to bring all of the weapons of
the schwere Panzerkampfwagen to unified effect.
33. Flank protection requires special attention,
VII. Tank versus Tank Combat
34.The most important task of the schwere Panzer-Kompanie is the
engagement of enemy tanks. It always has priority over every other assignment.
35. Independent, swift handling by the company commander and strict
control of the company with short, clear orders are the basis for success. Immediately attacking
is usually the best solution.
36. The enemy is to be repeatedly fooled and confused by constant
changes in the methods of attack. The following tactics aid in the”
a. Opening fire from ambush out of favorable positions (hull down or positions along the
edges of forest, towns, etc.) at effective ranges and from unexpected directions.
b. During counterattacks by enemy tanks, build a fire front and send elements to engage
them with flanking fire. Let the enemy tanks close range. Shut down the engines in order to head
better. Destroy the enemy with a counterstrike.
c. Envelop or bypass through difficult terrain.
d. Go into action against the flanks and read by exploiting the sun’s position, the wind
direction, and the ground cover.
e. If a strong defensive front is unexpectedly encountered, along with tank obstacles,
immediately withdraw from the enemy fire and renew the attack from an unexpected position.
Use smoke cleverly.
f. During attacks in close terrain or fight in built-up areas, send out Panzer-Grenadiere or
reconnaissance troops on foot in order to locate enemy tanks early and determine a favorable
attack direction in a timely manner or gain a favorable firing position while advancing under
mutually supporting cover fire.
g. Withdrawing enemy tanks are to be pursued without delay and destroyed.
37. Knocked out or immobilized enemy tanks are to be blown up during retreats.
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Appendix G
Copyright Information
Diagram of the Henschel factory on page 68 is used by permission of Alan Hamby.
Copyright 2003.
Map of Soviet Winter Offensives, 1941-1942 on page 109 is property of the United
States Government and is public domain.
Map of Kursk and Vicinity on page 133 is property of the United States Government and
is public domain.
Map of the Battle of Prokhorovka on page 139 is used by permission of Armchair
General webmaster. Copyright 2009.
Map of the North African campaign on page 177 is property of the United States
Government and is public domain.
Map of operations in Tunisia on page 179 is property of the United States Government
and is public domain.
Map of the Invasion of Sicily on page 184 is property of the United States Government
and is public domain.
Map of the Anzio beachhead on page 186 is property of the United States Government
and is public domain.
Map of the vicinity of Caen and Villers-Bocage is used by permission of Dan Taylor.
Copyright 2022.
KStN diagrams on pages 230, 231, and 232 are used by permission of Dr. Leo
Niehorster. Copyright 2016.

238

Bibliography
""Map of the Soviet Winter Offensive, 13 December 1942 - 18 February 1943." United States
Government. January 14, 2007.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ww2_map25_Dec42_Feb43.jpg (accessed July
24, 2022).
History in Images: Pictures of War, WWII. n.d.
https://historyimages.blogspot.com/2012/02/eastern-front-ww2-maps-color.html
(accessed July 28, 2022).
Aberdeen Proving Ground, U.S. Army. Tank Archives. November 2012.
http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/04/aberdeen-t-34-and-kv-1-test.html (accessed
December 2012).
Academy, United States Military. "World War II European Theater." United States Military
Academy. n.d. https://www.westpoint.edu/academics/academicdepartments/history/world-war-two-europe (accessed September 18, 2022).
Adam, Wilhelm , and Otto Ruhle. With Paulus at Stalingrad. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword
Books, 2015.
Admininstration, National Archives and Records. SS Officer Personnel Files. Lorenz, KarlHeinz 03-Jul-1917, College Park Maryland: National Arcvhives Microfilm Publication
A3343, Series SSO, roll227A, 1943.
Agte, Patrick. Michael Wittman and the Waffen-SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in
WWII. Lanham, MD: Stackpole Boooks, 1996.
—. Michael Wittman and the Waffen-SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in WWII, vol 1.
Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 1996.
Anderson, Thomas. Tiger. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013.
Antill, Peter. Stalingrad 1942. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007.
Archive, The Map. "Stalingrad Area: 19 November-28 December 1942." The Map Archive. n.d.
https://www.themaparchive.com/product/stalingrad-area-19-november-28-december/
(accessed July 20, 2022).
Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944. New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 2007.
Balsamo, Larry. "Germany's Armed Forces In the Second World War: Manpower, Armaments,
and Supply." History Teacher, 1991: 263-277.
Barnett, Correlli. Hitler's Generals. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.

239

Barron, Leo, and Don Cygan. No Silent Night: The Christmas Battle for Bastogne. London: New
American Library, 2012.
Battistielli, Pier. Heinz Guderian: Leadership, Strategy, Conflict. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2011.
"Battle of Prokhorovka." Armchair General. October 15, 2009.
http://armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/maps/maps1943SW.htm#Prokhorovka (accessed
July 31, 2022).
Beevor, Antony. Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944. London: Penguin Books, 2019.
—. Stalingrad. London: Penguin Books, 1999.
—. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.
—. The Second World War. New York: Back Bay Books, 2012.
Bell, Kelly. "Struggle for Stalin's Skies." WWII History, 2006: 62-63.
Belov, Fedor. The History of a Soviet Collective Farm. New York: Praeger, 1955.
Berghahn, Volker. "Preface." In War of Extermination, by Klaus Naumann, & Hannes Heer, xiv.
New York: Berghahn Books, 2004.
Bergstrom, Christer. Stalingrad: The Air Battle, 1942-January 1943. London: Chevron
Publishing, 2007.
Bird, Lorrin, and Robert Livingston. WWII Ballistics: Armor and Gunnery. Albany, NY:
Overmatch Press, 2001.
Bishop, Chris, and Chris McNab. Campaigns of World War II Day by Day. London: Amber
Books, 2003.
Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt and Co. Inc., 1951.
Brand, Deiter. "60 Years Ago: Prokhorovka." Austrian Military Journal, no. 6, 2003.
Brand, Wulf D. Tigerfibel: The Original Tiger Tank Manual. Branchville, N.J. : Portrayal Press,
2000.
Buchner, Alex. Ostfront 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front, 1944.
Mechanicsburg, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995.
Butler, ed., J.R.M. Victory in the West: The Battle for Normandy. London: Naval & Military
Press, 1962.
Buttar, Prit. The Reckoning: The Defeat of Army Group South, 1944. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2020.
Carius, Otto. Tigers in the Mud: The Combat Career of German Panzer Commander Otto
Carius. Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 1992.
240

Carruthers, Bob. Tiger I in Combat: Hitler's War Machine. Berkshire, UK: Archive Media
Publishing LTD, 2011.
Carruthers, Bob, ed. The German Army in Normandy. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military,
2013.
Ciano, Count Galeazzo. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943. New York: Doubleday, 1946.
Cicero, M. Tullius. "De Officiis." Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University. 1913.
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2007.01.0048%3Ab
ook%3D1%3Asection%3D76#text_main:~:text=For%20arms%20are%20of%20little%2
0value%20in%20the%20field%20unless%20there%20is%20wise%20counsel%20at%20
home. (accessed August 25, 2022).
Citino, Robert. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2007.
—. Forgotten Army, Lost Victories. February 9, 2010. https://www.historynet.com/forgottenarmy-lost-victories/?f (accessed November 26, 2022).
Citino, Robert. "New Gang in Town: The Rise of the German Panzer Division." MHQ: The
Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 28, no. 2, 2016.
—. The German War of War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.
—. The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2012.
—. The Wehrmacht's Last Stand: The German Campaigns of 1944-1945. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2017.
—. US Army Heritage and Education Center. May 21, 2014.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SdO-btKuds&t=1634s (accessed August 1, 2022).
Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945. New York: Quill, 1965.
Clark, Lloyd. Anzio: The Friction of War - Italy and the Battle for Rome. London: Headline
Publishing Group, 2006.
—. Kursk: The Greatest Battle, Eastern Front. London: Headline Publishing Group, 2012.
Command, German Armed Forces High. Adolf Hitler Material Guidance. Executive Order,
College Park, MD: National Archives Microfilm Publication T77, serial 194, roll 194,
item Wi/IF 5.900, 1942.
Connolly, SGT. "The Campaign in Normandy, 1944." Imperial War Museum. July 1944.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205206112 (accessed September 5,
2022).

241

Cooper, Matthew. The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failures. New York:
Stein and Day, 1978.
Cornwell, John. Hitler's Scientists: Science, War, and the Devil's Pact. New York: Viking
Penguin, 2003.
Corum, James. Hans von Seekt and the German Military Reform. Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 1992.
Craig, William. Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky &
Konecky, 1973.
Daniel, Lt. Col. Derrill. "Landings at Oran, Gela, and Omaha Beaches: An Infantry Battalion
Commander's Observations." Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital
Library. September 1947.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/5743/rec/4 (accessed
August 29, 2022).
Deighton, Len. Blood, Tears, and Folly: An Objective Look at WWII. New York: Castle Books,
1999.
D'Este, Carlo. Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign.
London: Pengiun, 1983.
"Deutsche Reichsbahn: The German State Railway ." Feldgrau: German Armed Forces
Research, 1918-1945. n.d. https://www.feldgrau.com/ww2-german-state-railwaydeutsche-reichsbahn/ (accessed October 2, 2022).
"Die Deutsche Wochenschau no. 726." Net-Film.ru. August 1944. https://www.netfilm.ru/en/film-55104/?search=q55104 (accessed October 7, 2022).
Doherty, Richard. El Alamein 1942: Turning Point in the Desert. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword
Military, 2017.
Dunn, Walter. Hitler's Gamble, 1943. London: Praeger Publishers, 1997.
Dunstan, Simon. Mechanized Warfare. Edison, N.J.: Chartwell Books, 2005.
Dupuy, Trevor N. A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945. Falls
Church, VA: Nove Publications, 1984.
—. Hitler's Last Gamble: The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944-Jumary 1945. New York:
Harper Collins Books, 1944.
Earle, Edward Mead. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943.
Ellis, Colonel Burton F. "Accounts by General Sepp Dietrich and Colonel Joachim Pieper." Ike
Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library . May 1, 1953.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2431 (accessed June 1,
2022).
242

Elstob, Peter. Hitler's Last Offensive. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2014.
Encyclopedia, D-Day and Battle of Normandy. Plan of Operation Goodwood. 2021.
https://www.dday-overlord.com/en/battle-of-normandy/allied-operations/goodwood
(accessed September 5, 2022).
Estes, Kenneth. A European Anabasis - Western Volunteers in the German Army, 1940-1945.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
Fallgeibel, Walther-Peer. Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939-1945: Die
Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkreiges aller Wehrmachtteile.
Freidberg, Germany: Podzun-Pallas, 2000.
Faust, Wolfgang. Tiger Tracks: Three Days on the Eastern Front. New York: Beyern Clasic
Publications, 2016.
Fletcher, David. Sherman Firefly. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
—. Tiger! The Tiger Tank - A British View. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1986.
Fletcher, David, et al. Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger I Ausf. E. Somerset, UK: Haynes Publishing,
2017.
Ford, Ken. Battleaxe Division: From Arfica to Italy with the 78th Division, 1942-1945.
Gloucestershire, UK: Stroud, 1999.
Fort Bliss Units. 2022. https://home.army.mil/bliss/index.php/units-tenants/1st-armored-division
(accessed August 28, 2022).
Fowler, Will. Kursk: The Vital 24 Hours. London: Amber Books, 2005.
Freiser, Karl-Heinz. "Schlagen aud der Nachhand - Schlagen aus der Vorhand: Die Schlachten
von Ch'arkow und Kursk 1943." In Gezweitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkreig? Die
Schlachten von Ch’arkow und Kursk im Früjahr und Sommer 1943 in operativer Anlage,
Verlauf und politiscer Bedeutung, by Roland Foerster, ed., 110-113. Berlin: E.S. Mittler,
1996.
Freiser, Karl-Heinz, Klaus Schmidt, Klaus Schörner, Gerhard Schreiber, Kristian Ungvary, and
Bernd Wegner. Die Ostfront 1943/44: Der Kreig im Osten und an den Nebenfronten.
München: Deutsch Verlag-Anhalt, 2007.
Fremdenblatt, Hamburger. "Generalfeldmarschall Paulus." Hamburgisches Welt-WirtschaftsArchiv. February 1, 1943. https://dfgviewer.de/show?tx_dlf%5Bdouble%5D=0&tx_dlf%5Bid%5D=https%3A%2F%2Fpm20.
zbw.eu%2Ffolder%2Fpe%2F0133xx%2F013314%2Fpublic.mets&tx_dlf%5Bpage%5D=
2&cHash=ed97453ddf223a5691752794216cd6a1 (accessed July 20, 2022).
Fretter-Pico, Maximillian. Mißbrauchte Infanterie: Deutsche Infanterie-Divisionen im
ousteuropäischen Großraum 1941 bis 1944. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag für Wehrwesen
Bernard & Graefe, 1957.
243

Fuller, J.F.C. Conduct of War. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1961.
GABTU. "Comparative Penetration." Tacnk Archives. January 09, 2017. https://andrewbek1974.livejournal.com/120699.html (accessed July 31, 2022).
—. "Report on the shooting of German tanks with AP and HE shells from tank guns." Tank
Archives. 1943. http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/05/f-24-vs-german-tanks.html
(accessed July 18, 2022).
—. "Topic 2VV-2: Investigation of the armor of tanks of the German Army, April 1943." Tank
Archives. April 1943. http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/03/gabtus-answers-to-tiger.html
(accessed July 18, 2022).
Glantz, David. "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943." U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, 1986: 1-20.
Glantz, David. "Soviet Military Strategy During the Second Period of War(November 1942 December 1943): A Reappraisal." The Journal of Military History, 1996: 115-150.
—. The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Glantz, David, and Harold Orenstein. The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff
Study. London: Frank Cass, 1999.
Glantz, David, and Jonathan House. The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1999.
—. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995.
Glatter, Goetz, Josef. "Tigerfibel." Internet Archive. July 20, 2014.
https://archive.org/details/tigerfibel/page/n1/mode/2up (accessed June 3, 2022).
Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1985.
Gooderson, Ian. "Allied Fighter‐Bombers versus German Armour in North‐West Europe 1944–
1945: Myths and Realities." Journal of Strategic Studies, 1991: 210-231.
Government, United States. Map of the Soviet Winter Offensive, 13 December 1942- 18
February 1943. Washington, D.C., January 14, 2007.
Graves, Donald. Blood and Steel 2: The Wehrmacht Archive, Retreat to the Reich, September to
December 1944. London: Frontline Books, 2015.
—. Blood and Steel: The Wehrmacht Archive, Normandy 1944. London: Frontline Books, 2013.
Green, Michael, and Gladys Green. Weapons of Patton's Armies. Minneapolis, MN: Zenith
Publishing, 2000.

244

Grier, Howard. Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich's Last Hope, 1944-1945.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007.
GSI. "Record of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II." National
Archives. May 28, 1945. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fedrecords/groups/331.html#331.10 (accessed June 15, 2022).
Guderian, Heinz. Achtung - Panzer! London: Cassell Books, 1999.
—. Erinnernungen des Soldaten. Munich: Motorbuch, 2001.
—. Panzer Leader. New York: Da Capo Press, 1996.
Habeck, MARY. Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet
Union, 1919-1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
Halder, Franz. The Halder War Diary, 1939-1942. Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1988.
Hallion, Richard. The US Army Air Forces in World War II: D-Day 1944, Air Power over the
Normandy Beaches. Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 1994.
Hamby, Alan. "The Maybach Engine." Tiger I Information Center. 2003.
http://www.alanhamby.com/maybach.shtml (accessed October 1, 2022).
—. Tiger I Information Center. 2003. http://www.alanhamby.com/tiger.html (accessed July 9,
2022).
Hans-Joachim, Jung. Panzer Soldiers for "God, Honor, Fatherland," The History of
Panzerregiment "Grossdeutschland:" The German Army's Elite Panzer Formation, trans.
David Johnson. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2000.
Harris, J.P. Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armored Forces. Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995.
Hart, Russell. Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won Normandy. London: Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Hastings, Major H.R.W.S. The Rifle Brigade in the Second World War. Aldershot: Gale &
Polden, 1950.
Hastings, Max. Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2004.
—. Das Reich: The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France, June 1944.
Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2013.
—. Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945. New York: Vintage Books, 2012.
—. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy, 1944. London : Pan Books, 1984.
Haupt, Werner. Heeresgruppe Nord: Der Kampf in Nordabschnitt der Ostfront 1941-1945.
Eggolsheim, Germany: Dörfler Verlag, 1967.
245

—. Panzerabwehrgeschütze 1935-1945. West Chester, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1990.
Healy, Mark. Zitadelle: The German Offensive against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943. Stroud,
UK: The History Press Limited, 2010.
Heereswaffenamt. Merkblatt für den Einsatz der sch. Panzer-Abteilung "Tiger". technical
manual, Berlin: Heereswaffenamt, 1943.
Hinze, Rolf. To the Bitter End: The Final Battles of Army Groups North Ukraine, A, Centre,
Eastern Front 1944-45. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, LTD, 2005.
Hirlinger, Kurt, ed. The Combat History of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508: In Action in Italy
with the Tiger. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc, 2001.
Historical Division, European Command. "German Maintenance in World War II." DA-PAM 20202, 1954: 17.
History, US Army Center of Military. Sicily. 1943. https://www.history.army.mil/brochures/7216/map1.JPG (accessed August 29, 2022).
—. Tunisia. 1943. https://history.army.mil/brochures/tunisia/p22-23(map).jpg (accessed August
29, 2022).
—. Tunisia. 1943. https://history.army.mil/brochures/tunisia/p16(map).jpg (accessed August 29,
2022).
Hitler, Adolf. "Fuhrer Directive 41." Führer Directives and other Top-Level Directives of the
German Armed Forces, 1942-1945. March 24, 2022.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/2359 (accessed July 20,
2022).
Hook, Patrick, Michael Sharpe, and Brian Davis. Waffenn-SS: Elite Forces II. London:
Compendium Publishing, 2007.
Hoth, Hermann. "Statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Panzer Army to a Request
from the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South." In Die Stabilisierung der
Ostfrontnach Stalingrad: Manstein’s Gegenschlag zweischen Donez und Dnjepr im
Früjahr 1943 , by Eberhard Schwartz, 285. Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt Verlag, 1985.
Hudson, Ian. "The Tiger Collection." North Africa Veteran Reg Hunt Remembers. June 2017.
https://blog.tiger-tank.com/people/north-africa-veteran-reghunt/#:~:text=In%20June%202017%20North%20Africa,the%20Army%20in%20April%
201939. (accessed August 24, 2022).
Hull, Isabelle. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of the War in Imperial
Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Hunnicutt, R.P. Pershing: A History of the American Medium Tank T20. Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 1999.
246

Isayav, Alexey. No Surprise: The History of the Second World War, 1942-1943. Moscow:
Eksmo, 2007.
Isserson, Georgii Samilovich. The Evolution of Operational Art. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute Press, 2013.
Jackson, Robert. Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles. Bath: Parragon Publishing, 2007.
Jentz, Thomas. Germany's Panther Tank: The Quest for Combat Supremacy. Atglen, PA:
Schiffer Military History, 1995.
—. Germany's Tiger Tanks. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1997.
—. Germany's Tiger Tanks: D.W. to Tiger I. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2000.
—. Germany's Tiger Tanks: Tiger I & II Combat Tactics. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1997.
—. Panzer Truppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's
Tank Force, vol. 1, 1933-1945. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1996.
—. Panzer Truppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany's
Tank Force, vol. 2, 1943-1945. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1996.
—. Tiger Tanks at the Front. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2001.
Jentz, Thomas, and Hilary Doyle. Germany's Panzers in World War II from Pz.Kpfw.I to Tiger
II. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2001.
—. Germany's Tiger Tanks: VK45.02 to Tiger II, Design, Production & Modifications. Atglen,
PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1997.
—. Kingtiger Heavy Tank, 1942-1945. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993.
—. Panzer Tracts 23: Panzer Production from 1933-1945. Boyds, MD: Panzerwrecks
Publishing, 2002.
—. Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausf. G, H, and J . Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001.
—. Tiger I Heavy Tank, 1942-1945. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993.
Jukes, Geoffrey. Stalingrad to Kursk: Triumph of the Red Army. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword
Books, Ltd, 2011.
Kast, Bernhard. Tiger Logistics. 2020. https://youtu.be/htD5NEGRwKk (accessed September 7,
2022).
Kast, Bernhard, and Christoph Bergs. German Army Regulation on the Medium Tank Company
H.Dv. 470/7 Mittlere Panzerkompanie. London: Bernhard Kast, 2020.
Katukov, Mikhail. At the Spearhead of the Main Blow. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1974.
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin Books, 1989.
247

Kesselring, Albert. Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units: MS #P06B. Archival manuscript, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1952.
Kolyvanov, Georgy G. "Mars: In the Shadow of Uranus." The Independent. Febraru 2005.
https://nvo.ng.ru/history/2005-12-02/5_mars.html (accessed July 16, 2022).
Krivosheev, Grigory, Vladimir Andronikov, and Petr Burikov. Russia and the USSR in the Wars
of the Twentieth Century. Moscow: Veche, 2010.
Laar, Mart. Estonia in World War II. Talinn: Grenader Press, 2005.
Lawrence, Christopher. Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka. Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books,
2015.
—. "Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk." DuPuy Institute. July 9, 2018.
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2018/07/09/panzer-aces-wittmann-and-staudegger-atkursk-part-1/ (accessed July 31, 2022).
—. The Battle of Prokhorovka: The Tank Battle at Kursk, the Largest Clash of Armor in History.
Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2015.
Liddell Hart, B.H. A History of the Second World War. New York: Putnam, 1971.
—. The German Generals Talk. New York: Quill, 1979.
—. The Other Side of the Hill. London: Cassell, 1951.
Lochmann, Franz-Wilhelm, Nordewin von Diest-Korber, Ulrich Koppe, Richard Freiherr von
Rosen, and Alfred Rubbel. The Combat History of Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503: In
Action on the East and West with the Tiger I and II . Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J.
Fedorowicz Publishing, 2000.
Lochmann, Franz-Wilhelm, Richard Freiherr von Rosen, and Alfred Rubbel. The Combat
History of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503 in WWII. Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books,
2000.
Lucas, James. Das Reich: The Military Role of the 2nd SS Division. London: Arms and Armour
Press, 1991.
—. World War II through German Eyes. New York: Sterling Publishing, 1987.
Macksey, Kenneth. Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority.
New York: Greenhill Books, 1996.
MacLean, French L. Waffen-SS Tiger Crews at Kursk: The Men of SS Panzer Regiments 1, 2, &
3 in Operation Citadel, July 5-15, 1943. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military , 2020.

248

Maier, Helmut. Forschung als Waffe: Rüstungsforschung in der Kaiser Wilhelm Gesselschaft
und das Kaiser Wilhelm Institut für Matallforschung 1900-1945 . Göttingen: Wallstein
Verlag, 2007.
Malmassari, Paul. "Les Maxi-Chars au-dela du Char Lourd, 1re partie – 1916-1927: Du char
derupture au char de fortresse." Histoire de Guerre, Blindes & Materiel, 2013: 39-48.
Mann, Ingrid. Weggemoffeld! Alten, Netherlands: Fagus Publishing, 2015.
Marie, Henri. Villers-Bocage: Normandy 1944. Bayeux: Heimdal, 2003.
May, Ernst. Strange Victories. New York: Hill & Wang, 2000.
McNab, Chris. Hitler's Armies: A History of the German War Machine, 1939-45. Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2011.
Mearsheimer, John. Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988.
Megargee, Geoffrey. Inside Hitler's High Command. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
2000.
"Military.com." Battle of Anzio. 1944.
http://www.military.com/Resources/ResourceFileView?file=worldwarii_europe_maps_m
ap49.htm (accessed August 29, 2022).
Milner, Marc. Stopping the Panzers. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014.
Mitcham, Samuel. German Order of Battle Volume Three: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and
Waffen-SS Divisions in WWII. Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2007.
—. German Order of Battle, vol 1: 1st-290th Infantry Divisions in World War II . Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2007.
—. Retreat to the Reich: The German Defeat in France, 1944. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole
Books, 2000.
—. The Rise of the Wehrmacht: The German Armed Forces in World War II. New York: Praeger
International, 2008.
Mitcham, Samuel, and Gene Mueller. Hitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht,
Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2012.
Moore, Daniel. Blitzkrieg to Götterdämmerung: Combined Arms Warfare, Deep Operation, and
the Flaws of German Doctrine, 1860-1945. Charles Town, WV: American Public
University, 2017.

249

Muirhead, Eric V. "The Tiger Gap: Culture, Contradiction, and Clausewitz in German Armored
Warfare in World War II." University of Tennessee. 2019.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/5442/ (accessed November 15, 2021).
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen. "The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in
Germany up to 1940." In Aspects of the Third Recih, by H.W. Koch, 158-159. London:
MacMillan, 1985.
Murray, Williamson, and Allen Millet. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second Waorld War.
London: Belknap Press, 2000.
Museum, United States Holocaust. Gleichschaltung: Coordinating the Nazi State. January 23,
2020. https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/gleichschaltung-coordinatingthe-nazi-state (accessed November 26, 2022).
Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory.
London: Francass, 1997.
Newsome, Bruce O. The Tiger Tank and Allied Intelligence, vol. I: Großtraktor to Tiger 231,
1926-1943. Coronado, CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020.
—. The Tiger Tank and Allied Intelligence, vol. II: The Tunisian Tigers. Coronado, CA: Tank
Archives Press, 2020.
—. The Tiger Tank and Allied Intelligence, vol. III: Tiger 131 From Africa to Europe. Coronado,
CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020.
—. The Tiger Tank and Allied Intelligence, vol. IV: Capabilities and Performance. Coronado,
CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020.
Niehorster, Leo. World War II Armed Forces: Orders of Battle and Organizations. 2010.
http://www.niehorster.org/index.htm (accessed May 5, 2022).
Noble, Alastair. "The Phantom Barrier: Ostwallblau 1944-1945." War in History, 2001: 442-467.
Noble, Charles. "On the Bazooka and the Tiger Tank." 90th Infantry Division Preservation
Group, 2009.
of, American Institute. American Institute for Economic Research. 2022.
https://www.aier.org/cost-of-livingcalculator/?utm_source=Google%20Ads&utm_medium=Google%20CPC&utm_campaig
n=COLA&gclid=Cj0KCQjwkOqZBhDNARIsAACsbfIqveHgGOYEp8D8wnaoh6r1l2G
wxB-0Pa3b7oCTgbG1YXqhx_L-kowaAgWqEALw_wcB (accessed October 3, 2022).
Office, War. "Royal Armored Corps Training, vol III - Armament Pamphlet No. 7, SP 17-pr
M10." War Office, 1952: 100-124.
OKH. "Schiessverfahren bei Pz. Bekämpfung." National Archives Microfilm Publication, 1943.

250

OKH. Schiessverfahren bei Pz. Bekämpfung. Ordnance report, College Park, MD: National
Archives Microfilm Publication, 1943.
Oliver, Dennis. Death Ride of the Panzers: German Armor and the Retreat in the West 19441945. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2018.
—. Tiger I and Tiger II Tanks: German Army and Waffen-SS, The Last Battles in the East 1945.
Barnsley, UK : Pen & Sword Books, 2020.
—. Tiger I and Tiger II Tanks: The German Army and the Waffen-SS, The Last Battles in the
West 1945. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Press, 2019.
—. Tiger I: Germany Army Heavy Tank, Eastern Front Summer 1943. Barnsley, UK: Pen &
Sword Books, 2019.
Ost, Fremde Heere. Kraftegegenubersellerung Stand: 1.4.43; Anglage 4b zu Abt. Fr. H. Ost (I)
no. 80/43g. German Manpower on the Eastern Front, Alexandria, VA: National Archives
Microfilm Series T078, roll 552, 1943.
—. "Panzerverluste Ost, 5 Juli 1943 - 31 August 1943." Der Panzeroffizier beim Chef des
Generalstabes des Heeres. Berlin, Germany: Bundesarchiv, RH 2/1933: Panzerverluste
Ost, BL.99, October 1943.
"Ostrogozhsko-Rossosh’ Offensive Operations of Voronezh Front Forces." SVIMVOV, 1953.
Overy, Richard. "Hitler and Air Strategy." Journal of Contemporary History, 1980: 405-421.
—. Why the Allies Won. New York: Norton Press, 1995.
Parker, Danny. "German Tiger tanks were at the Bulge, but not in the numbers usually cited for
them." World War II, 1990: 8.
Patton, George S. "Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library." Report on
Operation Conducted by II Corps United States Army Tunisia. April 10, 1943.
https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4382/rec/1 (accessed
August 28, 2020).
Pinter, Evan. "Franz Staudegger: German Tiger Ace in the Battle of Kursk." War Hitory Online.
Apr 22, 2017. https://www.warhistoryonline.com/guest-bloggers/franz-staudeggergerman-tiger-ace-battle-kursk.html?chrome=1 (accessed July 31, 2022).
"Piper Cub Tank Buster." Popular Science, 1945: 84-85.
Pöhlmann, Markus. Der Panzer und die Mechanisierung des Kreiges: Eine Deutsche Geschichte
1890 bis 1945. Paderborn, Deutschland: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016.
Porter, David. 7th Armoured Division at Villers-Bocage, 13 June 1944. London: Amber Books,
Ltd, 2012.
—. I SS Panzer Corps at Villers-Bocage, 13 June 1944. London: Amber Books, 2012.
251

Raus, Erhard. Panzers on the Eastern Front: General Erhard Raus and his Panzer Divisions in
Russia 1941-1945. Mechanicsburg., PA: Military Book Club, 2022.
Restayn, Jean. Tiger I on the Eastern Front. Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2007.
—. Tiger I on the Western Front. Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2001.
Reynold, Michael. Sons of the Reich: The History of the II SS Panzer Corps in Normandy,
Arnhem, and on the Eastern Front. Haverton, UK: Casemate Publishing, 2002.
Reynolds, Michael. Steel Inferno: 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. New York: Da Capo Press,
1997.
Ripley, Tim. The Waffen-SS at War: Hitler's Praetorians 1925-1945. St.Paul, MN: Zenith Press,
2004.
Ritter, Dale Richard. Charging Knights on the Eastern Front: The Combat History of schwere
Panzer-Abteilung 505. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedoroxicz Publishing, Inc., 2019.
—. The Tiger Project, book I: Alfred Rubbel, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503. Atglen, PA:
Schiffer Military History, 2004.
—. The Tiger Project, book II: Horst Krönke, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505. Atglen, PA:
Schiffer Military History, 2004.
Rokossovsky, Konstantin. A Soldier's Duty. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1997.
Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, 1953.
Rotmistrov, Pavel. "Tanks Against Tanks." In Main Front: Soviet Leaders Look Back in World
War II, by John Erickson, 106-109. London: Brassey's Ltd., 1987.
Rudel, Hans-Ulrich. Mein Leneb in Kreig und Freiden. Rosenheim, Germany: Deutsche
Verlagsgessellschaft, 1994.
Ruffner, Kevin Conley. Luftwaffe Field Divisions, 1941-45. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1990.
Sadarananda, Dana. Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don. New
York : Praeger Publishers, 1990.
Samsonov, Peter. "Sherman vs. Toger." Tank Archives. March 4, 2013.
http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/03/sherman-vs-tiger.html (accessed October 3, 2022).
Schafer, Robin. War History Online. November 2012.
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/articles/tiger-panzer-vi-combat-and-operationalevaluation-1-252-hits-taken-in-combat-ww2-by-rob-schafer.html, accessed 12 December
2021. (accessed December 12, 2021).
Schiebert, H. Die Tiger Familie. Friedberg, West Germany: Waffen-Arsenal, 1979.
Schneider, Helmut, ed. Tiger Battalion 507. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Books, 2020.
252

Schneider, Wolfgang. Das Reich Tigers. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2006.
—. Tigers in Combat I. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004.
—. Tigers in Combat II. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005.
—. Tigers in Combat III. Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, Ltd., 2016.
—. Totenkopf Tigers. Winnipeg, Manitoba: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2011.
School of Tank Technology, Military College of Science. Pz Kw VI (Tiger): The Official
Wartime Reports. Coronado, CA: Tank Archives Press, 2020.
Seale, Alaric. "A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals, and the
Debate on West German Rearmament." War in History, 1998: 327-357.
Shera, Neal. "Amazing Feats of the Tiger Tank." Firearms News, August 2019.
Shirer, William. Rise and Fall of the Third Recih. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960.
Showalter, Dennis. Hitler's Panzers: The Lightning Attacks that Revolutionized Warfare. New
York: Berkley Caliber, 2009.
Silverstein, Ken. "Ford and the Führer." The Nation, 2000.
Smelser, Ronald, and Edward Davies. The Myth of the Eastern Front. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
Snowden, Frank. The Conquest of Malaria: Italy, 1900-1962. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2006.
Sokolov, B.V. Stalin: Power and Blood. Moscow: AST-Press, 2004.
Solyankin, A.G., M.V. Pavlov, I.V. Pavlov, I.G. Zheltov, and Anatoly Sorokin, trans. "SelfPropelled Gun ISU-152." Russian Federation Publishing Cneter, 2005: 48.
Speer, Albert. "Führer Conference Notes." Records of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and
War Production, National Archives Microfil Publication T73, serial 182, roll 192, item
RmfRuk 2096. Captured German Record Collection, National Archives College Park
Maryland, June 23, 1942.
Speer, Albert. Führer Conference Notes 5-6 March 1942. Conference Notes, College Park, MD:
Records of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production, National Archives
Microfilm Publication T73, serial 192, roll 192, item RmfRuk 2096, Captured German
Records Collection, National Archives College Park Maryland , 1942.
—. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970.
Speer, Albert. Speech Compariing Industrial Production. Speech, College Park, MD: Captured
German Records Collection, National Archives, 1944.

253

Speidel, Hans. Normandy 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign. Chucago: Regnery,
1950.
Spielberger, Walter J, and Hillary Doyle. Tigers I and II and their Variants. Atglen, P.A.:
Schifffer Publishing, 2007.
Staff, German General. "Map of the German General Staff of the Environs of Rostov-on-Don in
1941." clubklad.ru. 1941. http://clubklad.ru/maps/182/#map (accessed June 22, 2022).
Stahel, David. The Battle for Moscow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Stockert, Peter. Der Eichenlaubträger 1939-1945, Band IV . Bad Friedrichshall, Germany:
Friedrichshaller Rundblick, 1998.
Stolfi, R.H.S. German Panzers in the Offensive: Russian Front, North Africa, 1941-1942.
Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2003.
Swain, Richard. "Reviewed Work: Liddell Hart and the Weight of History." Albion: A Quarterly
Journal Concerned with British Studies, 1991: 801-804.
Taylor, Dan. Battle of Villers-Bocage: Through the Lens of the German War Photographer. Old
Harlow, UK: Battle of Britain International, 1999.
Tessin, Georg. Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten
Weltkreig, 1933-1945. Onasbruck: Biblio Verlag, 1973.
"The Voronezh-Kasternoe Offensive Operations of Forces of the Voronezh and left wing of the
Briansk Fronts." SVIMVOV, 1954: 1-121.
Thomas, David. "Foreign Armies East and German Military Intelligence in Russia 1941-1945."
The Journal of Contemporary History, April 1987: 261-301.
Thyssen, Mike. "A Desperate Struggle to Save a Condemned Army: A Critical Review of the
Stalingrad Airlift." Air Command and Staff College. March 1, 1997.
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA397944.pdf (accessed June 9, 2022).
Toland, John. Adolf Hitler Volume II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1976.
Töppel, Roman. Kursk, 1943: The Second Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War.
Warwick, UK: Helion & Company, 2018.
—. "The War, One Great Adventure: The Writer and 'Historian' Franz Kurowski."
Academia.edu. 2018.
https://www.academia.edu/37429738/The_War_One_Great_Adventure_The_Writer_and
_Historian_Franz_Kurowski_2018_ accessed January 17, 2022 (accessed January 17,
2022).
Tout, Ken. Tanks, Adavnce! New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1989.

254

Tucker-Jones, Anthony. Stalin's Armour, 1941-1945: Soviet Tanks at War. Barnsley, UK: Pen &
Sword Military, 2021.
—. Stalin's Revenge: Operation Bagration & the Annihilation of Army Group Center. Barnsley,
UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2009.
Turner, Henry Ashby. Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933. New York: Castle Books,
2003.
Utenkov, F.N. On the Northwestern Front. Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1969.
Vasilevsky, Aleksandr. The Matter of my Whole Life. Moscow: Politizdat, 1978.
Vitruk, A. "Bronia protiv broni." VIZh, June 1983: 72-79.
von Bock, Field Marshall Fedor. Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock: The War Diary, 19391945. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1996.
von Eimannsberger, Ludwig Ritter. Der Kampfwagenkrieg. Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag,
1934.
von Luck, Hans. Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. New York:
Random House, 1989.
von Manstein, Field Marshal Erich. Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant
General. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982.
von Mellenthin, Major General F.W. Panzer Battles. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1955.
von Rosen, Richard Freiherr. Panzer Ace: The Memoirs of an Iron Cross Panzer Commander
from Barbarossa to Normandy. Yorkshire, UK: Greenhill Books, 2018.
Walden, Gregory. Tigers in the Ardennes: The 501st Heavy Tank Battalion in the Battle of the
Bulge. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2014.
Walker, David. "OSS and Operation Torch." Journal of Contemporary History, 1987: 667-679.
War Department, U.S. TM 30-506 German Military Dictionary. Washington, D.C.: War
Department, 1944.
Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1939-1945. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1962.
Wehrmacht, Oberkommando des. "Merkblatt 47a/30." Panzerworld. 1943.
https://panzerworld.com/tiger-abteilung-employment (accessed June 19, 2022).
Westphal, Siegfried. The German Army in the West. London: Cassell, 1951.
Wetterman, Ralph. "Kursk: The Greatest Tank Battle in History Might have Ended Differently
had it not been for the Action in the Air." Smithsonian Magazine, 2015.

255

Wheeler-Barnett, John. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945.
London: MacMillan, 1967.
Whiting, Charles. '44: In Combat from Normandy to the Ardennes. New York: Military Heritage
Press, 1984.
—. Ardennes: The Secret War. New York: Stein and Day, 1984.
Whittam, John. Fascist Italy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
Wilbeck, Christopher. Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World
War II. Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2004.
Williamson, Gordon. The SS: Hitler's Instrument of Power. New York: Amber Books, 2006.
Wilson, Dale. Treat em Rough! The Birth of American Armor, 1917-1920. Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 1990.
Winchester, Charles. Advancing Backwards: The Demodernization of the German Army in
World War II. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002.
Wood, Ian Michael. Tigers of the Death's Head: SS-Totenkopf Division's Tiger Company.
Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2013.
Woolner, Frank. Spearhead in the West, 1941-1945: The Third Armored Division. Uttar Predesh,
India: Lucknow Publishing, 2016.
Yeide, Harry. The Tank Killers: A History of America's World War II Tank Destroyer Force.
Drexel Hill: Casemate Publishing, 2007.
Yeryomenko, Andrey. Stalingrad. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1961.
Zaloga, Steven. Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II. Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2015.
—. Armored Thunderbolt. Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 2008.
—. Bagration 1944: The Destruction of Army Group Center. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1996.
—. Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008.
Zaloga, Steven. "Review of Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Battalions in World
War II." The Journal of Military History, 2004: 1283-1284.
—. Smashing Hitler's Panzers: The Defeat of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division in the Battle of
the Bulge. Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books, 2019.
—. Tanks in the Battle of the Bulge. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2020.
—. The T-34/76 Medium Tank, 1941-1945. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1994.

256

Zarzecki, Thomas W. Arms Diffusion: The Spread of Military Innovations in the International
System. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Zeitzler, Kurt. "Battle of Stalingrad." In The Fatal Decisions: Six Decisive Battles of the Second
World War from the Viewpoint of the Vanquished, by William Richardson, & Seymour
Freidlin, 151-168. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2012.
Zetterling, Niklas, and Anders Frankson. Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis. London: Frank
Cass, 2000.
Zheltov, Igor. "Iosif Stalin." Tankomaster Special Issue, 2002: 33.
Zhukov, Georgy. Marshal of Victory, vol II. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 1974.
—. Recollections and Reflections. Moscow: Novosti, 1992.
Zuber, Terence. The Moltke Myth: Prussian War Planning, 1857-1871. Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 2008.

257

